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ABSTRACT 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to show that corporate governance 
affects the value relevance of earnings in the presence of earnings management. The role 
of corporate governance is to reduce the divergence of interests between shareholders and 
managers. The role of corporate governance is more useful when managers have an 
incentive to deviate from shareholders’ interests. One example of management’s 
deviation from shareholders’ interests is the management of earnings through the use of 
accounting accruals. Corporate governance is likely to reduce the incidence of earnings 
management. Corporate governance is also likely to improve investors’ perception of the 
reliability of a firm’s performance, as measured by the earnings, in situations of earnings 
management. That is, corporate governance will be value relevant when earnings 
management exists. The results of this research support these propositions. 
In this thesis, the value relevance of earnings is measured using the earnings 
response coefficient. Earnings management is measured using the magnitude of abnormal 
accruals as estimated by the modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) model. A review of the 
corporate governance literature revealed nine attributes that were expected to impact on 
shareholders’ perception of earnings reliability due to their role in enhancing the integrity 
of the financial reporting process. The nine attributes represent three categories of 
corporate governance: 1) organisational monitoring; 2) incentive alignment; and 3) 
governance structure.  
Organisational monitoring includes ownership concentration, debt reliance, board 
independence, and the independence and competence of the audit committee. Incentive 
alignment includes managerial ownership and independent directors’ ownership. 
Governance structure includes CEO dominance and board size. These attributes are used 
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in this study to assess the impact of corporate governance on earnings management and 
the information content of earnings. 
Information dynamics models, such as the Ohlson (1995) model provide a testable 
pricing equation that also identifies the role non-accounting information (i.e. corporate 
governance) plays in determining firm value. Based on Ohlson’s (1995) model, the 
change in value model, as developed by Easton and Harris (1991), is modified to include 
the proposed interaction between corporate governance and earnings management. 
Pooled GLS regression is employed as the primary technique to estimate the 
coefficients. Four hypotheses are used to test the connections among corporate 
governance, abnormal accruals, and the earnings response coefficients. The returns-
earnings model is used to test the interaction coefficients after incorporating earnings 
management (Hypothesis Two), corporate governance (Hypothesis Three), or both 
(Hypothesis Four). These coefficients are then examined using the Wald test to find out 
whether the earnings response coefficients after incorporating indictors of earnings 
reliability are significantly different from the earnings response coefficients irrespective 
of any propositions.  
The sample was drawn from the top ASX 500 listed companies for the years 1997 
to 2000. The final sample contained 778 firm-year observations. Certain industries 
(financial, regulated, and mining) were excluded from the sample. One of the reasons the 
period 1997-2000 was chosen is due to the expected impact of the Asian currency crisis 
on increasing firms’ incentive to manage earnings. 
The results reveal that: 1) board size and audit committee independence are 
negatively associated with the magnitude of abnormal accruals; 2) incorporating the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals to the returns-earnings model does not significantly alter 
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the earnings response coefficient; 3) the earnings response coefficients are significantly 
different after incorporating CEO dominance and independent directors’ ownership; and 
4) conditioning on the magnitude of abnormal accruals improves the explanatory power 
of the interaction between corporate governance and earnings over share returns. 
Although not all corporate governance attributes suggested in the literature impact 
on investors’ perception of a firm’s performance, the primary proposition that corporate 
governance affects this perception when earnings are managed is supported. The primary 
contribution of the study is finding evidence supporting the moderating effect of earnings 
management on the relationship between corporate governance and the value relevance of 
earnings. These results validate Hutchinson and Gul’s (2004) claim that the role of 
corporate governance attributes in firm performance should be evaluated in concurrence 
with a firm’s organisational environment. Future research should control for corporate 
governance and earnings management, as indicators of earnings reliability, when using 
returns-earnings regressions to address a research question.  
 vii
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 EARNINGS RELEVANCE AND RELIABILITY 
The common factor in all value relevance studies is that an accounting number is 
deemed value relevant if it has a significant association with equity market value (Barth 
et al., 2001a). The value relevance literature suggests that shareholders use accounting 
earnings to estimate future returns (e.g. Beaver, 1998; Choi et al., 1997; Kallunki and 
Martikainen, 1997; Barth et al., 1996; Barth, 1994, 1991; Lev, 1989). 1  
If reported earnings are considered by investors to be value relevant and useful in 
estimating future returns, share returns and earnings should be related. Since Ball and 
Brown (1968), a long line of research empirically demonstrates that accounting earnings 
contained in financial reports are related to share returns (Liu and Thomas, 2000; Lipe et 
al., 1998; Das and Lev, 1994; Wild, 1992; Easton and Harris, 1991; Collins and Kothari 
1989; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989; Kormendi and Lipe, 1987)2. 
Returns-earnings research finds that the explanatory power of earnings is limited 
and differs across firms. The extent of earnings’ explanatory power is limited due to three 
reasons: methodological shortcoming, investors’ irrationality, and the low quality of 
                                                 
1 Value relevance studies use equity market value as the valuation benchmark to assess how well particular 
accounting amounts reflect information used by investors (Barth et al., 2001). 
2 This list is indicative and not intended to be exhaustive. 
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reported earnings (e.g. Ramakrishnan and Thomas, 1998; Collins et al., 1994; Ryan and 
Zarowin, 1993; Lev, 1989).  
The general problem of the returns and earnings relationship is of continuing 
concern for the accounting researchers. While Lev (1989) suggested that methodological 
misspecifications or the existence of investors’ irrationality may contribute to observed 
weak returns-earnings association, several studies provide empirical evidence to support 
that the low information content of reported earnings is responsible for the weak 
association (e.g. Kallunki and Martikainen, 1997; Easton et al., 1992). Their findings 
suggest that the low information content of earnings is a significant contributor to the 
weak observed returns-earnings relationship and is an outcome of low earnings reliability 
due to management manipulation.  
Earnings reliability becomes questionable when managers have an incentive to 
manipulate reported earnings opportunistically (e.g. Rosenfield, 2000; Dechow and 
Skinner, 2000; Brown, 1999; Healy and Wahlen, 1999).3 Such manipulations alter 
shareholders’ perception of the reliability of reported earnings due to the increase in the 
level of non-permanent components included in total earnings (e.g. Brown, 1999; Healy, 
1985).4 Prior studies empirically show that non-permanent earnings reduce the 
information content of accounting earnings (e.g. Anthony and Petroni, 1997; Wild, 1996; 
Collins and Salatka, 1993; Imhoff and Lobo, 1992). Consequently, it is crucial to evaluate 
returns-earnings relationship through assessing earnings reliability collectively with its 
relevance. 
                                                 
3 The Conceptual Framework identifies relevance and reliability as the key characteristics of accounting 
information used in market valuation decisions. If accounting earnings have been empirically demonstrated 
to be value relevant, it is then rational to attribute the weak explanatory power of accounting earnings for 
share returns to the low reliability of earnings rather than relevance. 
4 Permanent earnings are defined as the portion of earnings that alter investors’ perception about future 
earnings and cash flows, and thus affect share prices. Non-permanent earnings are defined as the portion of 
earnings with no implications on expected future earnings. 
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1.2 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
‘Earnings management’ is a form of earnings manipulation that is likely to reduce 
the reliability of earnings.5’6 Firms that engage less in earnings management are likely to 
offer more permanent accounting earnings (e.g. Kothari, 2001; Lev, 1989; Wang et al., 
1994; Ali and Hwang, 1995). 
Cheng et al. (1996) demonstrate the existence of this link between the permanence 
of earnings and the information content of earnings. They found that the less permanent 
accounting earnings are, the less informative they are in relation to future earnings and 
cash flows (e.g. Cheng et al., 1996, 1997; Collins and Kothari, 1989; Easton and 
Zamijewski, 1989; Kormendi and Lipe, 1987).  
Consequently, earnings management should be negatively associated with the 
information content of earnings. The association is empirically established in the 
literature (e.g. Wang et al., 1994; Ali and Hwang, 1995; Cheng et al., 1997). When 
mangers manage earnings for opportunistic purposes, accounting earnings become a less 
                                                 
5 Schipper (1989) defines earnings management as: “a purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain”. Healy and Wahlen (1999) state: 
“earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting and in structuring 
transaction to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers”. 
6 Managers have some degree of flexibility and discretion in reporting their financial performance and they 
may use it either opportunistically to manage earnings (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994) or they may use it 
to communicate private value-relevant information about the firm’s future performance (Jones, 1991; Healy 
and Palepu, 1993). However, much of the extant literature finds that earnings management is carried out 
with the intention of either misleading financial statement users or of biasing contractual outcomes that 
depend on accounting earnings. Recent studies have provided evidence of income-increasing opportunistic 
earnings management related to initial public offerings (Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998a; Teoh, Wong and 
Rao, 1998), seasoned public offerings (Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998b), stock financed acquisitions 
(Erickson and Wang, 1998), meeting analyst earnings expectations (Payne and Robb, 2000; Burgstahler 
and Eames, 1998), meeting management forecasts (Kasznik, 1999), and avoiding earnings decreases and 
losses (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Examples of settings leading to income-decreasing earnings 
management include management buyouts (DeAngelo, 1988; Perry and Williams, 1994), executive 
compensation (Healy, 1985; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995), and appeals for import relief (Jones, 
1991). This body of research has found convincing evidence of opportunistic earnings management in 
settings where there exist strong incentives to manage earnings. 
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reliable measure of a firm’s financial performance. The less reliable earnings are, the less 
informative and useful they become. Accordingly, it is justifiable to use earnings 
management as an indicator of the reliability of earnings.  
Accounting earnings are more reliable and informative when managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour is controlled using monitoring systems (e.g. Wild, 1996; Dechow 
et al., 1996). Klein (2002b) and Peasnell et al. (2000a) show that monitoring attributable 
to corporate governance reduces management’s capacity to manage earnings.7  
Monitoring attributable to corporate governance has the capacity to improve the 
reliability of accounting earnings; and therefore, increases the informativenss of 
accounting earnings. Corporate governance also helps investors by aligning the interest of 
managers with the interests of shareholders and enhancing the reliability of financial 
information and the integrity of the financial reporting process (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986).8 The results of Gul and Tsui (2001) support the effectiveness of corporate 
governance as a monitoring system.  
Given that earnings management are negatively associated with corporate 
governance and that corporate governance is positively associated with the integrity of 
the financial reporting process, it is then justifiable to also use corporate governance as an 
indicator of the reliability of accounting earnings.  
                                                 
7 Corporate governance is a system used to achieve firm objectives and monitor performance (OECD, 
1999). Good corporate governance should align the objectives of management with the objectives of 
shareholders (Cadbury report, 1992; OECD, 1999) and should facilitate effective monitoring, thereby 
encouraging managers to use resources more efficiently (OECD, 1999).  
 
8 Corporate governance’s primary objective is not to directly improve corporate performance, but to resolve 
agency problems by aligning management’s interests with the interests of shareholders (Maher and 
Andersson, 2000). A large segment of the corporate governance literature focuses on directly linking 
corporate governance to corporate performance. Empirical results from the literature are mixed and 
indecisive (Lawrence and Stapledon, 1999). 
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Most returns-earnings studies fail to account for earnings reliability, which is a key 
characteristic for earnings informativeness. If corporate governance and/or earnings 
management improve the explanatory power of accounting earnings, then the results 
should support the proposition that investors use other value relevant information (i.e. 
corporate governance and earnings management) to assess the reliability of accounting 
earnings. 
While there is little guidance on how corporate governance impacts on the 
information content of accounting earnings, extant research offers no theoretical 
comprehensive explanation for the role earnings management tends to play in the 
corporate governance-earnings informativeness relationship. As a result, the primary 
research question is: 
“Does corporate governance influence the information content of 
accounting earnings in the presence of earnings management?” 
 
1.3 ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM 
The study’s primary objective is to investigate the association between corporate 
governance and earnings informativeness in the presence of earnings management. In this 
thesis, the information content of earnings (value relevance of earnings) is measured 
using the earnings response coefficient. The earnings response coefficient is a measure of 
the extent to which new earnings information is capitalised in share prices (Cho and Jung, 
1991). Earnings management is measured using the magnitude of abnormal accruals as 
estimated by the modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) model.   
A review of the corporate governance literature revealed nine attributes that were 
expected to impact on shareholders’ perception of earnings reliability due to their role in 
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enhancing the integrity of the financial reporting process. The nine attributes represent 
three categories of corporate governance: 1) organisational monitoring; 2) incentive 
alignment; and 3) governance structure.  
Organisational monitoring includes ownership concentration, debt reliance, board 
independence, and the independence and competence of the audit committee. Incentive 
alignment includes managerial ownership and independent directors’ ownership. 
Governance structure includes CEO dominance and board size. These attributes are used 
in this study to assess the impact of corporate governance on earnings management and 
the information content of earnings. 
Based on Ohlson’s (1995) model, the change in value model, as developed by 
Easton and Harris (1991), is modified to include the proposed interaction between 
corporate governance and earnings management. Pooled GLS regression is employed as 
the primary technique to estimate the coefficients. The returns-earnings model is then 
tested after incorporating earnings management, corporate governance, or both. These 
coefficients are then examined using the Wald test to find out whether the earnings 
response coefficients after incorporating indictors of earnings reliability are significantly 
different from the earnings response coefficients irrespective of any propositions. A 
direct regression model is used to examine the connections between corporate governance 
and earnings management. 
The results reveal the following. First, board size and audit committee 
independence are negatively associated with the empirical indicator of earnings 
management at significant levels. Second, the empirical indicator of CEO dominance 
significantly decreases the incremental information content of earnings and improves the 
overall explanatory power of the returns-earnings model. Third, conditioning on the 
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empirical indicator of earnings management significantly improves the effect of corporate 
governance on earnings response coefficients and the overall explanatory power of 
earnings. Additional tests show that board size, managerial ownership and debt reliance 
are negatively associated with share returns at significant levels (see Appendix A). 
 
1.4 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
The major contribution is investigating, within the Australian context, the impact of 
corporate governance attributes on the returns-earnings relationship when managers’ have 
an incentive to manage earnings. The results will identify circumstances where the 
informational contributions of accounting earnings differ. This, in turn, provides a greater 
understanding of the contextual nature of the returns-earnings relationship. In doing so, 
the study will contribute to five groups: investors, corporations, regulators, educators, and 
researchers.  
1.4.1 Investors 
The results should confirm investors’ perception about the role corporate 
governance plays in enhancing the reliability of the financial reporting process and the 
information content of accounting earnings. Measuring corporate governance allows 
investors to be mindful of management’s capacity to alter accounting earnings for 
opportunistic purposes, which helps investors in evaluating the informativenss and 
reliability of accounting earnings. The results from this study will unlock a new door for 
investors to improve their decision-making process.  
1.4.2 Corporations 
Corporate governance is related to issues concerning the structure of the 
corporation, such as share holdings, boards, and board committees. Corporations need to 
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satisfy shareholders and attract potential investors by adopting good corporate 
governance practices. The results should highlight the importance of good corporate 
governance practices by measuring the impact of corporate governance practices on 
market’s response to accounting earnings. This enables corporations to evaluate the 
efficiency of corporate governance in enhancing the reliability and the information 
content of the end product, being the financial reports. Once shareholders are able to 
obtain reliable information about corporate performance, their response to financial 
performance measures becomes greater. 
1.4.3 Regulators 
Any move to harmonise corporate governance practices around the globe requires 
evidence that corporate governance systems are effective. This study provides evidence 
of the role corporate governance plays in enhancing the reliability of value relevant 
information (i.e. accounting earnings).  
New corporate governance regulations and revisions of existing corporate 
governance rules would be based on evidence from empirical studies rather than 
politically motivated debates. Empirically evidence supporting the importance of 
corporate governance’s role would: 
1. prove that the benefits of imposing governance regulations on firms 
outweigh the costs; and  
2. provide regulators with sufficient justification to impose additional 
corporate governance requirements.  
1.4.4 Educators 
Educators of corporate governance will have a clearer understanding of the role 
corporate governance plays in capital markets. The model will also assist classroom 
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discussions on the role of corporate governance and the analysis of case studies. For 
instance, educators could encourage the classroom to evaluate corporate governance 
practices for different firms and match their results with each firm’s magnitude of 
abnormal accruals and earnings response coefficient, as part of their empirical research 
project.  
1.4.5 Researchers 
Results from the study contribute to the literature in the following ways: 
1. As far as it is known, no prior study has, theoretically and empirically, 
examined the full interaction among corporate governance, earnings 
management, and the earnings response coefficient. The study contributes 
to and merges different distinct streams of research.  
2. Governance attributes adopted by recent regulatory developments (e.g. Sarbanes-
Oxley act of 2002) are empirically tested in the proposed model (i.e. director 
independence, financial expertise). 
3. The results should clarify the reason behind the inconclusive results 
regarding the governance-performance relationship.  
4. The results support the view from the literature that abnormal accruals are better 
measures of earnings management than other approaches, such as the frequency 
distribution approach. 
5. The major contribution to the earnings response coefficient research is to show 
that corporate governance and earnings management (as indicators of earnings 
reliability) are important determinants of earnings response coefficient. 
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6. The results provide support for external validity for prior studies by testing 
different economic setting, Australia, and by assessing the robustness of 
proposed theories. 
 
1.5 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter Two develops a model, which relates corporate governance attributes and 
earnings management to the information content of accounting earnings. The constructs 
in the model are identified and justified by analysing the existing literature. Finally, the 
chapter discusses propositions and limitations.  
Chapter Three describes the research method and techniques used to test the 
propositions stated in Chapter Two. Chapter Three begins with an overview of the 
models and restatements of the propositions as hypotheses to be empirically tested. A 
description of the sample, study period, and data collection is followed by the 
operationalisation of the theoretical constructs. Finally, the chapter presents an 
explanation of the analysis procedures 
Chapter Four starts with descriptive statistics and correlation analysis. This is 
followed by the presentation of the results of the tested models and the inferences drawn 
from the tests of the hypotheses. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
robustness checks for the models.  
Chapter Five summarises the finding of the study including limitation of the results. 
Chapter Five also investigates the impact of the results on future research. The conclusion 
restates the study’s contribution to knowledge. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
THEORY DEVELOPMENT  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter One identified the need for indicators of the reliability of accounting 
earnings. It also identified earnings management and corporate governance as possible 
indicators of earnings reliability. Chapter Two develops the theoretical link among 
corporate governance, earnings management, and the information content of accounting 
earnings. A set of propositions are structured to test the model, by drawing on the 
accounting and corporate law literature. The model is based on the view that shareholders 
use earnings management and corporate governance as guiding cues in their assessment 
of the reliability of earnings. 
The chapter proceeds by proposing a general model in section 2.2. The model 
identifies nine attributes within three major aspects of corporate governance as likely to 
influence the reliability of accounting earnings. Next, the chapter discusses the literature 
on the information content of accounting earnings and earnings management in sections 
2.3 and 2.4. Section 2.5 discusses the relevant literature for corporate governance 
attributes. The limitations are discussed in section 2.6. Section 2.7 provides a summary of 
the chapter and the propositions.  
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2.2 MODEL OVERVIEW 
Corporate governance and earnings management can be used as proxies for 
earnings reliability in the returns-earnings model. In particular, the model’s focus is on 
measuring the improvement in the overall explanatory power of earnings by introducing 
corporate governance and earnings management, as well as examining the connections 
among corporate governance, earnings management, and the value-relevance of earnings.  
Accounting earnings are deemed value relevant due to the association between 
share returns and accounting earnings (e.g. Easton and Harris, 1991; Kormendi and Lipe, 
1987). The association is based on shareholders’ reaction to accounting earnings, which 
is dependent on shareholders’ perception of earnings usefulness and reliability.  
Empirical results show earnings to be modestly informative in explaining 
movements in share prices (e.g. Ramakrishnan and Thomas, 1998; Collins et al., 1994; 
Ryan and Zarowin, 1993; Lev, 1989). Equation 1 presents the returns-earnings (Easton 
and Harris, 1991) model.9 
Equation 1: Returns and Earnings association based on the earnings valuation model. 
Rj = β0 + β1 Ej + β2 ∆Ej + υj 
Rj is the change in the price per share of firm j scaled by beginning price. 
Ej is accounting earnings per share of firm j. 
∆Ej is the change in accounting earnings per share of firm j. 
 
A valuable explanation of the weak returns-earnings association is that accounting 
earnings lack information relating to future earnings and cash flows (e.g. Kallunki and 
Martikainen, 1997; Easton et al., 1992; Lev, 1989). The incidence of earnings 
manipulations by managers prevents accounting earnings from being a reliable measure 
                                                 
9 As noted in Easton and Harris (1991), Ohlson (1989), and Ali and Zarowin (1992), earnings level and 
earnings changes have different valuation implications depending on the presence of non-permanent 
earnings. When earnings consist of a mixture of permanent and non-permanent earnings components, 
unexpected earnings can be better estimated by a weighted average of earnings level and earnings change. 
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of future earnings and cash flows (e.g. Lev, 1989; Wang et al., 1994; Ali and Hwang, 
1995). The less reliable are accounting earnings, the less informative they are in relation 
to future earnings and cash flows (Cheng et al., 1996, 1997).  
If reliable earnings are useful to shareholders, then reliable earnings are more value 
relevant than less reliable earnings. Thus, indicators of earnings reliability (i.e. corporate 
governance and earnings management) should be value relevant due to their usefulness to 
shareholders. 
It follows that the information content of accounting earnings is reduced by 
indicators of less reliable earnings, such as managed earnings (e.g. Wang et al., 1994; Ali 
and Hwang, 1995; Cheng et al., 1997). The link between corporate governance and the 
information content of accounting earnings is based on the view that corporate 
governance influences shareholders’ perception earnings reliability through its influence 
over management’s activities and opportunistic behaviour. A segment of earnings studies 
empirically supported this view on the link between corporate governance and earnings 
management (see Table 2-1). 10 
                                                 
10 While Healy and Wahlen (1999) suggest that there is overwhelming evidence to support the view that 
earnings management are made for opportunistic purposes, there is not much support for the view that 
earnings are managed for efficiency reasons. Hence, earnings management are expected to be opportunistic. 
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Table 2-1: Relevant prior studies 
Governance 
Attributes 
Corporate 
Governance and the 
information content 
of earnings 
Corporate 
Governance and 
Earnings 
Management 
Corporate 
Governance and 
Performance 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Bryan et al., 2004. Dempsey et al., 1993. Firth, et al., 2002; Demsetz 
and Villalonga, 2001; Füerst 
and Kang, 2000; Lehmann and 
Weigand, 2000; Pedersen and 
Thomsen, 1999; Burkart et al., 
1997; Bebchuk, 1994; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986; Stiglitz, 
1985.  
Managerial 
Ownership 
Bryan et al., 2004; Gabrielsen 
et al., 2002; Gul et al., 2002; 
Warfield et al., 1995.  
Bowen et al., 2004; Peasnell et 
al., 1998; Dechow et al., 1996; 
Warfield et al., 1995. 
Balatbat et al., 2004; Bowen et 
al., 2004; Faccio and Lasfer, 
1999; Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996. 
Independent 
Directors’ Ownership 
 Chtourou et al., 2001. Fiegener et al., 1996; Oswald 
and Jahera, 1991; Kim et al., 
1988; Kesner, 1987; Lloyd et 
al., 1986.  
Debt Reliance Gul et al., 2000; Dhaliwal et 
al., 1991; Watts and 
Zimmerman 1990 and 1986. 
Gul et al., 2000; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 
1994; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1990 and 1986. 
Firth, et al., 2002; Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1996; Grossman 
and Hart, 1982. 
CEO dominance Bryan et al., 2004; Anderson et 
al., 2003. 
Chtourou et al., 2001; Dechow 
et al., 1996. 
Coles et al., 2001; Fosberg and 
Nelson, 1999; Dalton et al, 
1998; Brickley et al, 1997; 
Baliga et al, 1996; Boyd, 1995; 
Daily and Dalton, 1993; 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 
Rechner and Dalton, 1991.  
Board Size Vafeas, 2000. Ching et al., 2002; Chtourou et 
al., 2001; Alonso et al., 2000; 
Dechow et al., 1996. 
Bradbury et al., 2004; Cheng, 
2004; Faleye, 2003; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003; Bhagat and 
Black, 1999; Eisenberg et al., 
1998; Brown and Maloney, 
1998; Yermack, 1996. 
Board Independence Anderson et al., 2003; Vafeas, 
2000. 
Xie et al., 2003; Klein, 2002b; 
Chtourou et al., 2001; Alonso 
et al., 2000; Peasnell et al., 
2000 and 1998; Dechow et al., 
1996. 
Cotter and Silvester, 2003; 
Füerst and Kang, 2000; 
Rhoades et al, 2000; Vafeas, 
2000; Bhagat and Black, 1999; 
Calleja, 1999; Lawrence and 
Stapledon, 1999; Dalton et al., 
1998; Hutchinson, 1998; 
Klein, 1998; Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 
1996; Grace et al., 1995; Daily 
and Dalton, 1993; Pearce and 
Zahra, 1992; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991; Baysinger 
and Butler, 1985. 
Audit Committee 
Independence 
Bryan et al., 2004. Xie et al., 2003; Klein, 2002b; 
Chtourou et al., 2001; Peasnell 
et al., 2000.  
Bradbury et al., 2004; Cotter 
and Silvester, 2003; Ellstrand 
et al., 1999; Klein, 1998. 
Audit Committee 
Competence 
The attribute is the result of incorporating directors’ independence and expertise. Several 
studies have tested the link between the expertise of directors on the audit committee and 
earnings management (Bryan et al., 2004; Chtourou et al., 2001; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; 
Xie et al., 2003) or share returns (Defond et al., 2004). 
 
Table 2-1 shows studies that empirically examined the impact of corporate 
governance on performance, earnings management, and earnings informativeness. While 
there are numerous attributes of corporate governance, nine attributes are selected 
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because of their potential impact on shareholders’ perception of the reliability of the 
financial reporting process (i.e. reported earnings). 11, 12 
The underlying assumption for using these attributes is that while shareholders 
respond to earnings reliability, they also respond to a number of cues that confirm the 
reliability of earnings. In this research, these cues are corporate governance attributes and 
earnings management.  
Corporate governance attributes are useful in signalling to shareholders the degree 
of managerial manipulations (e.g. Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996). This, in turn, 
indicates the level of earnings reliability. The third column of Table 2-1 shows the 
research where corporate governance impacts on earnings reliability. This research 
extends this relationship by proposing shareholders form a perception of earnings 
reliability based on cues, such as corporate governance. Each governance attribute 
impacts on shareholders’ perception as follows: 
1. Ownership concentration:  
Shareholders are likely to expect that larger shareholders have an incentive to monitor 
management and reduce managers’ ability to act opportunistically. Less opportunistic 
manipulations lead to more reliable and value relevant earnings (e.g. Lev, 1989; 
Wang et al., 1994; Ali and Hwang, 1995). 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 While some attributes were not selected in order to avoid nesting problems, Appendix C discusses and 
justifies the exclusion of other related attributes of corporate governance. 
12 The research framework is based on the assumption that corporate governance attributes are independent 
of each other. There is no overwhelming evidence in the corporate governance literature that establishes an 
interaction among the attributes of corporate governance used in the study. However, if a harmful 
interaction does exist between any of corporate governance attributes, statistical techniques will be used to 
avoid endogeneity problems (Section 3.5.4 for details). 
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2. Debt reliance: 
Shareholders are likely to expect that high debt reliance accompanies higher debt 
monitoring. Creditors have an incentive to monitor managers and reduce their 
manipulations when their investments are large (e.g. Daniels, 1995; OECD, 1995).  
3. Board independence: 
Shareholders are likely to expect outside directors on the board as vigilant monitors of 
management’s performance and behaviour. Board monitoring is likely to control 
managerial behaviour (e.g. Johnson et al., 1996; Bainbridge, 1993; Fama, 1980). 
4. Audit Committee Independence: 13  
Shareholders are likely to perceive outside directors as efficient monitors of the 
financial reporting process. The independence of directors on the audit committee has 
the prospective to reduce management’s manipulation of the financial reporting 
process (e.g. Klein, 2002b).  
5. Audit committee competence: 14  
Shareholders are likely to perceive outside directors with financial expertise sitting on 
the audit committee as efficient monitors. Financial expertise enables directors to 
detect and prevent opportunistic manipulation from occurring in the financial reports 
(e.g. Abbott et al., 2002). 
6. Managerial ownership: 
Shareholders are likely to perceive that managers’ interests are aligned with their 
interests when managers become shareholders. Thus, managers with equity stakes in 
                                                 
13 Audit committee independence is included with caution after checking for harmful collinearity with 
board independence or audit committee competence. 
14 Competence is used only in this study to represent the merging effect of committee independence and 
director expertise.  
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the firm are more likely to report reliable earnings that reflect the underlying 
economic value of the firm (Warfield et al. 1995). 
7.  Independent directors’ ownership: 
Shareholders are likely to perceive ownership by independent directors as a means to 
bring closer the interests of independent directors with interests of shareholders. Thus, 
greater ownership by independent directors reduces the likelihood of directors 
deviating from the interest of shareholders (e.g. Bhagat and Black, 1999; Bhagat et 
al., 1999). 
8. Board size: 
Shareholders are likely to perceive large boards are having a substantial number of 
experienced directors and are able to dedicate more directors into monitoring 
managers. Larger board are associated with greater monitoring capacity over 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour (e.g. Xie et al., 2003; Chtourou et al., 2001).  
9. CEO dominance: 
Shareholders are likely to perceive a greater monitoring capacity by the board when 
the chairman of the board is independent of management.15 Thus, CEO dominance 
indicates that less control is likely to be exercised over management’s activities and 
behaviour (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). 
These nine attributes of corporate governance have been shown to improve the 
integrity of the financial reporting process; and therefore, increases the reliability and 
value relevance of accounting earnings. While there is little guidance on how corporate 
governance interacts with information content of earnings, extant research offers no 
comprehensive explanation for the potential role earnings management tends to play in 
                                                 
15 While chairperson is the correct term, the literature seems to persist in using the term chairman. As the 
study derives its constructs from the literature, chairman is used through out this research. 
 18
the link between corporate governance and the information content of accounting 
earnings.  
The second column of Table 2-1 shows the attributes of governance that have been 
associated with the information content of earnings. In general, there is little consistent 
evidence that show governance to affect the information content of earnings. Section 2.3 
presents the information content of earnings literature and proposes corporate governance 
attributes as variables that interact with earnings to inform the market. 
2.3 VALUE RELEVANCE OF ACCOUNTING EARNINGS 
The value-relevance stream of research is based on the premise that if information 
is useful, investors will adjust their behaviour and the market will respond quickly 
through changes in share prices. Therefore, information is considered relevant if share 
returns are associated with the release of the information.  
The information content of accounting earnings is based on the understanding that 
accounting earnings, as a performance measure, are value relevant (e.g. Beaver, 1998; 
Kallunki and Martikainen, 1997; Lev, 1989). There has been significant range of studies, 
since Ball and Brown (1968), empirically showing the importance of accounting earnings 
as value-relevant information for investors (e.g. Liu and Thomas, 2000; Lipe et al., 1998; 
Das and Lev, 1994; Wild, 1992; Easton and Harris, 1991; Collins and Kothari 1989).16  
A primary research design consideration for value relevance research is the 
selection of the model used in the tests. Residual income valuation models (e.g. Ohlson 
model, 1995) express firm value as the sum of the book value of equity and the present 
value of future abnormal earnings (Ota, 2001). Thus, if share prices are a linear function 
                                                 
16 This list is indicative and not intended to be exhaustive. 
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of only book value of equity and expected abnormal earnings, then share returns are a 
linear function of level of earnings and change of earnings.17 
Earnings level, ceteris paribus, is derived from change in book value and change in 
earnings is derived from the movement of earnings level from period t0 to t1. Thus, the 
Easton and Harris (1991) returns model is a measure of the change in price from period t0 
to t1 relative to the change in the Ohlson (1995) residual income model. 
The value-relevance of a particular firm’s accounting earnings depends on the 
ability of current accounting earnings to facilitate the prediction of future returns by 
predicting future earnings and cash flows. Reliable earnings are price informative, 
because empirical evidence shows that reliable measures of future earnings and cash 
flows (i.e. permanent earnings) provide value relevant information (Cheng et al., 1996, 
1997).  
Although the market places greater emphasis on reliable earnings (Freeman and 
Tse, 1992), it is hard for shareholders to observe the reliability of earnings. Alternatively, 
shareholders use cues to guide the assessment of earnings reliability. The cues should be 
those that affect the actual earnings reliability. 
It is proposed that there are two main indicators of earnings reliability that will be 
investigated: 1) earnings management; and 2) corporate governance. The importance of 
earnings reliability rests with the assumption that more reliable earnings will be of greater 
relevance in assessing the value of a firm. Next, the literature relating to earnings 
management and corporate governance is discussed. 
                                                 
17 Deng and Lev (1998) recognize that the share prices (price model) may suffer from size-related problems 
(scale effect) and may not be well specified. Scale effects are generally understood to arise from the fact 
that large (small) firms will have large (small) market capitalization, large (small) book value, and large 
(small) earnings. In contrast, share returns (returns model) do not suffer such problems (scale-free) because 
the variables used in the model are deflated by the lagged market value of equity and therefore scale-free 
(Easton, 1999; Easton and Sommers, 2003).  
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2.4 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
Earnings management is an outcome of some degree of flexibility and discretion 
managers have in reporting their financial performance. Managers may use this discretion 
to either opportunistically manage earnings (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994) or 
communicate private value-relevant information about the firm’s future performance 
(Jones, 1991; Healy and Palepu, 1993). However, much of the extant literature finds that 
earnings management is carried out with the intention of either misleading financial 
statement users or of biasing contractual outcomes that depend on accounting earnings 
(e.g. Burgstahler and Eames, 2003; Payne and Robb, 2000). 
Management’s incentive to opportunistically manage earnings is driven by 
contractual agreements and/or change in economic environments. Contractual agreements 
can take the form of management compensation (eg. Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 
1995) or debt covenants (eg. DeAngelo et al., 1994; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). For 
example: 
• Reliance on earnings-based compensation systems can supply managers with 
incentives to increase their personal wealth by managing earnings upwards or 
downwards. Managing earnings would allow the maximisation of their 
remuneration for the current period or future periods depending on the parameters 
of the compensation system (Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995).  
• Debt covenant presents managers with an incentive to manage earnings to avoid 
violating their debt contracts (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994).  
• Managers alter earnings to mask poor managerial performance and safeguard 
themselves from possible dismissals (Dharan and Lev, 1993).  
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While there are numerous incentives for managers to manage earnings, the 
literature empirically supports the view that managers manage earnings only when they 
have an incentive to do so (e.g. Dechow et al., 2000; Peasnell et al., 2000a; Degeorge et 
al., 1999; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Holthausen et al., 1995; Healy, 1985). While 
firms with high earnings management are deemed to have an incentive to manage 
earnings, lower levels of earnings management indicate that managers have no incentive 
to manage earnings.  
An important line of current research has focused on corporate governance and its 
impact on earnings management. This line of research was initiated by Beasley (1996) 
and Dechow et al. (1996). Both papers empirically show that certain attributes of 
corporate governance are generally associated with earnings manipulations. Other 
empirical studies established an association between corporate governance and earnings 
management (e.g. Peasnell et al., 1998, 2000a; Chtourou et al., 2001). In the current 
paper, the impact of corporate governance attributes on earnings management is tested, 
which may increase support for the view that corporate governance plays a monitoring 
role rather than a performance enhancing role. 
 
Proposition One: Corporate governance is associated with earnings management.18 
 
Knowing management’s ability to manage earnings, shareholders assess their 
perception of accounting earnings by looking for other information (i.e. earnings 
management) that verify the earnings reliability. Earnings management is adversely 
associated with reliable measures of future earnings, such as permanent earnings 
                                                 
18 As corporate governance is represented by nine attributes, the proposition is expressed in general terms 
as the directionality of the relationship depends on the nature of each corporate governance attribute. 
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(Kothari, 2001). This is empirically supported by Subramanyam (1996b). Subramanyam 
(1996b) finds that managed earnings (abnormal accruals) are less value relevant than 
unmanaged earnings (normal accruals) by comparing the response coefficient of both 
forms of earnings.19 
An adverse association between earnings management and the information content 
of accounting earnings is empirically established in the literature. For example, Ali and 
Hwang (1995) find that as accruals management increases, the information content of 
accounting earnings decreases.20 Cheng et al. (1997) also provide evidence suggesting 
that non-permanent accruals affect the information content of accounting earnings.  
The relationship between earnings management and the information content of 
accounting earnings is based on the argument that the less reliable earnings are less 
informative. Most prior studies have tested the impact of earnings management on the 
information content of accounting earnings only during special events (see Table 2-2). 
Table 2-2: A summary of the literature on the link between earnings management and the 
information content of earnings 
Special Events Earnings management and information 
content of earnings 
Equity offering announcements Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; Shivakumar, 
2000; Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998 
High debt levels  Gul et al., 2000; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; 
1986 
High growth Gul et al., 2000 
Substantial earnings surprises  Defond and Park, 2001 
Non-linear returns-earnings Sankar, 2000 
                                                 
19 The basic principle of accrual accounting is that earnings (accruals + cash flows) is a better indicator of 
future earnings, dividends, and cash flows than current and past cash flows (Barth et al., 1999). Thus, 
accruals are value relevant. However, accruals are subject to manipulation. Abnormal accruals either reflect 
opportunistic earnings management or communicate value relevant information. The results of Gul et al. 
(2003) are consistent with the notion that auditors anticipate managers to use accruals in non-value 
maximizing behaviour to conceal poor performance. 
20 There are two vehicles through which earnings can be managed: first, through choice of accounting 
methods; and second, through estimation of accruals (Burilovich and Kattelus, 1997). Manipulation of 
accounting accruals is likely to be a favoured instrument for earnings management because it has no direct 
consequences on cash from operations and is relatively difficult to detect (Schipper, 1989; Burilovich and 
Kattelus, 1997). 
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The empirical findings comply with the suggestion that earnings management 
contains useful information to shareholders in their assessment of earnings reliability. As 
firms that engage less in earnings management are likely to offer more permanent 
accounting earnings (e.g. Kothari, 2001; Ali and Hwang, 1995; Wang et al., 1994; Lev, 
1989), it follows that a firm with high magnitudes of earnings management would likely 
produce less permanent and less informative earnings than a firm with low magnitude of 
earnings management. 
 
Proposition Two: Earnings Management is negatively associated with the information 
content of earnings. 
2.5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ATTRIBUTES  
Due to its adverse impact on management’s ability to manage earnings (e.g. Klein 
2002b; Peasnell et al., 2000a) and the difficulty markets may have in detecting earnings 
management, corporate governance is useful to shareholders in assessing the reliability of 
earnings. While corporate governance attributes are expected to provide shareholders 
with information about management’s capacity to alter accounting earnings 
opportunistically (Klein 2002b; Peasnell et al., 2000a), a large segment of the corporate 
governance literature focuses on linking corporate governance to corporate performance. 
Empirical results from the literature on the governance-performance relationship are 
mixed and inconclusive (Lawrence and Stapledon, 1999). The Hampel committee (1997) 
states:  
 24
“it is important to recognise there is no hard evidence to link corporate 
governance to corporate performance, although the committee believes 
that good governance enhances that prospect”.  
The mixed results indicate that corporate governance may play a role other than 
enhancing firm performance. Agency theory suggests a direct relation between effective 
monitoring of management and reduced costs of dysfunctional behaviour, rather than a 
direct increase of performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hence, corporate 
governance may act as an assurance to shareholders on the reliability of information 
provided by managers. Most studies that have corporate governance attributes to be 
significant have focused on its role in reducing agency costs and aligning managers’ 
interests with the shareholders’. 
Corporate governance’s primary objective is not to directly improve corporate 
performance, but to resolve agency problems by aligning management’s interests with the 
interests of shareholders (Maher and Andersson, 2000). Corporate governance achieves 
the same primary objective by watching over management’s performance and inspecting 
the financial reporting process.  
Regulatory development (e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) suggests that corporate 
governance should impact on shareholders’ perception of the information content of 
accounting earnings. Thus, in situations when accounting earnings are less reliable, 
shareholders’ response to earnings is likely to depend on corporate governance as an 
indicator of earnings reliability.21  
                                                 
21 Given that the nature of ASX rulings does not regard corporate governance practices compulsory, thus 
using Australian data provides an opportunity to test the impact of different degrees of corporate 
governance practices. 
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Shareholders’ perception is an outcome that depends on value-relevant cues (i.e. 
corporate governance) to assist in understanding the degree of earnings reliability (e.g. 
Wang et al., 1994; Ali and Hwang, 1995; Cheng et al., 1997). The existence of strong 
corporate governance may increase the value relevance of earnings through a perception 
of greater integrity of financial reporting and improved reliability management’s 
performance measures (i.e. reported earnings).  
 
Proposition Three: Corporate governance is associated with the information content of 
earnings.22 
 
The role of corporate governance is more useful when managers have an incentive 
to deviate from shareholders’ interests (Maher and Andersson, 2000). One example of 
management’s deviation from shareholders’ interests is the management of earnings 
through the use of accounting accruals (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994). The current 
study argues that corporate governance is likely to improve shareholders’ perception of 
the reliability of earnings in situations of earnings management.  
Information dynamics models (i.e. Ohlson, 1995) provide a testable pricing 
equation that also identifies the roles non-accounting information (i.e. corporate 
governance) plays in firm value. Based on a formal valuation model of share returns 
developed by Easton and Harris (1991), corporate governance can be incorporated to 
model its impact on the information content of earnings after conditioning on earnings 
management (see Equation 2).  
  
                                                 
22 As corporate governance is represented by nine attributes, the proposition is expressed in general terms 
as the directionality of the relationship depends on the nature of each corporate governance attribute. 
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Equation 2: Corporate governance, earnings management, and the information content of 
accounting earnings 
Rj = β0 + β1 Ej + β2 ∆Ej + υj 
 
 
β1 + β2= f (CG⏐EM) 
Rj  is the change in the price per share of firm j scaled by beginning price. 
Ej is accounting earnings per share of firm j. 
∆Ej  is the change in accounting earnings per share of firm j. 
CG⏐EM is corporate governance attributes conditioned by earnings management. 
 
Equation 2 explains that shareholders use additional variables, in this case corporate 
governance conditioned by earnings management, to guide their assessment of earnings 
reliability. The equation is based on the notion that earnings management and corporate 
governance are used as cues by shareholders to assess the information content of 
earnings. While earnings management reflects management’s incentive to act 
opportunistically, corporate governance is used to reflect the degree of control exercised 
over the financial reporting process (e.g. Peasnell et al., 1998, 2000a; Chtourou et al., 
2001). Based on this model, proposition four is formulated as follows: 
 
Proposition Four: Managers’ incentive to manage earnings moderates the association 
between corporate governance and the information content of earnings.23 
 
Corporate governance is a meta concept. The subsequent sub-sections deals with 
the attributes of corporate governance discussed previously and how they interact with 
earnings to impact on share returns. 
                                                 
23 As corporate governance is represented by nine attributes, the proposition is expressed in general terms 
as the directionality of the relationship depends on the nature of each corporate governance attribute. 
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2.5.1 Organisational Monitoring  
2.5.1.1 Ownership Concentration 
Ownership concentration is a measure of the existence of large shareholders in a 
firm (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000).24 Large shareholders have greater incentives to 
monitor management, because the costs associated with monitoring management are less 
than the expected benefits to their large equity holdings in the firm. Ramsey and Blair 
(1993) suggest that increased ownership concentration provides large shareholders with 
sufficient incentives to monitor managers. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Stiglitz (1985) 
empirically support this view by finding that large equity holders have incentives to bear 
the fixed costs of collecting information and to engage in monitoring management.  
In contrast, dispersed ownership leads to weaker incentives to monitor management 
(Maher and Andersson, 2000). In situations where shareholders hold low stakes in the 
firm, shareholders have little or no incentive to monitor managers (Ramsay and Blair, 
1993; Hart, 1995), because monitoring costs will exceed the gains of monitoring 
managers. 
Contrary to the view discussed above, other studies (e.g. Bebchuk, 1994; Stiglitz, 
1985) suggest that ownership concentration may negatively affect the value of the firm, 
because large shareholders have the capacity to abuse their position of dominant control 
at the expense of minority shareholders. However, the willingness of large shareholders 
to expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth may be constrained by other incentives, 
                                                 
24 A large segment of the literature on ownership concentration has focused either on the causes of 
ownership concentration (e.g. Kahn and Winton, 1998; Maug, 1998; Roe, 1994; Bhide, 1993; Holmstrom 
and Tirole, 1993; Huddart, 1993; Coffee, 1991; Black, 1990; Mayer, 1988) or the causes of changes in 
ownership concentration (e.g. Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Hellman, 1997; 
Levin, 1995; Bartlett, 1994; Berglof, 1994). Only a small segment of the literature analyses the outcome of 
ownership concentration, which is explained in the rest of this section.  
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such as legal remedies available to minority shareholders and the incentive to end 
management’s absolute control over the firm.  
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) argue that larger shareholders are recognised by 
minority shareholders as a signal of a better monitoring environment. Their argument is 
consistent with the view that ownership concentration is a monitoring attribute of 
corporate governance (La Porta et al., 1998).  
Building on the agency framework developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the 
existence of large shareholders is expected to lower opportunistic earnings management. 
The justification for this is that managers at publicly traded firms either lose their control 
to large shareholders or are constantly monitored by large shareholders. 
If higher ownership concentration increases monitoring over management (Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985; Stiglitz, 1985), higher ownership concentration should decrease 
management’s capacity to alter accounting earnings and increase the reliability earnings. 
Dempsey et al. (1993) finds that different categories of ownership concentration are 
related to different levels of opportunistic earnings management.  
Earnings management also reflects the strength of management’s incentive to 
manage earnings. Once managers have no incentive to manage earnings 
opportunistically, they act according to the interest of shareholders, and thus ownership 
concentration should not have an impact on shareholders’ perception of accounting 
earnings. 
Given the impact of ownership concentration on earnings management and earnings 
reliability, highly concentrated ownership should affect shareholders’ perception of 
earnings reliability and relevance after conditioning on earnings management. Thus, less 
reliable earnings associated with high ownership concentration are perceived by 
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shareholders to be more value relevant than those associated with lower ownership 
concentration.  
As shareholders perceive that monitoring caused by higher ownership concentration 
reduces earnings management and enhances the reliability and relevance of accounting 
earnings, the propositions are: 
• Highly concentrated ownership is negatively related to earnings management. 
•  Highly concentrated ownership is positively related to the information content of 
accounting earnings.25 
• Managers’ incentive to manage earnings moderates the positive association 
between highly concentrated ownership and the information content of accounting 
earnings.26  
 
2.5.1.2 Debt Reliance 
Debt reliance, as a governance mechanism, is based on the view that debt-holders 
monitor and evaluate managerial performance. Although the level of debt reliance is an 
internal decision, higher debt is expected to be associated with higher monitoring from 
debt holders (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Daniels, 1995).  
While the literature suggests firms with high debt are more likely to be associated 
with earnings management to avoid debt covenant violations (e.g. DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994), a counter response from the finance literature (e.g. 
Rubin, 1990; Jensen, 1986) recognises that debt could have a monitoring effect. An 
                                                 
25 The proposition incorporates a boundary condition that only includes highly concentrated firms to 
overcome the confounding effect of firms with perceived limited monitoring contributions. 
26 The proposition incorporates two boundary conditions. First, ownership must be highly concentrated to 
overcome the confounding effect of firms with perceived limited monitoring contributions. Second, the 
proposed link should be conditioned by the existence of an incentive for managers to manage earnings to 
reflect the deviation of managers’ interests from the interests of shareholders. 
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important part of the financing process is risk assessment by debt-holders. Hence, debt-
holders have an incentive to monitor managerial performance to assess the risk of the 
firm (Legoria et al., 1999). Debt-holders have the potential to serve as external monitors 
over managerial performance (Keasey and Wright, 1997; OECD, 1999; Maher and 
Andersson, 2000).  
Debt-holders have the potential to increase the level of external monitoring because 
of their industrial knowledge and continuous transactions (Daniels, 1995). Debt-holders 
are able to develop a broadly based benchmark to evaluate firm performance when they 
provide loans to a number of different firms in the same industry (Daniels, 1995). The 
renewal of short-term or medium term loan agreements gives debt-holders more 
opportunities to monitor managerial performance (Daniels, 1995). 
Debt contracts reduce dysfunctional behaviour by using accounting numbers (Smith 
and Warner, 1979; Leftwich, 1983). Jensen (1986) suggests that the obligations of debt 
contracts can reduce management incentive to engage in non-optimal activities. Debt-
holders tend to use debt covenants in debt contracts to restrict managers from engaging in 
investment and financing decisions that reduce the value of debt-holders’ claims (DeFond 
and Jiambalvo, 1994).  
Debt-holders are able to make demands on a firm’s management within the debt 
contract (Dedman, 2000). Failure to meet such demands may result in higher costs of 
borrowing or refusal to offer finance. As result, debt-holders have the capacity to pressure 
managers to act in the interests of debt-holders.  
It can also be argued that managers have the incentive to provide more relevant and 
reliable information to debt-holders and comply with debt covenants in order to obtain 
finance on more favourable terms. Harris and Raviv (1991) find that the evidence is 
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broadly consistent with the view that debt can mitigate agency conflicts. Grossman and 
Hart (1982) also assert that debt forces managers to conduct operations more efficiently 
in order to lessen the probability of bankruptcy, loss of control and loss of reputation. 
Gul and Tsui (2001) provide supporting evidence that debt is a monitoring device 
that reduces agency costs. One of the reasons debt reduces agency costs is that debt-
holders are expected to monitor managers (Rubin, 1990). 
Monitoring by debt-holders will depend on the size of stake the debt-holder has in 
the business (Daniels, 1995). The higher the debt reliance (leverage), the closer the firm 
is to the constraints in the debt covenants (Kalay, 1982). Unless firms are reasonably 
close to violation, it is unlikely that the choice of an accounting method will be monitored 
by debt restrictions (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Hence, high leverage justifies a 
strong monitoring role by debt-holders (OECD, 1995). A negative association between 
debt reliance and opportunistic earnings management can be an outcome of debt-holders 
monitoring opportunistic managerial behaviour. 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Sweeney (1994) find empirical evidence that 
earnings are managed when debt covenant is violated. However, tested samples in both 
studies only included firms that reported covenant violations. Thus, both studies bear 
selection bias due to the exclusion of firms with high debt reliance, but managed to avoid 
the violation of debt covenant. The avoidance of debt covenant violation by such firms 
can be an outcome of the external monitoring role that debt-holders play in the 
governance of borrowing firms. It can be argued that firms, which are unable to avoid 
debt covenant violation, strategically manage their earnings in preparation for 
renegotiations relating to debt contracts. 
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While high debt reliance encourages managers to overcome debt covenant through 
earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994), high debt reliance 
gives managers an incentive to operate efficiently and generate sufficient cash flows to 
meet its debt obligations (Denis, 2001). Empirical evidence supports the proposition that 
increased debt mitigates agency conflicts (see Rozeff, 1982; Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
Dhaliwal et al. (1991) finds that the explanatory power of earnings is larger for low 
leverage firms. They argue that leverage is a proxy for default risk. However, Dhaliwal et 
al. (1991) represents leverage as a dummy variable. Thus, level of debt is used to 
partition the sample rather than being used as continuous variable. Just simply 
partitioning the sample according to leverage disregards any information that might relate 
to the degree of monitoring exercised by debt-holders.  
It can be argued that leverage is an indication of a firm’s default risk. The present 
study controls for default risk by including a control variable representing systemic risk 
(beta risk) when testing debt reliance. 
If higher debt reliance increases monitoring over management (Daniels, 1995; 
OECD, 1995), higher debt reliance should decrease management’s capacity to alter 
accounting earnings and increase the reliability earnings. No prior study has tested the 
association between debt reliance, as a monitoring device, and earnings management.  
Earnings management can also reflect the strength of management’s incentive to 
manage earnings. Once managers have no incentive to manage earnings 
opportunistically, they act according to the interest of shareholders, and thus debt reliance 
is not expected to have an impact on shareholders’ perception of accounting earnings. 
Given the impact of debt reliance is likely to influence earnings management and 
earnings reliability, high debt reliance should affect shareholders’ perception of earnings 
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reliability and relevance after conditioning on earnings management. Thus, less reliable 
earnings associated with high debt reliance are perceived by shareholders to be more 
value relevant than those associated with lower debt reliance. 
As shareholders perceive that monitoring caused by higher debt reliance reduces 
earnings management and enhances the reliability and relevance of accounting earnings, 
the propositions are: 
• High debt reliance is negatively related to earnings management. 
•  High debt reliance is positively related to the information content of accounting 
earnings. 27 
• Managers’ incentive to manage earnings moderates the positive association 
between high debt reliance and the information content of accounting earnings. 28 
2.5.1.3 Board Independence 
The board of directors is the shareholders’ first line of defense against 
management’s opportunistic behaviour (Weisbach, 1988; Sundaramurthy, 2000). Boards 
of directors have three major responsibilities in a firm (Lawler et al., 2002; Kenton, 
1995). First, they are responsible for the strategic direction of the firm (Kesner and 
Johnson, 1990; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). Second, they provide advice and a base for 
networking into the corporate community (Westphal, 1999; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). 
Third, they exercise a monitoring function over executive management on behalf of 
shareholders (Johnson et al., 1996; Bainbridge, 1993; Fama, 1980). It is the third 
                                                 
27 The proposition incorporates a boundary condition that only includes highly debt reliant firms to 
overcome the confounding effect of firms with perceived limited monitoring contributions. 
28 The proposition incorporates two boundary conditions. First, debt reliance must be high to overcome the 
confounding effect of firms with perceived limited monitoring contributions. Second, the proposed link 
should be conditioned by the existence of an incentive for managers to manage earnings to reflect the 
deviation of managers’ interests from the interests of shareholders. 
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responsibility that should have a direct impact on shareholders’ perception of the firm’s 
financial reporting integrity.  
Boards of directors monitor management by ensuring that executive managers carry 
out their duties in a way that serves the best interests of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). However, not all boards are vigilant monitors of corporate management 
(Sundaramurthy, 2000).  
While Fama (1980) asserts that insider dominated boards have a problem of self-
monitoring and particularly weak monitoring over executive officers, Lawler et al. (2002) 
also provides data showing that board independence is an important factor in enhancing 
the monitoring function of the board.29 The results of Tsui et al. (2001) also support the 
expectation that firms with independent boards provide an effective monitoring 
mechanism. Previous studies empirically show that board independence is positively 
associated with board monitoring (See Table 2-3).30 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 One of the tests performed in Lawler et al. (2002) measures the association between different board 
attributes and a firm’s financial and market performance. They found that board independence has the 
largest direct impact on share returns. Their finding supports the view that board independence should 
affect shareholders’ perception of a firm’s accounting earnings. 
30 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) defines an independent director as a director who: 
• Does not accept, directly or indirectly, any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from 
the company apart from his/her role as a member of the board of directors and its committees. 
• Is not an affiliated person of the company or any of its subsidiaries. 
• Does not directly or indirectly controls the company, is controlled by the company, or is under 
control along with the company by an executive officer, director, or 10% shareholder. 
• Is not a director, executive officer, partner, member, principal, or designee of an affiliated firm. 
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Table 2-3: Board Independence and Board Monitoring 
Studies Findings 
Weisbach (1988) A stronger association was found between prior 
performance and the probability of a CEO 
resignation for firms with outsider-dominated 
boards than for firms with insider-dominated 
boards. 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) The appointment of an outside director who is 
an officer of a financial firm increases share 
value. 
Byrd and Hickman (1992) Less-negative returns to shareholders of 
bidding firms are associated with boards of 
directors in which at least 50% of the members 
are independent of firm managers. 
Brickley et al. (1994) The average stock market reaction to 
announcements of poison pills is positive when 
the board has majority of outside directors and 
negative when it does not. 
 
Board independence is established on the assumption that outside directors are 
more vigilant than inside directors because:  
1. Outside directors focus on financial performance, which is a central component of 
monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
2. Outside directors are more likely than insiders to dismiss CEOs following poor 
performance (Weisbach, 1988).  
3. Outside directors have an incentive to protect their personal reputations as 
independent directors by vigilantly monitoring management (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). 
In spite of the above, there is an absence of studies empirically examining the 
impact of board independence on shareholders’ perception of accounting earnings. Only 
Vafeas (2000) and Anderson et al. (2003) have attempted to examine the impact on the 
market’s response to accounting earnings. While Vafeas (2000) failed to detect a link 
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between board independence and information content of earnings, Anderson et al. (2003) 
find that board independence is positively related to the information content of earnings.31  
The results from Vafeas (2000) are not surprising because Vafeas’ (2000) sample 
contains survivorship bias. The problem with Vafeas (2000) excluding failing firms is 
that managers of failing firms tend to have an incentive to manage earnings as a last 
means of survival. Thus, Vafeas’ (2000) sample contains firms that on average have a 
less incentive to manage earnings, which is likely to explain the reason Vafeas (2000) 
was unable to detect the impact of board independence on shareholders’ perception of 
accounting earnings. Thus, Vafeas’ (2000) failure to detect an impact is not sufficient 
evidence that the link does not exist.  
The current study extends the investigations of Vafeas (2000) and Anderson et al. 
(2003) by including two portions. First, Vafeas (2000) and Anderson et al. (2003) use a 
single proxy for unexpected earnings. Brown et al. (1987) demonstrates that multiple 
proxies for unexpected earnings is likely to reduce measurement error bias in regression 
estimates of the coefficients relating to unexpected earnings and unexpected returns. 
Easton and Harris (1991) also provide empirical evidence that the level of earnings 
enhances the returns-earnings relationship. It is difficult to detect the impact of board 
independence when the returns-earnings relationship lacks a comprehensive reflection of 
shareholders’ response to accounting earnings. Consequently, the present study uses 
multiple proxies for unexpected earnings.  
Second, Vafeas (2000) and Anderson et al. (2003) did not account of the important 
role the existence of an incentive for managers to manage earnings may play in the 
                                                 
31Although Aderson et al. (2003) supports the current study’s expectations, their results are limited by 
testing a single financial period and using a single proxy for unexpected earnings when testing the returns-
earnings regression. 
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relation between corporate governance and information content of accounting earnings. 
Earnings management reflects the strength of management’s incentive to manage 
earnings. Once managers have no incentive to manage earnings opportunistically, they 
act according to the interest of shareholders, and thus board independence should not 
have an impact on shareholders’ perception of accounting earnings. The link is 
strengthened by empirical evidence from the literature supporting the impact of board 
independence on opportunistic earnings management (e.g. Peasnell et al., 1998, 2000a; 
Chtourou et al., 2001). As a results, the current study tests the interaction between board 
independence and the information content of accounting earnings conditioned on 
earnings management. 
Highly independent boards are expected have an impact on shareholders’ perception 
of earnings reliability and relevance after conditioning on earnings management, because 
stronger board monitoring should enhance the integrity of the financial reporting process 
and should provide assurance to shareholders on the reliability of reported earnings. 
Thus, less reliable earnings associated with independent boards are perceived by 
shareholders to be more value relevant than those associated with insider dominated 
boards. 
As shareholders perceive that monitoring caused by higher board independence 
reduces earnings management and enhances the information content of accounting 
earnings, the propositions are: 
• Highly independent boards are negatively related to earnings management. 
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• Highly independent boards are positively related to the information content of 
accounting earnings. 32 
• Managers’ incentive to manage earnings moderates the positive association 
between highly independent boards and the information content of accounting 
earnings. 33 
 
2.5.1.4 Audit Committee Independence 
Boards of directors have to participate in the auditing process, as part of their 
monitoring responsibilities.34 With the increase in board responsibilities, certain roles are 
allocated to sub-committees. Kesner (1988) and Vance (1983) maintain that most 
essential board decisions originate at the committee level, such as audit committees. 
Audit committees aim to increase the integrity of the financial auditing process (Klein, 
2002a) and the quality of financial reporting (McMullen, 1994).  
Audit committees can contribute to internal monitoring by increasing the level of 
integrity to the financial auditing process (Klein, 2002a). Dechow et al. (1996) report that 
firms without an audit committee are more likely to commit financial fraud.  
In September 1998, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur 
Levitt attacked the problem of "earnings management" and called for audit committees to 
improve financial reporting quality and effectively monitor executives. Contrary to the 
United States and United Kingdom, Australian public companies are currently not 
required to form audit committees, either by statute or by ASX listing rules. The decision 
                                                 
32 The proposition incorporates a boundary condition that only includes highly independent boards to 
overcome the confounding effect of firms with perceived limited monitoring contributions. 
33 The proposition incorporates two boundary conditions. First, boards must be highly independent to 
overcome the confounding effect of firms with perceived limited monitoring contributions. Second, the 
proposed link should be conditioned by the existence of an incentive for managers to manage earnings to 
reflect the deviation of managers’ interests from the interests of shareholders. 
34 Auditing is an important form of monitoring used by firms to reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
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of the ASX not to mandate audit committees is in conflict with recommendations of the 
Working Group on Corporate Practices and Conduct (Bosch Committee) and the 
Working Party of the Ministerial Council for Corporations, which have recommended 
audit committees be formed by all companies listed on the ASX (Baxter and Pragasam, 
1999).35 
While Wild (1994a, 1994b) concludes that the magnitude of the market’s reaction 
to earnings reports is positively influenced by the formation of audit committees, DeFond 
and Jiambalvo (1991) find that the overstatement of earnings is less likely among firms 
with audit committees. McMullen (1994) also finds that audit committee existence relates 
positively to financial reporting quality.  
However, the existence of audit committee alone does necessarily lead to effective 
monitoring. Peasnell et al. (2000a) attempted to associate the existence of an audit 
committee with earnings management, but did not find a significant relationship. The 
results from Peasnell et al. (2000a) were not surprising, because the mere existence of an 
audit committee does not guarantee the efficiency of the monitoring process and the 
reliability of the financial reporting process. Other factors should be considered when 
analysing the role of an audit committee in monitoring management’s behaviour and 
performance efficiently, such as directors’ independence.  
Audit committees should be independent from management to be able to conduct 
effective monitoring, leading to less opportunistic earnings management.36 Independent 
audit committees can potentially improve the quality and credibility of financial reporting 
                                                 
35 Given that the formation of audit committees remains essentially unregulated in Australia, audit 
committee independence is expected to exhibit considerably greater variation than that found in related 
studies undertaken in other countries, mainly the United States. This variation found in Australian firms 
provides an improved setting for examining the impact of audit committees. 
36 One of the major limitations of using audit committee independence is its supposedly high correlation 
with board independence. However, such limitation is overcame by checking for collinearity and testing 
each attribute individually and jointly.  
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(Guthrie and Turnbull, 1995). Klein (1998) and Verschoor (1993) report that many audit 
committees of publicly traded companies are not entirely independent. If outside directors 
sitting on the audit committees lack the balance of power, a potential increase in 
opportunistic earnings management can be practiced due to weakness in internal 
monitoring. 
Chtourou et al. (2001) find no association between earnings management and a 
dichotomous variable of whether or not an entirely independent audit committee exists. 
The results from Chtourou et al. (2001) should not undermine the importance of audit 
committee independence. As it is essential for independent directors sitting on the audit 
committees to hold the balance of power, it is not necessary for the audit committee to be 
made entirely of independent directors to monitor effectively.  
Empirical evidence shows that audit committee independence is crucial in reducing 
earnings management and increasing the information content of accounting earnings. 
While Klein (2002b) finds that earnings management is associated with a dichotomous 
variable of whether or not the audit committee has a majority of outside directors, Bryan 
et al. (2004) find that audit committee independence is positively associated with the 
information content of accounting earnings. 
The present study extends prior studies by investigating the impact of highly 
independent audit committees on shareholders’ perception of the information content of 
accounting earnings after conditioning on earnings management. The link is built on the 
notion that independent directors on the audit committee are likely to influence the 
perception of shareholders on the reliability of earnings when managers have a strong 
incentive to alter earnings opportunistically.  
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Earnings management reflects the strength of management’s incentive to manage 
earnings. Once managers have no incentive to manage earnings opportunistically, they 
act according to the interest of shareholders, and thus audit committee independence 
should not have a substantial impact on shareholders’ perception of accounting earnings. 
Highly independent audit committees are expected have an impact on shareholders’ 
perception of earnings reliability and relevance after conditioning on earnings 
management, because stronger audit committee monitoring should enhance the integrity 
of the financial reporting process and should provide assurance to shareholders on the 
reliability of reported earnings. Thus, less reliable earnings associated with independent 
audit committees are perceived by shareholders to be more value relevant than those 
associated with insider dominated audit committees. 
As shareholders perceive that stronger monitoring encouraged by independent audit 
committees reduces earnings management and enhances the information content of 
accounting earnings, the propositions are: 
• Highly independent audit committees are negatively related to earnings 
management. 
• Highly independent audit committees are positively related to the information 
content of accounting earnings. 
• Managers’ incentive to manage earnings moderates the positive association 
between highly independent audit committees and the information content of 
accounting earnings. 37  
 
                                                 
37 The proposition incorporates a boundary condition. The proposed link should be conditioned by the 
existence of an incentive for managers to manage earnings to reflect the deviation of managers’ interests 
from the interests of shareholders. 
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2.5.1.5 Audit Committee Competence  
Audit committee competence is a comprehensive attribute that reflects efficient 
monitoring and should provide shareholders with a clear perception about accounting 
earnings. Audit committee competence is defined as a combination of independence and 
expertise, and is measured by the portion of outside directors with financial expertise 
sitting on the audit committee.38 Financial expertise typically is based on employment 
experience or certification in accounting /finance (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000).  
Motivated by recent regulatory requirements (i.e. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002; Blue 
Ribbon Panel, 1999) that public companies disclose whether they have independent 
directors with financial expert on their audit committee, the impact of independent 
directors’ financial expertise on the audit committee is selected as a corporate governance 
attribute contributing to the integrity of the financial reporting process. This regulatory 
requirement is motivated by the view that independent directors are more likely to use 
their expertise to detect and prevent opportunistic managerial behaviour and benefit 
shareholders.  
While different areas of director expertise may be valuable to the firm, corporate or 
financial expertise is an essential requirement for directors sitting on the audit committee 
to carry out their responsibilities successfully. The Blue Ribbon Panel’s report (1999) 
assumes that members with no experience in accounting or finance are less likely to be 
able to detect problems in financial reporting.  
The inclusion of competence as an attribute is supported by the findings from 
McMullen and Randghun (1996) who find that firms under investigation from the 
                                                 
38 Financial expertise is defined broadly as past employment experience in finance or accounting, 
certification in accounting, or other comparable experience resulting in the individual’s financial 
sophistication (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000a, 4). Also see footnote 26 for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
definition of an independent director.  
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Securities and Exchange Commission are less likely to have financially literate members 
on their audit committee. While DeZoort and Salterio (2001) finds that auditor-
management disputes are more when audit committee members lack financial expertise, 
Abbott et al. (2002) show that financial misstatements are less likely to occur in firms 
with audit committees that have a financial expert. 
Given that independent directors’ expertise is an important determinant of the 
extent of their monitoring effectiveness, an independent director with no corporate or 
financial background may be a well-intentioned monitor, except is not likely to have the 
financial sophistication to identify earnings manipulations (i.e. earnings management). In 
contrast, an independent director with corporate or financial background is likely to be 
more familiar with the different forms of earnings manipulations (Xie et al., 2003).  
Following this line of reasoning, independent directors with financial expertise 
sitting on the audit committee are likely to provide valuable monitoring. Their level of 
monitoring is expected to enhance the integrity of financial reporting process and the 
reliability of reported earnings by constraining the extent of earnings management.  
Chtourou et al. (2001) empirically demonstrates that the presence of at least one 
member with financial expertise sitting on the audit committee is negatively related to the 
level of earnings management. After classifying audit committee member into six groups, 
Xie et al. (2003) finds a negative association between the proportion of audit committee 
members with corporate or investment banking backgrounds and the level of earnings 
management.39 
                                                 
39 Xie et al. (2003) fail to detect a significant link between the other four groups of audit committee 
members (i.e. Finance, Commercial banking, Legal, and Blockholder) and the level of earnings 
management. Given that prior studies support the link (e.g. DeZoort and Salterio, 2001), the findings of Xie 
et al. (2003) are not strong evidence that the link does not exist. 
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Consequently, highly competent audit committees are expected to have an impact 
on shareholders’ perception of earnings reliability and relevance after conditioning on 
earnings management, because the link is built on the notion that outside directors with 
financial expertise are efficient monitors and would have the experience or the training to 
understand and detect opportunistic earnings management. Thus, stronger monitoring 
should enhance the integrity of the financial reporting process and should provide 
assurance to the shareholders on the reliability of reported earnings. Bryan et al. (2004) 
find that financially literate audit committees are positively associated with the 
information content of accounting earnings.  
As shareholders perceive that monitoring caused by financially literate independent 
directors dominating the audit committee reduces earnings management and enhances the 
reliability and relevance of earnings, the propositions are:40 
• Highly competent audit committees are negatively related to earnings 
management. 
• Highly competent audit committees are positively related to the information 
content of accounting earnings. 
• Managers’ incentive to manage earnings moderates the positive association 
between highly competent audit committees and the information content of 
accounting earnings.  
 
                                                 
40 The proposition incorporates two boundary conditions. First, audit committees must be highly competent 
to overcome the confounding effect of firms with perceived limited monitoring contributions. Second, the 
proposed link should be conditioned by the existence of an incentive for managers to manage earnings to 
reflect the deviation of managers’ interests from the interests of shareholders. 
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2.5.2 Interests’ Alignment 
2.5.2.1 Managerial Ownership 
Based on agency theory arguments (Jensen and Meckling 1976), managers with a 
high ownership interest in the firm are less likely to alter earnings for short term private 
gains at the expense of outside shareholders. This is consistent with the idea that 
managers whose interests are aligned with shareholders are more likely to report earnings 
that reflect the underlying economic value of the firm (Warfield et al. 1995). 
The empirical literature finds that firm value is higher when officers and directors 
have greater equity ownership (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; 
Mehran, 1995).41 However, it can be argued that the increase in value is not an outcome 
of positive increase in performance; it is rather the market’s perception of the reliability 
of the financial reporting process. It should also be noted that the focus of the study is on 
the role managerial ownership plays in improving earnings reliability and financial 
reporting integrity and not share performance. 
More concentrated share holdings by insiders provide a greater alignment of 
interests between managers and shareholders (Singh and Harianto, 1989; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Several studies find empirical support to the argument that capital 
market pressure leads firms with low managerial ownership to make income-increasing 
accounting choices that do not reflect the underlying firm economics (e.g. Klassen, 1997; 
Stein, 1989; Jensen, 1986).  
Alexander and Cohen (1999) examine the relationship between ownership structure 
and corporate crime. They find that corporate crime occurs less frequently among firms 
                                                 
41 While evidence from the United Kingdom finds a linear relationship between managerial ownership and 
performance (e.g. Thompson et al., 1992), empirical literature from the United States suggests that the 
relationship is non-linear (e.g. Kole, 1995; McConnell and Servaes, 1995, 1990; Morck et al., 1988). 
However, the impact on performance is not the focus of the current study. 
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with larger managerial ownership, which is consistent with evidence that ownership 
structure plays an important role in aligning the hidden actions of top management with 
the interest of the shareholders. 
If higher managerial ownership increases the alignment of interests between 
managers and shareholders (e.g. Singh and Harianto, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
higher managerial ownership should increase the reliability earnings. While several 
empirical studies find a negative association between insiders’ ownership and earnings 
management (Gul et al., 2003; Klein, 2002b; Warfield et al., 1995), Warfield et al. (1995) 
and Gul et al. (2003) find that managerial ownership is positively related the explanatory 
power of earnings.  
One implication of Warfield et al. (1995) is that high levels of managerial 
ownership provide managers with a long-term horizon. In contrast, managers in firms 
with low managerial ownership have a short-term horizon where managers exploit 
accounting choices to alleviate accounting-based contractual constraints, presumably to 
ensure job preservation (annual salary) and maximize incentive compensation (annual 
bonus) (Nagy et al., 1999). In contrast, managerial ownership is expected to undo the 
effects of short-term compensation horizons by inducing managers to align their interests 
with the long-term performance of firms that employ them. 
Given the impact of managerial ownership is likely to influence earnings 
management and shareholders’ perception of earnings, high managerial ownership should 
affect shareholders’ perception of earnings reliability and relevance after conditioning on 
earnings management. Thus, less reliable earnings associated with high managerial 
ownership are perceived by shareholders to be more value relevant than those associated 
with lower managerial ownership. 
 47
As shareholders perceive that higher managerial ownership reduces earnings 
management and enhances the reliability and relevance of accounting earnings, the 
propositions are: 
• High managerial ownership is negatively related to earnings management. 
•  High managerial ownership is positively related to the information content of 
accounting earnings. 42 
• Managers’ incentive to manage earnings moderates the positive association 
between high managerial ownership and the information content of accounting 
earnings. 43 
2.5.2.2 Independent Directors’ Ownership 
Ownership by independent directors is expected to enhance their monitoring 
capacity. When independent directors hold shares of the same firm, they have a greater 
incentive to fire an underperforming CEO and observe opportunistic managerial 
behaviour (Bhagat and Black, 1999; Bhagat et al., 1999). 
It can be argued that ownership by independent directors may affect their incentive 
to monitor performance of executives. However, the Hampel report (1997) noted that ‘the 
payment of part of a non-executive directors’ remuneration in shares can be useful and 
legitimate way of aligning the directors’ interests with those of shareholders’. 
Bhagat and Black (1999) empirically support the view that independent directors 
perform better if they have stronger share-based incentives. This can be rationalised by 
increased liability of independent directors if weaker monitoring is exercised. Prior 
                                                 
42 The proposition incorporates a boundary condition that only includes firms with high managerial 
ownership to overcome the confounding effect of firms with perceived limited monitoring contributions. 
43 The proposition incorporates two boundary conditions. First, managerial ownership must be high to 
overcome the confounding effect of firms with perceived limited monitoring contributions. Second, the 
proposed link should be conditioned by the existence of an incentive for managers to manage earnings to 
reflect the deviation of managers’ interests from the interests of shareholders. 
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studies suggest that large equity stakes held in the firm by non-executive directors are 
likely to give them greater incentive to monitor executive directors than those without 
such a stake (e.g. Shivdasani, 1993; Jensen, 1989). 
Beasley (1996) provides empirical evidence of a negative association between 
financial reporting fraud and non-executive directors’ ownership. Gerety and Lehn (1997) 
also report that accounting fraud is negatively associated with directors’ ownership.  
If higher independent directors’ ownership increases their incentive to monitor 
managers (e.g. Shivdasani, 1993; Jensen, 1989), higher independent directors’ ownership 
should increase the reliability of earnings. Chtourou et al. (2001) finds a negative 
association between earnings management and ownership by non-executive directors. 
Given the impact of independent directors’ ownership is likely to influence 
earnings management and shareholders’ perception of earnings reliability, high 
independent directors’ ownership should affect shareholders’ perception of earnings 
reliability and relevance after conditioning on earnings management. Thus, less reliable 
earnings associated with high independent directors’ ownership are perceived by 
shareholders to be more value relevant than those associated with lower managerial 
ownership. 
While no prior studies examined the link between independent directors’ ownership 
and the information content of accounting earnings, the previous line of reasoning 
indicates that independent directors’ ownership increases the monitoring capacity over 
the financial reporting process. As shareholders perceive independent directors’ 
ownership to reduce earnings management and to enhance the reliability and relevance of 
accounting earnings, the propositions are: 
 49
• High independent directors’ ownership is negatively related to earnings 
management. 
•  High independent directors’ ownership is positively related to the information 
content of accounting earnings. 44 
• Managers’ incentive to manage earnings moderates the positive association 
between high independent directors’ ownership and the information content of 
accounting earnings. 45 
 
2.5.3 Governance Structure 
2.5.3.1 Board Size 
From an agency perspective, it can be argued that a larger board is more likely to be 
vigilant for agency problems simply because a greater number of people will be 
reviewing management actions (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). The evidence on the role of 
board size is inconclusive (e.g. Dalton et al., 1999; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Yermack, 
1996). However, most of these studies focused on the role of board size in enhancing 
performance rather its role in improving the integrity of the financial reporting process.  
Given that the major role of the board is to monitor management, the literature on 
board size is reviewed only from a monitoring perspective. John and Senbet (1998) argue 
that an increase in board size increases the board’s monitoring capacity. Xie et al. (2003) 
and Chtourou et al. (2001) empirically support this argument by finding that larger boards 
are strongly associated with lower levels of earnings management. 
                                                 
44 The proposition incorporates a boundary condition that only includes firms with high independent 
directors’ ownership to overcome the confounding effect of firms with perceived limited monitoring 
contributions. 
45 The proposition incorporates two boundary conditions. First, independent directors’ ownership must be 
high to overcome the confounding effect of firms with perceived limited monitoring contributions. Second, 
the proposed link should be conditioned by the existence of an incentive for managers to manage earnings 
to reflect the deviation of managers’ interests from the interests of shareholders. 
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While Beasley (1996) finds a positive relationship between board size and the 
likelihood of fraud, Abbott et al. (2000) find no relationship. Chaganti et al. (1985) 
suggest that large boards are valuable for the breadth of their services. They suggest that 
a larger board is more effective in preventing corporate failure. 
Lipton and Lorsh (1992) and Jensen (1993) for instance, argue that because of 
difficulties in organizing and coordinating large groups of directors, board size is 
negatively related to the board’s ability to advise and engage in long-term strategic 
planning. In contrast, Adams and Mehran (2002) and Yermack (1996) suggest that some 
firms require larger boards for effective monitoring. 
Although the findings relating to the role of board size are mixed, the current study 
proposes that larger boards are likely to reduce earnings management and increase the 
reliability and value relevance of earnings due to the following reasons:  
1. Increased board size leads to diversity, which is likely to yield benefits by 
creating a network with the external environment and securing a broader resource 
base (Pfeffer, 1973; Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Larger boards are likely to provide 
more expertise (Dalton et al., 1999). 
2. As boards become larger, they are likely to include more independent directors 
with valuable experience (Xie et al., 2003). Experienced independent directors are 
expected to be better at preventing or limiting managerial opportunistic behaviour 
(i.e. earnings management). 
3. Larger boards are more likely to delegate responsibilities to board committees 
than smaller boards (Menon and Williams, 1994). The formation of sub-
committees due to larger boards is likely to provide greater monitoring benefits 
than smaller boards (Klein, 2002a).  
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4. Committees composed from larger boards are likely to gain from a more diverse 
expertise than smaller boards. 
Vafeas (2000) concludes that smaller boards give higher explanatory power of 
earnings. However, the results from Vafeas (2000) were inconsistent and should not be 
generalised due to the following reasons: 
1. When using board size as a continuous variable the results were insignificant.  
2. Firms with five to ten directors on the board were positively associated with 
earnings response coefficients.  
3. While firms with twelve directors or more were negatively associated with 
earnings response coefficients, the association was insignificant when testing 
firms with fourteen directors or more.  
Due to these reasons, the findings from Vafeas (2000) relating to board size are 
inconsistent and inconclusive. Alonso et al. (2000) also provides results that display a 
strong positive association between board size and earnings management. Alonso et al. 
(2000) argues that large boards imply poorer coordination and communication between 
directors.  
Alonso et al. (2000) has certain limitations: 
1. The results cover only one financial period. 
2. While the sample used mixed data from ten different OECD countries, the study 
did not control for the difference in accounting principles and corporate 
governance regulations among these countries when testing the research question. 
The results of Alonso et al. (2000) may be biased due to lack of control for external 
factors (i.e. accounting standards and regulatory rules). In addition, other studies provide 
evidence of board size’s role in enhancing monitoring over management. Klein (2002a) 
 52
for instance, suggests that board monitoring is positively associated with board size due 
to the ability to distribute the work load over a greater number of observers. Monks and 
Minow (1995) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) extend this argument by suggesting that 
larger (smaller) boards are able to commit more (less) time and effort to overseeing 
management.  
If large boards reduce earnings management (Xie et al., 2003; Chtourou et al., 
2001) and are more effective monitors of the financial accounting process (Adams and 
Mehran, 2002; Yermack, 1996), then the information content of accounting earnings 
should increase with board size due to the increase in earnings reliability. This leads to 
following proposition: 
• Larger boards are negatively related to earnings management. 
• Larger boards are positively related to the information content of accounting 
earnings. 46 
• Managers’ incentive to manage earnings moderates the positive association 
between larger boards and the information content of accounting earnings. 47  
 
2.5.3.2 CEO dominance 
Most Corporate Practice recommendations strongly suggested the separation 
between the roles of board chairman and the CEO. Corporate governance regulators 
recognise that CEO dominance over the board as a source of excessive power (Dedman, 
2000).  
                                                 
46 The proposition incorporates a boundary condition that only includes larger boards to overcome the 
confounding effect of firms with perceived limited monitoring contributions. 
47 The proposition incorporates two boundary conditions. First, board size must be high to overcome the 
confounding effect of firms with perceived limited monitoring contributions. Second, the proposed link 
should be conditioned by the existence of an incentive for managers to manage earnings to reflect the 
deviation of managers’ interests from the interests of shareholders. 
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The role of the board chair is to monitor the CEO (Jensen, 1993). Chairman of the 
board has the power to control the agenda and the running of the board meetings. There is 
likely to be a lack of independence between management and the board, if the CEO is 
also the board chair.  
CEO dominance becomes problematic if the interests of the CEO are different from 
interests of shareholders. Using data from the United States, Yermack (1996) and 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) show that firms with independent chairmen outperformed 
firms with CEO dominance. CEO dominance does not necessarily decrease performance; 
it is likely to influence the market’s perception of the level of control exercised over 
managerial performance and the financial reporting process.48  
Gul and Leung (2004) find that CEO dominance is associated with lower voluntary 
corporate disclosure for Hong Kong companies. They argue that CEO dominance 
combines decision management and decision control, which could erode the board’s 
ability to exercise effective control. 
Empirical evidence support the view that CEO dominance is likely to lead to more 
opportunistic managerial behaviour due to the reduction in effective board monitoring 
over executives (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). Core et al. (1999) find that CEO 
compensation is lower when the CEO and board chair positions are separate. Dechow et 
al. (1996) also provide evidence that firms whose CEO chairs the board of directors are 
more likely to be subject to accounting enforcement action by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission for alleged violations of GAAP. Thus, it is justifiable to assume a 
positive association between CEO dominance and earnings management. 
                                                 
48 In the United States, CEO dominance is the norm, while in Australia and the United Kingdom it is not. 
Therefore there may be cultural difference. As a result, what holds for the United States may not hold for 
Australia. 
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Anderson et al. (2003) find that the separation between CEO and board chair 
positions appear to positively influence the information content of accounting earnings. If 
CEO dominance decreases monitoring over management (Dechow et al., 1996; 
Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994), CEO dominance should decrease the reliability 
earnings.49  
Unlike prior studies, this study defines CEO dominance in terms of the 
independence of the chairman rather than CEO duality. The reason it is defined 
differently from prior studies is that the chairman is less likely to hold the CEO 
accountable if the board chair is a person who is not independent of management (i.e. 
current or past executives). 
Given that CEO dominance should influence earnings management and earnings 
reliability, CEO dominance is expected to affect shareholders’ perception of earnings 
reliability and relevance after conditioning on earnings management. Thus, reliable 
earnings associated with CEO dominance are perceived by shareholders to be less value 
relevant than those associated with independent chairmen. 
As shareholders perceive that reduction of monitoring caused by CEO dominance 
increases earnings management and reduces the reliability and relevance of accounting 
earnings, the propositions are: 
• CEO dominance is positively related to earnings management. 
•  CEO dominance is negatively related to the information content of accounting 
earnings.  
                                                 
49 Chtourou et al. (2001) and Xie et al. (2003) find no association between CEO dominance and earnings 
management. The current study defines CEO dominance differently from these studies. 
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• Managers’ incentive to manage earnings moderates the negative association 
between CEO dominance and the information content of accounting earnings. 50 
 
2.6 LIMITS 
As with the development of any model, the process of abstracting from reality 
introduces a number of limitations into the model. The major limitations of the model are 
as follows:  
• The model applies only to large firms where there is a clear separation between 
ownership and management. This is called a “Berle-Means” world (Stiglitz, 
1999).51 
• Corporate governance practices might be driven by poor financial results. 
Endogeneity problems in empirical corporate governance research are large, but 
not critical (Denis, 2001). Dealing with this problem requires carefully designed 
tests and cautious interpretation of the results.52 
• If other corporate governance attributes contribute to the integrity of the financial 
reporting process, then parameter estimates may be biased. 
                                                 
50 The proposition incorporates a boundary condition. The proposed link should be conditioned by the 
existence of an incentive for managers to manage earnings to reflect the deviation of managers’ interests 
from the interests of shareholders. 
51 Berle and Means (1932) emphasised the separation of share ownership and managerial control. The 
shareholder exercises full clear-cut property rights over the shares, that is, to buy, hold, or sell the shares. 
But no organized decision-making unit owns the company as its private property. 
52 The problem is dealt with, in this study, through vigilant collection of the data and through a research 
method that isolates endogenetic problems. While data relating to corporate governance practices are 
selected for the duration of the period, financial data are selected for the ending financial year. Thus, the 
practices of corporate governance precede the financial results, which controls for endogenetic problems 
relating to corporate governance. The cross-sectional approach in analysing the data also isolates any 
problems relating to endgeneity that accompany the time-series approach. 
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• Given that the model is tested using archival data, the data are likely to contain 
the influences of several factors that are not accounted for in the model. Isolating 
the impact of the constructs on the market’s reaction may prove difficult.  
 
2.7 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER  
The academic literature and corporate governance regulators acknowledge the 
impact of corporate governance attributes on the integrity of the financial reporting 
process. Chapter Two developed a theoretical model of the links among corporate 
governance, earnings management, and the information content of accounting earnings.  
A number of theoretical propositions emerge from the discussion in this chapter. 
The propositions relate to the links among corporate governance, earnings management, 
and the information content of accounting earnings. As corporate governance is 
represented by nine attributes, the propositions relating to corporate governance are 
expressed in general terms as the directionality of the relationship depends on the nature 
of each corporate governance attribute. 
Proposition One: Corporate governance is associated with earnings management. 
Proposition Two: Earnings Management is negatively associated with the information 
content of earnings. 
Proposition Three: Corporate governance is associated with the information content of 
earnings. 
Proposition Four: Managers’ incentive to manage earnings moderates the association 
between corporate governance and the information content of earnings. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter One identified earnings reliability as the problem area of the research. 
Chapter Two developed a theoretical link among corporate governance, earnings 
management, and the information content of accounting earnings. Chapter Three 
describes the research method used to empirically test the propositions developed in 
Chapter Two.  
Chapter Three proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 gives an overview of the research 
design. Section 3.3 describes the sample selection and data collection procedures. Section 
3.4 describes the operationalisation of the constructs in the model. Sections 3.5 states the 
analysis procedures undertaken. Section 3.6 summarises the chapter. 
 
3.2 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH DESIGN 
When testing earnings management and the information content of accounting 
earnings, the following methods were adopted:  
• The earnings response coefficient is used to measure the information content 
of accounting earnings. 
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• The magnitude of abnormal accruals is used as a proxy for managers’ capacity 
to act opportunistically (Hypothesis One), as an indicator of earnings 
reliability (Hypothesis Two), and as a boundary condition to determine 
management’s incentive to manage earnings (Hypothesis Four).  
• OLS regression is used to estimate abnormal accruals as measured by the 
modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) model. 
When testing variables representing corporate governance, the analysis is carried 
out via three stages. First, the relationship between the magnitude of abnormal accruals 
and corporate governance variables is tested in Hypothesis One. The second stage 
assesses the relationship between corporate governance variables and the earnings 
response coefficients. This is tested in Hypothesis Three. The third stage of the analysis 
examines the impact of corporate governance variables on the earnings response 
coefficients after conditioning on the magnitude of abnormal accruals. This is a test of 
Hypothesis Four. 
The following provides a general overview of the research design introduced in the 
chapter: 
1. The research uses market and corporate disclosure data collected from annual 
reports and share markets to empirically test indicators of corporate governance, 
earnings management and the information content of accounting earnings. 
2. The 1996/1997-1999/2000 financial years are the study period. Australian 
companies were required by the ASX listing rules to disclose corporate 
governance practices after 30th June 1996.  
3. The targeted sample is the top 500 listed companies on the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) as at 30th June of each financial year during the study period.  
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4. Financial, mining and regulated industries are excluded from the sample due to 
their different nature and uncommon practices. 
5. The returns-earnings relationship is represented using an empirical model from 
Easton and Harris (1991), which incorporates the level of earnings and change in 
earnings.  
6. Share returns are based on annual returns accumulated over the 12 months 
extending from nine months prior to through three months after each firm’s 
respective fiscal year-end (e.g. Easton and Harris, 1991; Ali, 1994; Cheng et al., 
1996). 
7. Due to the independence of corporate governance attributes over time, a cross-
sectional approach is used to test the empirical models.  
8. The proposed models are tested using pooled GLS regression, mean coefficients 
and the Wald test.53 
The following sections present the proposed models and state the hypotheses based on the 
propositions from Chapter Two. 
 
3.2.1 Corporate Governance-Earnings Management Model 
The study uses regression to estimate the model with earnings management as the 
dependent variable and corporate governance as the independent variables. The objective 
of the model is to provide an assessment of the impact of corporate governance on 
earnings management.  
                                                 
53 Factor analysis was used in an attempt to arrive at factor scores for important variables. The results were 
inconclusive and inconsistent across the study period. 
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Equation 3: The association between the empirical indicators of corporate governance and the 
empirical indicator of earnings management. 
AAAj = γ 0 + γ1 OWNCONjt + γ 2 CEOjt + γ 3 BRDSZEjt + γ 4 BRDINDjt + γ 5 AUDINDjt + 
γ 6 AUDCMPjtj + γ 7 OWNOUTjt + γ 8 OWNMANjt + γ 9 DEBTRLjt + υj  
AAAjt the absolute value of the residual from the modified Jones (Dechow et 
al., 1995) model. 
OWNCONjt the percentage of total shares held by the top 20 shareholders divided 
by the total number of shares. 
CEOjt Equals 1 if the chairman of the board is not an independent director. 
Otherwise, CEOjt = 0. 
BRDSZEjt the number of directors on the board. 
BRDINDjt the number of independent directors divided by the total number of 
directors on the board. 
AUDINDjt the number of independent directors on the audit committee divided 
by the total number of directors on the audit committee. 
 
AUDCMPjt the number of independent directors with financial expertise on the 
audit committee divided by the total number of directors on the audit 
committee. 
OWNOUTjt the percentage of total shares held by independent directors divided by 
the total number of shares. 
OWNMANjt the percentage of total shares held by executive directors divided by 
the total number of shares. 
DEBTRLjt total long-term borrowings divided by total assets. 
 
Using US and UK data, prior studies found a significant association between 
corporate governance and earnings management. Similar results are anticipated in this 
study using Australian data. While CEO dominance is expected to display a positive 
association with the magnitude of abnormal accruals, all other corporate governance 
variables are expected to display a negative association with the magnitude of abnormal 
accruals. 
Hypothesis One: The coefficients of regressing the magnitude of abnormal accruals on 
the empirical indicators of corporate governance are statistically different from zero.54 
                                                 
54 As corporate governance is represented by nine variables, there are nine sub-hypotheses and the primary 
hypothesis is expressed in general terms as the directionality of the coefficient depends on the nature of 
each corporate governance variable. 
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Hypothesis One can be stated in terms of the regression coefficients from Equation 3 (see 
Table 3-1). 
Table 3-1: Hypothesis One 
Hypothesis One A: The coefficient of regressing the magnitude of abnormal accruals on 
the empirical indictor of ownership concentration is statistically less than zero. 
H1A0: γ 1 ≥ 0, H1A1: γ 1 < 0 
Hypothesis One B: The coefficient of regressing the magnitude of abnormal accruals on 
the empirical indictor of CEO dominance is statistically greater than zero. 
H1B0: γ 2 ≤ 0 H1B1: γ 2 > 0 
Hypothesis One C: The coefficient of regressing the magnitude of abnormal accruals on 
the empirical indictor of board size is statistically less than zero. 
H1C0: γ 3 ≥ 0 H1C1: γ 3 < 0 
Hypothesis One D: The coefficient of regressing the magnitude of abnormal accruals on 
the empirical indictor of board independence is statistically less than zero. 
H1D0: γ 4 ≥ 0 H1D1: γ 4 < 0 
Hypothesis One E: The coefficient of regressing the magnitude of abnormal accruals on 
the empirical indictor of audit committee independence is statistically less than zero. 
H1E0: γ 5 ≥ 0 H1E1: γ 5 < 0,  
Hypothesis One F: The coefficient of regressing the magnitude of abnormal accruals on 
the empirical indictor of audit committee competence is statistically less than zero. 
H1F0: γ 6 ≥ 0 H1F1: γ 6 < 0 
Hypothesis One G: The coefficient of regressing the magnitude of abnormal accruals on 
the empirical indictor of independent director’s ownership is statistically less than zero. 
H1G0: γ 7 ≥ 0 H1G1: γ 7 < 0 
Hypothesis One H: The coefficient of regressing the magnitude of abnormal accruals on 
the empirical indictor of managerial ownership is statistically less than zero. 
H1H0: γ 8 ≥ 0 H1H1: γ 8 < 0 
Hypothesis One I: The coefficient of regressing the magnitude of abnormal accruals on 
the empirical indictor of debt reliance is statistically less than zero. 
H1I0: γ 9 ≥ 0 H1I1: γ 9 < 0 
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3.2.2 Earnings Management-Earnings Informativeness Model 
The study uses the Easton and Harris (1991) model to capture the additional 
information provided by the empirical indictor of earnings management to the returns-
earnings regression. As the explanatory power of earnings may be affected by the 
reliability of earnings, it is expected that the empirical indictor of earnings management 
reduce the earnings response coefficients and increase the overall explanatory power of 
earnings (see Equation 4). 
Equation 4: The association between the empirical indicator of earnings management and the 
returns-earnings (Easton and Harris, 1991) model. 
ARj = β 0 + α 0 Ejt + + α 1 Ejt AAAjt + ψ0 ∆Ejt + ψ1 ∆Ejt AAAjt + ζj 
 
ARjt the annual return accumulated for firm j for nine months prior to 
through three months after fiscal year-end. 
Ejt earnings per share scaled by beginning price, before extraordinary 
items. 
∆Ejt change in earnings per share and then scaled by beginning of period 
price for firm j. 
 
It is expected that the magnitude of abnormal accruals display a negative 
association with the earnings response coefficients. Table 3-2 displays Hypothesis Two. 
Table 3-2: Hypothesis Two 
Hypothesis Two: The interaction between the magnitude of abnormal accruals and 
earnings is less than the coefficient for earnings in the absence of abnormal accruals. 
H20: (α0 + α 1) ≥ β1, (ψ 0 + ψ 1) ≥ β2 H21: (α0 + α 1) < β1, (ψ 0 + ψ 1) < β2 
 
3.2.3 Corporate Governance-Earnings Informativeness Model 
The Easton and Harris (1991) model is also used to capture the additional 
information provided by the empirical indictors of corporate governance to the returns-
earnings regression. As the explanatory power of earnings may be affected by the 
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reliability of earnings, it is expected that the empirical indictors of corporate governance 
increase the earnings response coefficients and the overall explanatory power of earnings 
(see Equation 5).55 Appendix D explains the development of Equation 5. 
Equation 5: The association between the empirical indicators of corporate governance and the 
returns-earnings (Easton and Harris, 1991) model. 
ARj = β0 + ϕ0 Ejt + ϕ1 Ejt D1OWNCONjt + ϕ2 Ejt CEOjt + ϕ3 Ejt D2 BRDSZEjt + ϕ4 Ejt D3 
BRDINDjt + ϕ5 Ejt AUDINDjt + ϕ6 Ejt D4 AUDCMPjtj + ϕ7 Ejt D5 OWNOUTjt + ϕ8 Ejt D6 
OWNMANjt + ϕ9 Ejt D7DEBTRLjt + λ0 ∆Ejt + λ1 ∆Ejt D1OWNCONjt + λ2 ∆Ejt CEOjt + λ3 ∆Ejt D2 
BRDSZEjt + λ4 ∆Ejt D3 BRDINDjt + λ5 ∆Ejt AUDINDjt + λ6 ∆Ejt D4 AUDCMPjt + λ7 ∆Ejt D5 
OWNOUTjt + λ8 ∆Ejt D6 OWNMANjt + λ9 ∆Ejt D7DEBTRLjt + εj 
D1j Equals 1 if OWNCONj is greater than its yearly cross-sectional median. 
Otherwise, D1j = 0. 
D2j Equals 1 if BRDSZEj is greater than its yearly cross-sectional median. 
Otherwise, D1j = 0. 
D3j Equals 1 if BRDINDj is greater than its yearly cross-sectional median. 
Otherwise, D1j = 0. 
D4j Equals 1 if AUDCMPj is greater than its yearly cross-sectional median. 
Otherwise, D1j = 0. 
D5j Equals 1 if OWNOUTj is greater than its yearly cross-sectional median. 
Otherwise, D1j = 0. 
D6j Equals 1 if OWNMANj is greater than its yearly cross-sectional median. 
Otherwise, D1j = 0. 
D7j Equals 1 if DEBTRLj is greater than its yearly cross-sectional median. 
Otherwise, D1j = 0. 
 
While CEO dominance is expected to display a negative association with the 
earnings response coefficients, all other corporate governance variables are expected to 
display a positive association with the earnings response coefficients.  
Hypothesis Three: The interactions between earnings and the empirical indicators of 
corporate governance are different from zero and from the coefficient for earnings in the 
absence of corporate governance.56 
                                                 
55 Equation five can also be presented in the following format: 
ARj = β0 + ϕ0 Ejt + ϕ Ejt DxjCGjt + λ0 ∆Ejt + λ ∆Ejt DxjCGjt + εj 
DxjCGjt  = D1OWNCONGjt + CEOjt + D2BRDSZEjt + D3BRDINDjt + AUDINDjt + D4AUDCMPjtj + D5 
OWNOUTjt + D6 OWNMANjt + D7DEBTRLjt 
56 As corporate governance is represented by nine variables, there are nine sub-hypotheses and the primary 
hypothesis is expressed in general terms as the directionality of the coefficient depends on the nature of 
each corporate governance variable. 
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Hypothesis Three can be stated in terms of the regression coefficients from Equation 5 
(see Table 3-3). 
 
Table 3-3: Hypothesis Three 
Hypothesis Three A: The interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of ownership 
concentration is different from zero and greater than the coefficient for earnings in the absence of 
ownership concentration. 
H3A0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 1) ≤ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 1) ≤ β2 H3A1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 1) > β1 , (λ 0 + λ 1) > β2 
Hypothesis Three B: The interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of CEO dominance is 
different from zero and less than the coefficient for earnings in the absence of CEO dominance. 
H3B0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 2) ≥ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 2) ≥ β2 H3B1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 2) < β1 , (λ 0 + λ 2) < β2 
Hypothesis Three C: The interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of board size is 
different from zero and greater than the coefficient for earnings in the absence of board size. 
H3C0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 3) ≤ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 3) ≤ β2 H3C1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 3) > β1 , (λ 0 + λ 3) > β2 
Hypothesis Three D: The interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of board independence 
is different from zero and greater than the coefficient for earnings in the absence of board independence. 
H3D0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 4) ≤ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 4) ≤ β2 H3D1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 4) > β1 , (λ 0 + λ 4) > β2 
Hypothesis Three E: The interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of audit committee 
independence is different from zero and greater than the coefficient for earnings in the absence of audit 
committee independence. 
H3E0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 5) ≤ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 5) ≤ β2 H3E1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 5) > β1 , (λ 0 + λ 5) > β2 
Hypothesis Three F: The interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of audit committee 
competence is different from zero and greater than the coefficient for earnings in the absence of audit 
committee competence. 
H3F0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 6) ≤ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 6) ≤ β2 H3F1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 6) > β1 , (λ 0 + λ 6) > β2 
Hypothesis Three G: The interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of independent 
director’s ownership is different from zero and greater than the coefficient for earnings in the absence of 
independent director’s ownership. 
H3G0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 7) ≤ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 7) ≤ β2 H3G1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 7) > β1 , (λ 0 + λ 7) > β2 
Hypothesis Three H: The interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of managerial 
ownership is different from zero and greater than the coefficient for earnings in the absence of managerial 
ownership. 
H3H0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 8) ≤ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 8) ≤ β2 H3H1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 8) > β1 , (λ 0 + λ 8) > β2 
Hypothesis Three I: The interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of debt reliance is 
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different from zero and greater than the coefficient for earnings in the absence of debt reliance. 
H3I0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 9) ≤ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 9) ≤ β2 H3I1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 9) > β1 , (λ 0 + λ 9) > β2 
 
As the explanatory power of earnings may be affected by earnings management, it 
is expected that conditioning on earnings management enhances the overall explanatory 
power of earnings by improving the association between the empirical indictors of 
corporate governance and the earnings response coefficients (see Equation 6).57 Appendix 
D explains the development of Equation 6. 
 
 
Equation 6: The association between the empirical indicators of corporate governance conditioned on 
the empirical indicator of earnings management and the returns-earnings (Easton and Harris, 1991) 
model. 
ARj = β0 + ϕ0 Ejt + ϕ1 Ejt D0D1OWNCONjt + ϕ2 Ejt D0 CEOjt + ϕ3 Ejt D0D2 BRDSZEjt + ϕ4 Ejt 
D0D3 BRDINDjt + ϕ5 Ejt D0 AUDINDjt + ϕ6 Ejt D0D4 AUDCMPjtj + ϕ7 Ejt D0D5 OWNOUTjt + ϕ8 
Ejt D0D6 OWNMANjt + ϕ9 Ejt D0D7DEBTRLjt + λ0 ∆Ejt + λ1 ∆Ejt D0D1OWNCONjt + λ2 ∆Ejt D0 
CEOjt + λ3 ∆Ejt D0D2 BRDSZEjt + λ4 ∆Ejt D0D3 BRDINDjt + λ5 ∆Ejt D0 AUDINDjt + λ6 ∆Ejt 
D0D4 AUDCMPjt + λ7 ∆Ejt D0D5 OWNOUTjt + λ8 ∆Ejt D0D6 OWNMANjt + λ9 ∆Ejt D0D7 
DEBTRLjt + εj 
D0j Equals 1 if the magnitude of abnormal accruals is above its 
yearly cross-sectional median. Otherwise, D0j = 0. 
 
Hypothesis Four: The coefficients for the interaction between earnings and the empirical 
indicators of corporate governance conditioned on the magnitude of abnormal accruals 
are different from zero and from the earnings response coefficient in the absence of 
abnormal accruals and/or corporate governance.58 
                                                 
57 Equation six can also be presented in the following format: 
ARj = β0 + ϕ0 Ejt + ϕ Ejt D0 DxjCGjt + λ0 ∆Ejt + λ ∆Ejt D0 DxjCGjt + εj 
DxjCGjt  = D1OWNCONGjt + CEOjt + D2BRDSZEjt + D3BRDINDjt + AUDINDjt + D4AUDCMPjtj + D5 
OWNOUTjt + D6 OWNMANjt + D7DEBTRLjt 
58 As corporate governance is represented by nine variables, there are nine sub-hypotheses and the primary 
hypothesis is expressed in general terms as the directionality of the coefficient depends on the nature of 
each corporate governance variable. 
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Table 3-4: Hypothesis Four 
Hypothesis Four A: The coefficients for the interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of 
ownership concentration conditioned on the magnitude of abnormal accruals are different from zero and 
greater than the earnings response coefficient in the absence of abnormal accruals and/or ownership 
concentration. 
H4A0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 1) ≤ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 1) ≤ β2 H4A1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 1) > β1 , (λ 0 + λ 1) > β2 
Hypothesis Four B: The coefficients for the interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of 
CEO dominance conditioned on the magnitude of abnormal accruals are different from zero and less than 
the earnings response coefficient in the absence of abnormal accruals and/or CEO dominance. 
H4B0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 2) ≥ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 2) ≥ β2 H4B1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 2) < β1 , (λ 0 + λ 2) < β2 
Hypothesis Four C: The coefficients for the interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of 
board size conditioned on the magnitude of abnormal accruals are different from zero and greater than the 
earnings response coefficient in the absence of abnormal accruals and/or board size. 
H4C0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 3) ≤ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 3) ≤ β2 H4C1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 3) > β1 , (λ 0 + λ 3) > β2 
Hypothesis Four D: The coefficients for the interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of 
board independence conditioned on the magnitude of abnormal accruals are different from zero and greater 
than the earnings response coefficient in the absence of abnormal accruals and/or board independence. 
H4D0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 4) ≤ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 4) ≤ β2 H4D1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 4) > β1 , (λ 0 + λ 4) > β2 
Hypothesis Four E: The coefficients for the interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of 
audit committee independence conditioned on the magnitude of abnormal accruals are different from zero 
and greater than the earnings response coefficient in the absence of abnormal accruals and/or audit 
committee independence. 
H4E0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 5) ≤ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 5) ≤ β2 H4E1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 5) > β1 , (λ 0 + λ 5) > β2 
Hypothesis Four F: The coefficients for the interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of 
audit committee competence conditioned on the magnitude of abnormal accruals are different from zero 
and greater than the earnings response coefficient in the absence of abnormal accruals and/or audit 
committee competence. 
H4F0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 6) ≤ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 6) ≤ β2 H4F1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 6) > β1 , (λ 0 + λ 6) > β2 
Hypothesis Four G: The coefficients for the interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of 
independent director’s ownership conditioned on the magnitude of abnormal accruals are different from 
zero and greater than the earnings response coefficient in the absence of abnormal accruals and/or 
independent director’s ownership. 
H4G0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 7) ≤ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 7) ≤ β2 H4G1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 7) > β1 , (λ 0 + λ 7) > β2 
Hypothesis Four H: The coefficients for the interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of 
managerial ownership conditioned on the magnitude of abnormal accruals are different from zero and 
greater than the earnings response coefficient in the absence of abnormal accruals and/or managerial 
ownership. 
H4H0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 8) ≤ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 8) ≤ β2 H4H1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 8) > β1 , (λ 0 + λ 8) > β2 
Hypothesis Four I: The coefficients for the interaction between earnings and the empirical indicator of 
debt reliance conditioned on the magnitude of abnormal accruals are different from zero and greater than 
the earnings response coefficient in the absence of abnormal accruals and/or debt reliance. 
H4I0: (ϕ0 + ϕ 9) ≤ β1 , (λ 0 + λ 9) ≤ β2 H4I1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 9) > β1 , (λ 0 + λ 9) > β2 
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Details of the study’s research design are discussed in different sections of the 
chapter.  
3.3 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION 
PROCEDURES 
3.3.1 Study period 
The study focuses on the 1996/1997, 1997/1998, 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 
financial years because of the following points: 
1. Corporate governance listing rules of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
became effective on 30th June 1996.59 ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 requires listed 
companies to disclose their corporate governance practices.60  
2. During the same study period managers had an incentive to manage earnings in 
order to smooth the impact of the Asian crisis on financial performance. 
Corporate governance is expected to be more effective when managers have an 
incentive to manage earnings. 
3. Limiting the study period to four years would make the process of hand-collecting 
extensive manual data practical.  
3.3.2 Sample selection 
The selection procedure follows two stages. The first stage commenced with 
selecting the top 500 Australian listed firms by total market capitalisation as at 30th June 
of each financial year. Targeting the top 500 Australian listed firms would ensure 
                                                 
59 During the study period exchange rates of Asian currencies were affected by the Asian economic crisis. 
As a result, the impact of gains and losses from foreign exchanges on accounting earnings will be removed 
from the accounting earnings used in the model. Such a procedure will direct the focus to measuring 
shareholders’ response to change of accounting earnings relating to performance rather change in earnings 
relating to external economic factors. 
60 Previously known as ASX Listing Rule 3C(3)(j). 
 68
satisfactory statistical power in the tests and would also ensure maximum data 
availability. 
In the second stage, the rest of the sample is retained after excluding regulated, 
financial and mining industries (see Table 3-5). These industries are excluded due to the 
following:  
1. Revenues in regulated industries are set on fixed accounting rates of return, which 
gives firms an incentive to adopt conservative accounting practices to defer 
income recognition. Given that the deferring of income recognition is a common 
practice for regulated industries, it would be hard to uncover management’s 
opportunistic manipulations.  
2. Financial industries are excluded due to their special accounting practices that 
make the estimation of discretionary (abnormal) accruals difficult, as explained in 
previous empirical studies (Peasnell et al., 1998, 2000a; Chtourou et al., 2001).  
3. Mining firms are excluded due to empirical evidence supporting the view that 
investors recognise the value inherent in operating flexibility in the mining 
industry (Kelly, 2004). Thus, the market value of mining firms differs from other 
firms in that it includes other major factors, such value of any real operating 
options (Kelly, 2004; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Brennan and Schwartz, 1985). 
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Table 3-5: Sample size for the study period. 
Description 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 Total 
Number of 
Firms 
Top 500 on ASX 
(according to 
Connect 4) 
500 506 513 500 2019 
Insufficient/missing 
data 
(45) (54) (39) (64) (202) 
Regulated & Mining 
Industries, and 
Financial Sector 
(265) (253) (247) (215) (980) 
Industries are too 
small 
(13) (9) (9) (14) (45) 
Outliers (1) (2) (7) (4) (14) 
Firms used in the 
full sample 
176 188 211 203 778 
 
OLS regression is used to estimated abnormal accruals; it is therefore necessary to 
only include industries with sufficient firm observations to ensure unbiased estimation. 
Following prior research (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996), industry 
groups with less than six observations are dropped from the sample. 
Due to the sensitivity of regressions to extreme outliers, firm observations were 
removed (see Table 3-5). The criteria used to identify outliers are adopted from Easton 
and Harris (1991).61 
The reasons non-top 500 Australian public companies listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX) were excluded are:  
1) Information relating to the top 500 companies on ASX is more freely available 
and more standardised than non-top 500 companies on ASX.  
                                                 
61 If earnings level scaled by beginning price or change in earnings scaled by beginning price are above 1.5 
or below -1.5, then it is considered to be an outlier. 
 70
2) Small firms do not implement corporate governance mechanisms to the same 
level as large firms. A survey from the Centre for Corporate Law and Securities 
Regulations (CCLSR) found that the extent and quality of corporate governance 
disclosure is typically greater for larger companies than smaller companies 
(Ramsay and Hoad, 1998). The CCLSR defines ‘small companies’ as 
companies not ranked in the top 500 companies on ASX. Carson (1996) found 
that larger companies were more likely to disclose information regarding 
corporate governance practices in their annual reports than smaller companies. 
 
3.3.3 Data collection 
Monthly share prices of the top 500 ASX listed companies during 1996-1999 are 
calculated from daily share prices (source: SIRCA database). Accounting data are hand-
collected from 1996/1997, 1997/1998, 1998/1999, 1999/2000 annual reports for each 
firm (source: Connect 4 database). Corporate governance practices are also hand 
collected and quantified from the 1996/1997, 1997/1998, 1998/1999, 1999/2000 annual 
reports (source: Connect 4 database). The process involves an examination of financial 
statements to identify the required data from income and cash flow statements, balance 
sheet, and footnote disclosure items. 
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3.4 OPERATIONALISATION OF THE CONSTRUCTS 
3.4.1 Information Content of Accounting Earnings 
3.4.1.1 Development of the empirical model 
One measure of the information content of earnings is its explanatory power for 
share returns. Tests relating to the information content of accounting earnings are conduct 
in two steps. The first step is to examine the relation between earnings and returns 
irrespective of indicators of earnings reliability. The model shown below assumes that 
both earnings level and earnings change help explain changes in share prices.  
Equation 7: The Easton and Harris (1991) model 
ARj = β0 + β 1 Ej + β 2 ∆Ej + ξj 
ARj is the annual return accumulated for firm j for nine months prior to through three months after fiscal 
year-end. 
Ej is earnings per share. 
∆Ej is change in earnings per share. 
 
Unlike all prior studies in the corporate governance and earnings management 
literature, the information content of accounting is tested by using earnings level and 
change in earnings as proxies for unexpected earnings. The approach is motivated by the 
following reasons: 
• Brown et al. (1987) demonstrates that multiple proxies for unexpected earnings is 
likely to reduce measurement error bias in regression estimates of the coefficients 
relating to unexpected earnings and unexpected returns. 
• Easton and Harris (1991) provide evidence both variables (earnings level and change 
in earnings) complement each other and do not substitute each other. 
• Residual income valuation models (e.g. Ohlson model) express firm value as the 
sum of the book value of equity and the present value of future abnormal earnings 
 72
(Ota, 2001). If share prices are a linear function of only book value of equity and 
expected abnormal earnings, then share returns are a linear function of level of 
earnings and change of earnings.62 
Previous practices are followed in measuring variables in Equation 7. The annual 
return is estimated as the annual returns accumulated over the 12 months extending from 
nine months prior to through three months after each firm’s respective fiscal year-end 
(e.g. Easton and Harris, 1991; Ali, 1994; Cheng et al., 1996).  
The normal practice is also to scale variables by the beginning price (Christie, 
1987). The practice was initiated to cope with heteroscedasticity (see White, 1980). 
Accordingly, earnings and change in earnings (in Equation 7) are deflated by beginning 
of year market price in the model. 
The second step of the analysis is to test the information content of earnings 
conditional on the reliability of earnings. The slope of earnings response coefficient is a 
measure of the information content of earnings (e.g. Ali, 1994; Cho and Jung, 1991; 
Collins and Kothari, 1989). The primary proposition of the research is that corporate 
governance and earnings management, as indicators of earnings reliability, should affect 
the slope of the earnings response coefficient through their impact on shareholders’ 
perception of earnings.  
The Wald test (see Greene 2000) is used as one of the tests to find out whether the 
earnings response coefficient after conditioning on earnings reliability are significantly 
different from the earnings response coefficient before introducing the indicators of 
                                                 
62 Deng and Lev (1998) recognise that the share prices (price model) may suffer from size-related problems 
(scale effect) and may not be well specified. Scale effects are generally understood to arise from the fact 
that large (small) firms will have large (small) market capitalization, large (small) book value, and large 
(small) earnings. In contrast, share returns (returns model) do not suffer such problems (scale-free) because 
the variables used in the model are deflated by the lagged market value of equity and therefore scale-free 
(Easton, 1999; Easton and Sommers, 2003). 
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earnings reliability.63 Three major tests are conducted using the slope of the earnings 
response coefficient. They are:  
1. Testing the impact of earnings management (as an indicator of earnings 
reliability) on the information content of accounting earnings;  
2.  Testing the impact of corporate governance attributes (as indicators of earnings 
reliability) on the information content of accounting earnings; and 
3. Testing the impact of corporate governance attributes (as indicators of earnings 
reliability) on the information content of accounting earnings after conditioning 
on earnings management (as an indictor of managers’ incentive to manage 
earnings). 
3.4.1.2 Cross-sectional vs. Firm specific time-series  
When testing the slope of the earnings response coefficient, a cross-sectional 
approach is used due to its general advantages, such as flexibility in the reoccurrence of 
observations over time. A cross-sectional approach is selected over a time-series 
approach due to the independence of corporate governance observations over time. Other 
factors also support the selection of a cross-sectional approach. They are:  
1. While firm-specific time-series response coefficients are slightly higher than 
cross-sectional (Teets and Wasley, 1996), the magnitude of earnings response 
coefficient should not matter as much as providing evidence that earnings 
response coefficients for firms with effective corporate governance or low 
earnings management are higher than firms with ineffective corporate governance 
or high earnings management. The cross-sectional approach tends to address the 
existing research question. 
                                                 
63 See section 3.5.3.4 for further information on the Wald test. 
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2. Studies (e.g. Collins and Kothari, 1989) supporting the view that earnings 
response coefficients vary over time emphasis the line of reasoning that a time-
series approach cannot serve in measuring the impact of the independent 
observations. Given that corporate governance, earnings management, and 
earnings response coefficients vary over time, a cross-sectional approach should 
be selected. 
3. Extreme levels of earnings management are not accounted for when estimating 
earnings response coefficient using a time-series model. The explanation is that 
using a time series eliminates extreme levels of earnings management by 
combining them with the reversal effect over time for each firm. A cross-sectional 
approach is more effective in accounting for extreme cases of earning 
management by separating them from any reversal effects.  
Following Collins and Kothari (1989), Ali (1994) and Cheng et al. (1996), the 
cross-sections will be pooled over time. A pooled cross-section over time would display 
an over time picture of the results without the disadvantages of a time series approach. 
3.4.1.3 Controlling for cross-sectional determinants of earnings response coefficient  
Cross-sectional regression ignores earnings response coefficient variation across 
firms and uses all observations to estimate a single response coefficient for each year. 
Other studies empirically show that earnings response coefficients vary across firms due 
to firm specific factors (e.g. Lipe, 1990; Collins and Kothari, 1989). Including such 
factors would reduce the bias in the cross-sectional coefficients caused by correlated 
omitted variables. These factors are described in the literature as ‘determinants of 
earnings response coefficient’ (Cho and Jung, 1991). Systematic risk and growth are 
major determinants of earnings response coefficient.  
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An inverse relationship exists between price reactions and firm risk (Lipe, 1990; 
Collins and Kothari, 1989). The higher the systematic risk the smaller the present value 
of a given increase in expected future earnings and cash flows caused by current 
unexpected earnings (Collins and Kothari, 1989).  
Empirical studies use beta as a proxy for systematic risk (e.g. Vafeas 2000). Beta is 
a determinant of a firm’s expected rate of return (Cho and Jung, 1991) and is measured 
through market model CAPM using the available time-series of monthly returns and 
market returns, as measured by the ASX All-Ordinaries index (Gul et al., 2002). 
According to the standard share price growth model developed by (Cheng et al., 
1999), growth is already incorporated in the constant variable of the cross-sectional 
returns-earnings relationship (see appendix E for further details). Hence, growth is not 
controlled for when testing the hypotheses in the current study. 
 
3.4.2 Corporate Governance 
Operationalisation of corporate governance attributes follows previous practice in 
the literature. Table 3-6 shows the operationalisation of explaining constructs.  
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Table 3-6: Operationalisation of explaining constructs 
Corporate Governance 
attributes 
Operationalisation 
Ownership Concentration Percentage of total shares held by the top 20 
shareholders divided by the total number of shares. 
CEO dominance One if the chairman of the board is not an independent 
director. Otherwise, it equals zero. 
Board Size Number of directors on the board. 
Board Independence  Number of independent directors divided by the total 
number of directors on the board. 
Audit Committee 
Independence 
Number of independent directors on the audit 
committee divided by the total number of directors on 
the audit committee. 
Audit Committee Competence  Number of independent directors with financial 
expertise on the audit committee divided by the total 
number of directors on the audit committee. 
Independent Directors’ 
Ownership 
Percentage of total shares held by independent 
directors divided by the total number of shares. 
Managerial Ownership Percentage of total shares held by executive directors 
divided by the total number of shares. 
Debt Reliance Total long-term borrowings divided by total assets.  
 
The explaining constructs are operationalised as follows: 
1. Ownership concentration 
Following previous empirical research (e.g. Ramsay and Blair, 1993; Crough, 1980), the 
percentage of holdings by the top twenty shareholders is used to operationalise ownership 
concentration. Annual reports of listed companies in Australia are required to disclose the 
investment size of the top twenty shareholders.  
2. CEO dominance 
Following prior studies, CEO dominance is represented by a dummy variable. While 
prior studies measure CEO dominance as whether the CEO is the chairman (e.g. Gul and 
Leung, 2004; Dechow et al., 1996), the current study uses a broader measure of CEO 
dominance. A CEO is considered powerful if the chairman is not independent of 
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management. The measure is based on the notion that the chairman is less likely to hold 
the CEO accountable if the board chair is the CEO, a current executive of the firm, or a 
former executive of the firm within the past five years. 
3. Board size 
Following prior studies (e.g. Vafeas, 2000; Beasley, 1996), board size is measured as the 
total number of directors on the board. Annual reports of listed companies in Australia 
disclose information relating to board structure. 
4. Board independence 
The percentage of independent directors on the board is used to operationalise board 
independence.64 Following regulatory recommendations, an independent director is 
defined as a director who has not been employed in any executive capacity by the 
company within the last five years. Annual reports of listed companies in Australia are 
not required to disclose information about the independence of non-executives. The 
current study uses other sources of information to help determine the independence of 
directors.  
5. Audit committee independence 
Audit committee independence is operationalised as the continuous variable representing 
percentage of independent directors sitting on the audit committee (e.g. Bryan et al., 
2004). Director independence is measured similarly to the approach used in measuring 
board independence.  
6. Audit committee competence 
                                                 
64 Board independence is not measured using a dichotomous variable relating to whether outsiders have a 
majority on the board or not, because only 6% of the sample have below 50% outsiders. Thus, board 
independence will not be a variable after using the median to remove the confounding effect. 
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The percentage of independent directors with financial expertise sitting on the audit 
committee is a recently introduced measure of ‘Audit committee competence’. The 
measure is intended to merge independence and expertise. The third recommendation of 
the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) is used as the basis for measuring the existence of 
financial expertise. The recommendation states that financial expertise is demonstrated by 
“past employment experience in finance or accounting, requisite professional certification 
in accounting, or any other comparable experience or background which results in the 
individual’s financial sophistication, including being or having been a CEO or other 
senior officer with financial oversight responsibilities”. Annual reports of listed 
companies in Australia are not required to disclose extensive information about directors’ 
expertise or any information about the independence of non-executives. Other sources of 
information are used to help determine such information if it is not disclosed through the 
annual reports. 
7. Independent directors’ ownership 
Following prior studies (e.g. Beasley, 1996), independent directors’ ownership is 
measured as the number of share owned by independent directors divided by the firm’s 
total issued ordinary shares. Director independence is measured similarly to the approach 
used in measuring board independence. 
8. Managerial ownership 
Following prior studies (e.g. Hutchinson and Gul, 2004; Gul et al., 2002), managerial 
ownership is measured as executive directors ownership divided by the firm’s total issued 
ordinary shares. Firms listed on the ASX are not required to disclose shareholding of all 
executives, but are required to report executive directors’ share ownership in the annual 
reports. 
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9. Debt reliance 
Following prior studies (e.g. Gul and Tsui, 2001; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996), debt 
reliance is represent by the level of leverage. Leverage is calculated as total long-term 
debt divided by total assets. 
Each corporate governance attribute must be at a threshold level. It is possible that 
although each corporate governance attribute is high, shareholders may not perceive it to 
be sufficiently high and would perceive it to have a limited contribution. As a result, all 
operational variables (except for CEO dominance and audit committee independence) are 
partitioned by a dummy variable representing the cross-sectional median to overcome the 
confounding effect of perceived-limited-monitoring contributions.65 
Given that the task of corporate governance is to align managers’ objectives with 
the interests of shareholders (Maher and Andersson, 2000), the impact of corporate 
governance is important only when managers are acting opportunistically. When 
managerial behaviour is consistent with the interests of shareholders, the monitoring 
contribution of corporate governance attributes becomes restricted.  
 
3.4.3 Earnings Management 
Earnings management is used in three separate tests. 66 The descriptions of these 
tests are as follows: 
1. When testing the association between corporate governance and earnings 
management, earnings management is used to reflect managers’ capacity to act 
                                                 
65 While CEO dominance is already a dummy variable, the median of audit committee independence equals 
100%. 
66 While opportunistic accrual management often difficult to observe directly, analysis of patterns in 
accruals may reveal to investors that cash flow changes are moving in a different direction from accruals 
(Ayres, 1994). 
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opportunistically. The empirical indicator of earnings management is used as a 
continuous variable in this test. 
2. When testing the association between earnings management and earnings 
response coefficient, earnings management is used as an indicator for earnings 
reliability. Earnings management is represented by a continuous variable. 
3. When testing the association between corporate governance and earnings response 
coefficients, earnings management is used as a condition boundary to determine 
whether managers have an incentive to manage earnings. The empirical model is 
based on the proposal that managers in firms with low abnormal accruals have no 
incentive to manage earnings and managers in firms with high abnormal accruals 
have an incentive to manage earnings. The empirical indicator of earnings 
management is used as a dummy variable to partition sample firms and focus on 
firms with high earnings management in order to fully capture the impact of the 
existence of management’s incentive to alter accounting earnings on the relation 
between corporate governance and the information content of earnings.  
From a permanence of earnings perspective, earnings management should mean to 
shareholders that accounting earnings are less likely to reflect the natural effect of a 
firm’s transactions and events. Kothari’s (2001) argues that opportunistic earnings 
management are not permanent. Subramanyam (1996) provides evidence supporting 
Kothari’s (2001) argument that opportunistic earnings are transitory. Subramanyam 
(1996) finds that share returns’ response to non-discretionary earnings is higher than 
discretionary earnings.  
To determine the level of earnings management in a firm, a measure of the 
proportion of earnings that are not managed is needed. Although managed earnings are 
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hard to measure, the level of managed earnings is determined by estimating the 
unmanaged proportion of earnings.  
As accruals provide management with the opportunity to alter earnings, abnormal 
accruals are used as an empirical indicator of earnings management (Bowman and 
Navissi, 2003; Batov et al., 2001, Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b; Dechow et al., 1995; 
DeFond and Jimbalvo, 1994; Boynton et al., 1992; Jones, 1991). Abnormal and normal 
accruals are used to measure managed and unmanaged earnings, respectively.  
McNichols (2000) discusses three research designs commonly used in earnings 
management literature, which are shown in Table 3-7. McNichols (2000) argues that 
selecting a research design to measure earnings management depends on the question 
addressed by the research. Two of the three research designs focus on accruals 
management rather than earnings management, because of the following: 
1. Cash earnings are less likely to be managed, because they are hard to manipulate. 
2. Accounting accruals are the favoured instrument for earnings management 
(Schipper, 1989; Burilovich and Kattelus, 1997).  
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Table 3-7: Research designs from the earnings management literature. 
Research design in the earnings management 
literature 
Studies implementing the design 
Aggregate Accruals Models (e.g. Kothari et al., 2001; DuCharme, 2001; 
Erickson and Wang, 1999; DeFond and 
Subramanyam, 1998; Becker et al., 1998; 
Han and Wang, 1998 ; Dechow et al., 
1995; Jones, 1991; DeAngelo, 1986; Healy, 
1985) 
Specific Accrual Models (e.g. Beaver and McNichols, 1998; 
Beneish, 1997; Beaver and Engel, 1996; 
Petroni, 1992; McNichols and Wilson, 
1988) 
Frequency Distribution Approach (e.g. Degeorge et al., 1999; Myers and 
Skinner, 1999; Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997) 
 
In general, aggregate accruals models have significant advantages over specific 
accruals when the research seeks to understand the explanatory consequences of other 
variables. McNichols (2000) provides the following reasons to justify the selection of the 
aggregate accruals approach over specific accruals approach: 
1. While the specific accrual models approach is not flexible in investigating 
additional variables, the aggregate accruals models approach allows the 
control for additional variables (i.e. corporate governance). 
2. Using a specific accrual model may limit the generalisability of the findings, 
because the number of firms for which a specific accrual is managed may be 
small relative to the number of firms with aggregate accruals (Beneish, 
2001). 
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3. If it is not clear which accrual management might be used to manage 
earnings, then the power of a specific accrual test for earnings management 
is reduced.67 
4. If a research aims to explore the association between earnings management 
and other hypothesised factors, then a specific accrual model is less 
tractable because it requires a separate model for each accrual likely to be 
influenced by the hypothesised factors. 
5. Finally, the large number of studies published using aggregate accruals 
models indicates the wide acceptance of the aggregate accruals approach as 
a proper proxy for earnings management. 
Aggregate accruals approach is selected over frequency distribution approach 
because of the following reasons: 
1. Holland (2004) concludes that the assumption of symmetry used by the 
frequency distribution approach in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) to test for 
the prevalence of earnings management can only be justified where there is 
a known symmetrical distribution for the data in question. 
2. Durtschi and Easton (2004) state that there is no unequivocal evidence 
supporting the pervasive presumption that the discontinuities at zero in the 
frequency distribution approach are due earnings management. They 
provide evidence suggesting that the discontinuity is likely to reflect a 
tendency for analysts to avoid coverage of firms with small loses, rather 
than being an indication of earnings management. 
                                                 
67 Prior studies do not specify any accruals item that is specifically associated with corporate governance 
attributes; and therefore does not promote the use of specific accrual models in corporate governance 
studies. 
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3. Frequency distribution approach measures discretion over earnings as the 
behaviour of earnings after they are managed. Measuring the behaviour of 
earnings after management does not help test the propositions presented in 
Chapter Two. 
4. Frequency distribution approach does not differentiate between 
discretionary (abnormal) and non-discretionary (normal) accruals 
(McNichols, 2000). Not being able to differentiate between accruals does 
not satisfy the need to measure management’s incentives to manage 
earnings, as discussed in Chapter Two.  
5. Frequency distribution approach provides results specifying which group of 
firms will manage earnings rather than forming a better measure of 
discretionary (abnormal) accruals (McNichols, 2000). The propositions 
presented in the previous chapter require the measuring of discretionary 
(abnormal) accruals.  
The aggregate accruals approach is selected due to three factors. First, it captures 
the net effect of all accounting estimations and choices that influence reported earnings. 
This factor is needed because the corporate governance literature does not specify certain 
accounting manipulations to be meaningfully related to corporate governance. Second, 
examining the behaviour of total discretionary accruals fulfils the need to measure 
whether managers had an incentive to manage earnings. Managers only manage earnings 
when they have an incentive to do so (e.g. Dechow et al., 2000; Degeorge et al., 1999). 
Finally, the aggregate accruals approach has been the primary focus of earnings 
management studies measuring opportunistic earnings management (McNichols, 2000). 
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3.4.3.1 Aggregate Accruals Models 
Healy (1985) argues that accruals modify the timing of accounting earnings and are 
composed of discretionary accruals (abnormal accruals) and non-discretionary accruals 
(normal accruals). Prior research documented that firms use discretionary accruals to 
practice earnings management (eg. Kasznik, 1999; Hall and Stammerjohan, 1997; 
Robinson and Grant, 1997; Dechow et al., 1995; Gaver et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 
1995; Warfield et al., 1995; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Perry and Williams, 1994; 
Sweeny, 1994; Cahan, 1992; Jones, 1991; Healy, 1985). 
While non-discretionary accruals represents accruals mandated by accounting 
standard setting bodies and are beyond the control of management, discretionary 
(abnormal) accruals enable managers to transfer earnings between periods and are proxies 
for earnings management (Healy, 1985; Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b). The most commonly 
used discretionary accruals models by academic researchers in the area of earnings 
management are the Jones (1991) and the modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) models 
(eg. Kothari et al., 2001; Bartov et al., 2000; Thomas and Zhang, 2000; Kasznik, 1999; 
Becker et al., 1998; Beneish, 1997; Guay et al., 1996; Subramanyam, 1996; Dechow et 
al., 1995; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Table 3-8 summaries the description and the 
limitation for each of the two models.  
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Table 3-8: Abnormal accruals models 
Model Description Limitations 
Jones (1991) Expresses accruals as a function of the 
changes in sales revenue and the level 
of gross total property, plant, and 
equipment.  
 
Has the potential to measure 
abnormal accruals poorly when 
managers exercise discretion 
over revenue, because it assumes 
that revenues are unmanaged. It 
also may provide bias accruals, 
because it omits expenses. 
Modified Jones 
model (Dechow 
et al., 1995) 
Modifies the Jones (1991) model to 
better control for the possibility of 
revenue manipulation. It attempts to 
mitigate potential bias from assuming 
manipulation-free revenues. 
 
May misestimate accruals, 
because it assumes that all 
changes in credit sales are the 
result of an earnings 
management activity. It also 
may provide bias accruals, 
because it omits expenses. 
 
Several researches argue that only the Jones and the modified Jones models appear 
to have the potential to provide reliable estimates of discretionary accruals (Kothari, 
2001; Guay et al., 1996; Subramanyam, 1996; Dechow et al., 1995).68 A brief explanation 
of the assumption each model is based on is followed (see Table 3-8 for descriptions and 
limitations):  
1. Jones (1991) model: 
Jones (1991) is motivated to capture a larger portion of managers’ manipulations 
rather than selecting a single accrual account as suggested by McNichols and Wilson 
(1988). Jones (1991) argues that accruals are influenced by economic circumstances.  
                                                 
68 A form of discretionary accruals models (Kothari et al., 2001) is based on the view that discretionary 
accrual estimates are influenced by firm performance. If discretionary accrual estimates are correlated with 
firm performance (Dechow et al. 1995; Kasznik 1999; Kothari et al. 2002), then measures of discretionary 
accruals should control for firm performance in the estimation of discretionary accruals. Such a measure is 
based on partitioning firms within each industry to deciles and then using the median return on assets of 
each portfolio to control performance. This requires a large number of firms per each industry, such as 
samples obtained from large capital markets (i.e. US markets). Given the size of firm observations in each 
industry in the sample, such an approach is not feasible to apply to samples derived from smaller markets 
(i.e. Australian markets). 
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Jones (1991) attempts to control for the effect of changing economic circumstances 
on accounting accruals by controlling changes in non-discretionary accruals. While 
sales growth controls a firm’s non-discretionary working capital, the level of 
property, plant, and equipment controls the firm’s non-discretionary depreciation 
expense (Bernard and Skinner, 1996). Jones (1991) uses the abnormal portion of total 
accruals to capture earnings management.  
2. Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
Dechow et al. (1995) explain that a weakness of the Jones (1991) model lies in its 
inability to capture the impact of sales-based manipulations, because Jones (1991) 
assumes changes in sales are associate with non-discretionary accruals. Dechow et al. 
(1995) proposes a modification that would help detect sales-based earnings 
management. While Jones (1991) implicitly assumes that revenues are non-
discretionary, Dechow et al. (1995) assumes that only collected revenues are non-
discretionary. Dechow et al. (1995) modifies the Jones model by eliminating errors 
caused when discretion is exercised over revenue through credit sales.  
The original models of Jones (1991) and Dechow et al. (1995) are time series. 
However, recent studies (eg. DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996; DeFond 
and Subramanyam, 1998; Becker et al., 1998; Peasnall et al., 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a, 
1998b) prefer cross-sectional discretionary accruals models to time-series models due to 
the following reasons:  
1. Time series Jones model assumes that coefficient estimates on change in sales and 
the level of property, plant and equipment remain stationary over time, which is 
not appropriate (Peasnell et al., 2000b).  
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2. Using cross-sectional accruals models help to avoid the survivorship bias 
problems inherent in the time-series approach (Peasnell et al., 2000a).  
3. Under time-series models, the self-reversing property of accruals may introduce 
specification problems in the form of serially correlated residuals (Peasnell et al., 
2000b).  
4. Subramanyam (1996) and Bartov et al. (2000) use Jones (1991) and modified 
Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) models to evaluate whether cross-sectional models 
are similar to time series models in providing reliable estimates of discretionary 
accruals. Subramanyam (1996) and Bartov et al. (2000) find that the cross-
sectional Jones and the cross-sectional modified Jones models perform better than 
their time-series counterparts in detecting earnings management. 
5. Subramanyam (1996) and Peasnell et al. (1998) state that cross-sectional models 
generate larger samples and provide more observations per model when 
estimating coefficients than time-series models. 
6. Peasnell et al. (1998) state that cross-sectional models allow the inclusion of firms 
with short histories. 
The above reasoning justifies the selection of the cross-sectional version over the 
time-series version.  
3.4.3.2 Cross-sectional Models 
The cross-sectional approach adjusts for changing industry wide economic 
conditions, which influences accruals independently of earnings management (Teoh et 
al., 1998a, 1998b). However, it is based on the assumption that all firms in the industry 
have similar operating cycle. 
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Recent studies measure abnormal (discretionary) accruals using cross-sectional 
models (eg. DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996; DeFond and 
Subramanyam, 1997; Becker et al., 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b; Kasznik, 1999; 
Bartov et al., 2000; Chtourou et al., 2001; Kothari et al., 2001). Details of the cross-
sectional Jones (1991) and modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) models are followed. 
1. Cross-sectional Jones model 
Abnormal accruals are measured in two steps. Firstly, the Jones model measures non-
discretionary accruals as a function of the level of property, plant, and equipment, and 
changes in revenue. All variables in the accruals expectations model are scaled by lagged 
assets to reduce heteroscedasticity (Jones, 1991). Equation 8 estimates coefficients 
separately for each industry group.  
Equation 8: Cross-sectional Jones (1991) non-discretionary accruals model 
TAj,g/Aj,g = α0 (1/Aj,g) + α1 (∆REVj,g/ Aj,g) + α2 (PPEj,g/Aj,g) 
where 
TA  =  Total accruals 
A  =  Beginning of year total assets 
∆REV  =  Change in net revenue 
PPE  =  Property, plant, and equipment 
j  =  denote firm from g industry group 
g  =  denote industry group 
 
Secondly, in Equation 9 abnormal accruals for each sample firm j is defined as the 
residual from Equation 8. 
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Equation 9: Cross-sectional Jones (1991) discretionary accruals model 
AAj = TAj/Aj – [αˆ 0  (1/Aj) + αˆ1  (∆REVj/Aj) + αˆ 2  (PPEj/Aj)] 
where  
AAj =  Abnormal accruals as measured by the difference between total accruals 
and predicted total accruals. 
αˆ 0 , αˆ1 , and αˆ 2  are the fitted coefficients from Equation (8). 
  
Estimated abnormal accruals are calculated as the error term from Equation 8.  
 
2. Cross-sectional Modified Jones model: 
As can be seen from Equations 10 and 11, the modified Jones model proposes modifying 
the change in revenue by adjusting for change in accounts receivable (∆REC).  
Equation 10: Dechow et al. (1995) modification of the cross-sectional Jones non-discretionary 
accruals model 
TAj,g/Aj,g = γ0 (1/Aj,g) + γ1 ((∆REVj,g - ∆RECj,g)/Aj,g) + γ 2 (PPEj,g/Aj,g) 
where ∆REC is the change in accounts receivables. 
 
Equation 11: Dechow et al. (1995) modification of the cross-sectional Jones discretionary accruals 
model 
AAj = TAj/Aj – [γˆ 0  (1/Aj) + γˆ 1  ((∆REVj - ∆RECj) /Aj) + γˆ 2  (PPEj/Aj)] 
where γˆ 0 , γˆ 1 , and γˆ 2  are the fitted coefficients from equation (8). 
 
In Equation 11, the coefficients from Equation 10 are used to predict expected total 
accruals. Expected total accruals are deducted from actual total accruals (TAj,g/Aj,g) to 
obtain abnormal accruals (AAj).The effectiveness of the model in measuring earnings 
management depends on how well discretionary accruals are separated from non-
discretionary accruals. Dechow et al. (1995) conclude that their version of the modified 
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Jones model is superior over all other currently available models, though it remains 
imperfect. Subramanyam (1996) finds that results obtained from cross-sectional modified 
Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) are qualitatively similar to the results obtained from 
cross-sectional Jones model. However, estimations cannot be very precise. 
Subramanyam (1996) states that cross-sectional models are not free of 
measurement problems, similar to all other discretionary accruals models. It can be 
argued that the Jones (1991) and the modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) models 
misclassify discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. However, Bernard and Skinner 
(1996) state that the misclassification problem is common to all earnings management 
studies.69  
The current study focuses on the modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) model as the 
key measure for earnings management for two reasons. First, the results obtained from 
cross-sectional modified Jones model are qualitatively similar to the results obtained from 
cross-sectional Jones model (Subramanyam, 1996). Second, the modified Jones (Dechow 
et al., 1995) model eliminates errors caused when discretion is exercised over revenue 
through credit sales.  
3.4.3.3 Measuring Total Accruals 
To be able to estimate discretionary accruals, total accruals need to be computed. 
There are two methods for computing total accruals. The first method is the traditional 
balance sheet approach that has been used in the majority of prior studies (eg. Healy, 
1985; Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Peasnell et al., 1998; Kothari, 2001). The second 
method is the cash flow approach, which is being adopted by recent studies (e.g. 
                                                 
69 The data results show that there is no significant difference between the Jones (1991) model and the 
modified Jones (Dechow te al., 1995) model. 
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Subramanyam, 1996; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1997; Becker et al., 1998; Klein, 
2002b).  
Under the traditional balance sheet approach, total accruals are measured as 
follows: 
Equation 12: Balance sheet approach. 
TAt = ∆CAt - ∆Casht - ∆CLt + ∆DCLt - DEPt  
∆CAt Change in current assets in year t 
∆Casht Change in cash and cash equivalents in year t 
∆CLt Change in current liabilities in year t 
∆DCLt Change in debt included in current liabilities in year t. 
DEPt Depreciation and amortization expense in year t 
 
Under the cash flow approach, total accruals are measured as follows: 
Equation 13: Cash flow approach. 
TAt = EBXAt – OCt 
EBXAt Earnings before extraordinary and abnormal items in year t 
OCt Operating cash flow in year t 
  
However, most recent studies prefer the cash flow approach to the traditional 
balance sheet approach due to the following reasons: 
1. While the balance sheet approach omits non-current accruals (except for 
deprecation and amortisation), the cash flow approach accounts for both current 
and non-current accruals. Omitted non-current accruals can take the form of 
overstated provisions for restructuring costs, loan losses or warranty costs. Such 
unrealistic assumptions of estimated liabilities remove accruals from current 
earnings to future earnings and are not captured by the balance sheet approach.  
2. Collins and Hribar (2002) find empirical evidence that the balance sheet approach 
becomes less efficient than the cash flow approach when firms experience 
mergers or acquisitions. The reason is that under the balance sheet approach an 
articulation is presumed between changes in balance sheet working capital 
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accounts and accrued revenues and expenses on the income statement. The 
articulation breaks down when non-operating events or activities are introduced 
(i.e. mergers or acquisitions). 
3. Collins and Hribar (2002) find empirical evidence that the balance sheet approach 
is biased in measuring accruals for firms experiencing discontinuing operations 
(abnormal items). This is also due to the break down in the presumed articulation 
in the balance sheet approach. 
Collins and Hribar (2002) demonstrate that the frequency and magnitude of errors 
introduced when using the balance sheet approach can be substantial. Based on the 
reasoning above, the cash flow approach will be employed to calculate total accruals.70 
As a result, the measure of total accruals is based on the cash flow approach, which 
is used to divide accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals based on the 
cross-sectional modified Jones models. The level of discretionary accruals is then used to 
as an empirical indicator of earnings management. 
 
3.5 ANALYSIS PROCEDURES AND HYPOTHESES  
The analysis of the data proceeds in four distinct steps. Each of these steps and the 
associated hypothesis to be tested are outlined in the sections below. 
3.5.1 Step one: Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics 
The first stage of analysis is to collect the data from share markets and annual 
reports of the selected firms and insert them into a computer spreadsheet. Descriptive 
statistics are computed to profile the data. A comparison is made between firms that 
                                                 
70 Data results support Collins and Hribar’s (2002) findings that the cash flow approach is less bias than the 
balance sheet approach. 
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deemed to have engaged in earnings management and firms that deemed to not have 
engaged in earnings management. 
3.5.2 Step two: Computing Abnormal Accruals 
The second step of analysis is to compute abnormal accruals. The study uses the 
modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) model to compute abnormal accruals. Abnormal 
accruals are calculated as the error term of the accruals expectation model (see section 
3.4.3 for details). 
Only the magnitude of abnormal accruals is used rather than the level of abnormal 
accruals. This is due to earnings management being the deviation of accounting earnings 
from reflecting the natural effect of the firm’s transactions and events. Hence, earnings 
management is not conditioned by the direction (upwards or downwards) of the change in 
accounting earnings, but by the change itself.71 
  
3.5.3 Step three: Regression Analysis (Univariate and Multivariate 
Analysis) 
Three methods are used to test the hypotheses. They are pooled GLS (random effect) 
regression, mean coefficients, and Wald test. 
3.5.3.1 Pooled GLS regression 
The pooled GLS regression over the four-year test period is used rather than the 
pooled OLS. The use of pooled OLS would be optimal if the residuals were cross-
sectionally uncorrelated, and if they were homoscedastic across firms (Baltagi, 2001).  
                                                 
71 It can be argued that downward abnormal accruals are indicative of conservatism, and therefore, should 
be analysed separately from upward abnormal accruals. However, downward abnormal accruals could be 
driven by other factors. For example, Butler et al. (2004) finds evidence that firms in severe financial 
distress engage in liquidity-enhancing transactions (e.g., delaying payables or factoring receivables) that 
result in large downward abnormal accruals. Downward abnormal accruals can also result from reversal of 
previous short-term upward abnormal accruals or from a strategic approach such as a “big bath” effect in 
which downward abnormal accruals are adopted in one period to increase future reported earnings. 
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While the OLS estimates coefficients are still unbiased and consistent under the 
violation of normality and constant variance, the estimates are inefficient (Greene, 2000). 
The estimated standard errors are biased and inconsistent, thus the results test statistics 
are also biased and inconsistent (e.g. Baltagi, 2001; Greene, 2000).  
Under these circumstances, GLS is the proper estimation method. GLS estimation 
effectively standardises the observations (e.g. Baltagi, 2001; Greene, 2000). 
Given that coefficients may be constant over time, estimating using pooled 
regression becomes more efficient. Also pooled estimation is a simple way to examine 
the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications (Beaver, 1998). 
3.5.3.2 Random effect versus Fixed effect 
A pooled cross-sectional GLS (random effects) model is used to test the proposed 
relationships. The fundamental advantage of a pooled regression over a cross section is 
that it allows the researcher far greater flexibility in modelling differences in sample 
specific behaviour (Greene, 2000). The assumptions underlying the pooled least square 
imply that no relationships exist within or between each cross-section. Thus, if any 
relationship does exist and is not specified in the model, then the misspecification is 
captured in the error term and may contaminate the coefficient estimates. 
There are two basic frameworks used to account for relationships within or between 
each cross-section (e.g. Baltagi, 2001; Greene, 2000). The least squares dummy variable 
(fixed effect) approach assumes that individual constant is a group specific constant term 
in the regression model (Greene, 2000). The generalised least squares (random effect) 
approach specifies that individual constant is a group specific disturbance similar to the 
error term, except for each group (Greene, 2000). There is a trade-off between the 
consistency of the least squares dummy variable (fixed effect) approach and the 
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efficiency of the generalised least squares (random effect) approach. Mundalk (1978) 
argue that the generalised least squares (random effect) approach assumes exogeneity of 
all the regressors and the random individual effects. In contrast, the least squares dummy 
variable (fixed effect) allows for endogeneity of all the regressors and the individual 
effects. Most applications in economics have made the choice between both approaches 
based upon the standard Hausman (1978) test. However, when dealing with unbalanced 
panels, as the case in this study, the Hausman test becomes problematic (Greene, 2000).  
The random effect model is chosen as a better approach due to the following 
reasons: 
1. The fixed effect model may be viewed as applying only to the cross-sectional 
firms in the study, and cannot be generalised outside the sample (Greene, 2000). 
Thus, it is not possible to confirm that the differences between firms can be 
described as parametric shifts of the regression function.  
2. Given that the sampled cross-sectional firms were drawn from a large population 
(i.e. ASX list companies), it is more appropriate to view individual specific 
constant terms as randomly distributed across cross-sectional firms (Greene, 
2000). 
3. Using dummy variables to identify firms would result in a large number of 
parameters relative to the number of observations. Thus, fixed effect is costly in 
terms of degrees of freedom lost. 
4. Given that some empirical indicators of corporate governance do not vary much 
over time, the pooled fixed effect regression is not a correct method in this case. 
The estimations of pooled random effects regressions assist in controlling for the 
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underlying time-invariant corporate governance characteristics and policies of 
each firm.  
5. Although unbalanced random-effects models may lead to groupwise 
heteroscedasticity problems, White’s Heteroscedasticity Consistent Covariance 
estimator is used to correct for heteroscedasticity. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that one of the limitations of the random effect 
approach is that it may suffer from the inconsistency due to omitted variables. Given that 
the study uses multiple proxies for unexpected earnings and multiple empirical indicators 
for corporate governance, the impact of the limitation is likely to be minimal.  
3.5.3.3 Mean Coefficients 
The mean estimates across results for each of the four individual years are used. As 
pointed out by Bernard (1987), because of industry effects, the standard error in the t-
statistics dominator may be biased downward due to an overstatement of the true but 
unknown number of independent observations in the regression.  
To address this concern, a test of the mean coefficients is computed across the four 
individual years as follows. First, each year’s regression parameter estimates is treated as 
a single observation. The cross-time means of these parameters estimates (for each 
independent year variable) are then divided by their standard errors.  
Second, the resulting amounts are then compared to the t-statistic with three degrees 
of freedom to assess their statistical significance. Thus, the mean estimates are mainly 
used to confirm that the potential cross-sectional correlations in the error term have no 
effect on the annual coefficients. 
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3.5.3.4 Wald Test 
A comparison is conducted between the coefficients of two models using the Wald test. 
Wald test is used to determine whether coefficients in both models are significantly 
different from each other. The following equation is used (Greene, 2000):  
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3.5.4 Step four: Robustness Checks 
The fourth step of analysis is to test regression assumptions and check for outliers 
and collinearity. For example, regression assumptions are tested by examining the 
residuals of the model (Pedhazur, 1997). The assumptions are: normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals (Pedhazur, 1997). Alternative methods 
will be used to overcome any violation of the assumptions, such as variance stabilising 
transformations and the use of weighted least squares regression. 
Distributions with infinite variance tend to have thick tails, implying outliers. 
Relatively heavy weights can be placed on outliers (Judge et al., 1988). Thus, their 
presence tends to lead to bias and extremely sensitive least square estimates. Following 
prior studies (e.g. Easton and Harris, 1991), if earnings level scaled by beginning price or 
change in earnings scaled by beginning price are above 1.5 or below -1.5, then it is 
considered to be an outlier. This approach is proposed by Malinvaud (1980) to transfer 
infinite variance into finite variance by assuming that the distribution of the disturbances 
is bounded. 
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Corporate governance attributes could be considered interrelated (collinearity 
problem). If collinearity (or Multicollinearity) is found to be harmful, several methods 
will be adopted to reduce the severity of the collinearity problem.72 These methods are:  
1. To transform variables included in the model to minimise seriousness of the 
problem (Gujarati, 1999).  
2. To use the ridge regression estimator as proposed by Hoeral and Kennard (1970a, 
1970b).  
3. To choose a different operational variable representing the interrelated attributes 
to avoid potential endogeneity problems. 
3.6 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
Chapter Three discussed the sample selection, data collection procedures, and 
analysis procedures. The chapter discussed the method used to test the propositions, as 
presented in Chapter Two. The chapter presents the hypotheses that present empirically 
the propositions stated in Chapter Two. Tables 3-9 and 3-10 provide a summary of 
hypotheses and definition of variables. 
  
                                                 
72 Simultaneous equations is a method used in the corporate governance literature to detect collinearity (e.g. 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). However, it will not be the only method used to detect collinearity, because 
the estimation of simultaneous linear equation systems needs a theory to restrict the coefficients before the 
estimation starts. Given that there is no theory on how the three attributes interact, the coefficients in the 
system cannot be reliably restricted using simultaneous equations. 
 100
 
Table 3-9: Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis One: The 
coefficients of regressing the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals 
on the empirical indicators of 
corporate governance are 
statistically different from zero. 
 
H10: γ 1 ≥ 0, γ 2 ≤ 0, γ 3 ≥ 0, γ 4 ≥ 0, γ 5 
≥ 0, γ 6 ≥ 0, γ 7 ≥ 0, γ 8 ≥ 0, γ 9 ≥ 0 
 
H11: γ 1 < 0, γ 2 > 0, γ 3 < 0, γ 4 < 0, γ 5 
< 0, γ 6 < 0, γ 7 < 0, γ 8 < 0, γ 9 < 0 
 
Equation 3 
Hypothesis Two: The interaction 
between the magnitude of 
abnormal accruals and earnings is 
less than the coefficient for 
earnings in the absence of 
abnormal accruals. 
H20: (α0 + α 1) ≥ β1 , (ψ 0 + ψ 1) ≥ β2 
 
H21: (α0 + α 1) < β1 , (ψ 0 + ψ 1) < β2 
 
Equation 4 
Hypothesis Three: The 
interactions between earnings and 
the empirical indicators of 
corporate governance are 
different from zero and from the 
coefficient for earnings in the 
absence of corporate governance. 
 
H30: (ϕ0 + ϕ 1) ≤ β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 2) ≥ β1 , 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 3) ≤ β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 4) ≤ β1 , (ϕ0 + 
ϕ 5) ≤ β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 6) ≤ β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 7) ≤ 
β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 8) ≤ β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 9) ≤ β1 , 
(λ 0 + λ 1) ≤ β2, (λ 0 + λ 2) ≥ β2, (λ 0 + λ 
3) ≤ β2, (λ 0 + λ 4) ≤ β2, (λ 0 + λ 5) ≤ β2, 
(λ 0 + λ 6) ≤ β2, (λ 0 + λ 7) ≤ β2, (λ 0 + λ 
8) ≤ β2, (λ 0 + λ 9) ≤ β2 
 
H31: (ϕ0 + ϕ 1) > β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 2) < β1 , 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 3) > β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 4) > β1 , (ϕ0 + 
ϕ 5) > β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 6) > β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 7) > 
β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 8) > β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 9) > β1 , 
(λ 0 + λ 1) > β2, (λ 0 + λ 2) < β2, (λ 0 + λ 
3) > β2, (λ 0 + λ 4) > β2, (λ 0 + λ 5) > β2, 
(λ 0 + λ 6) > β2, (λ 0 + λ 7) > β2, (λ 0 + λ 
8) > β2, (λ 0 + λ 9) > β2 
 
Equation 5 
Hypothesis Four: The 
coefficients for the interaction 
between earnings and the 
empirical indicators of corporate 
governance conditioned on the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals 
are different from zero and from 
the earnings response coefficient 
in the absence of abnormal 
accruals and/or corporate 
governance. 
 
H40: (ϕ0 + ϕ 1) ≤ β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 2) ≥ β1 , 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 3) ≤ β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 4) ≤ β1 , (ϕ0 + 
ϕ 5) ≤ β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 6) ≤ β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 7) ≤ 
β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 8) ≤ β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 9) ≤ β1 , 
(λ 0 + λ 1) ≤ β2, (λ 0 + λ 2) ≥ β2, (λ 0 + λ 
3) ≤ β2, (λ 0 + λ 4) ≤ β2, (λ 0 + λ 5) ≤ β2, 
(λ 0 + λ 6) ≤ β2, (λ 0 + λ 7) ≤ β2, (λ 0 + λ 
8) ≤ β2, (λ 0 + λ 9) ≤ β2 
 
H41: (ϕ0 + ϕ 1) > β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 2) < β1 , 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 3) > β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 4) > β1 , (ϕ0 + 
ϕ 5) > β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 6) > β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 7) > 
β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 8) > β1 , (ϕ0 + ϕ 9) > β1 , 
(λ 0 + λ 1) > β2, (λ 0 + λ 2) < β2, (λ 0 + λ 
3) > β2, (λ 0 + λ 4) > β2, (λ 0 + λ 5) > β2, 
(λ 0 + λ 6) > β2, (λ 0 + λ 7) > β2, (λ 0 + λ 
8) > β2, (λ 0 + λ 9) > β2 
 
Equation 6 
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Table 3-10: Definition of variables 
SYMBOL VARIABLE DEFINITION 
ARjt Share Return Annual return accumulated for firm j for nine months prior to 
through three months after fiscal year-end. 
Ejt Earnings Level Earnings per share scaled by beginning price, before extraordinary 
items. 
∆Ejt Earnings Change  Change in earnings per share and then scaled by beginning of 
period price for firm j. 
OWNCONjt Ownership 
Concentration 
Percentage of total shares held by the top 20 shareholders divided 
by the total number of shares. 
OWNMANjt Managerial Ownership Percentage of total shares held by executive directors divided by the 
total number of shares. 
OWNOUTjt Independent Directors’ 
Ownership 
Percentage of total shares held by independent directors divided by 
the total number of shares. 
DEBTRLjt Debt Reliance Total long-term borrowings divided by total assets.  
CEOjt CEO dominance One if the chairman of the board is not an independent director. 
Otherwise, it equals zero. 
BRDSZEjt Board Size Number of directors on the board. 
BRDINDjt Board Independence  Number of independent directors divided by the total number of 
directors on the board. 
AUDINDjt Audit Committee 
Independence 
Number of independent directors on the audit committee divided by 
the total number of directors on the audit committee. 
AUDCMPjt Audit Committee 
Competence  
Number of independent directors with financial expertise on the 
audit committee divided by the total number of directors on the 
audit committee. 
AAAjt Absolute Value of 
Abnormal Accruals  
Absolute value of the residual from the Modified Jones model. 
D0j Dummy for absolute 
value of abnormal 
accruals 
One if magnitude of abnormal accruals as measured by the 
modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) model is above its yearly 
cross-sectional median. Otherwise, D0j equals zero.  
D1j Dummy variable for 
Ownership 
Concentration 
One if OWNCONj is greater than its yearly cross-sectional median. 
Otherwise, D1j equals zero. 
D2j Dummy variable for 
Board Size 
One if BRDSZEj is greater than its yearly cross-sectional median. 
Otherwise, D1j equals zero. 
D3j Dummy variable for 
Board Independence 
One if BRDINDj is greater than its yearly cross-sectional median. 
Otherwise, D1j equals zero. 
D4j Dummy variable for 
Audit Committee 
Competence 
One if AUDCMPj is greater than its yearly cross-sectional median. 
Otherwise, D1j equals zero. 
D5j Dummy variable for 
Independent Directors’ 
Ownership 
One if OWNOUTj is greater than its yearly cross-sectional median. 
Otherwise, D1j equals zero. 
D6j Dummy variable for 
Managerial Ownership 
One if OWNMANj is greater than its yearly cross-sectional median. 
Otherwise, D1j equals zero. 
D7j Dummy variable for 
Debt Reliance 
One if DEBTRLj is greater than its yearly cross-sectional median. 
Otherwise, D1j equals zero. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Four presents the results of the data analysis from the research method 
described in Chapter Three. Based on the analysis, hypotheses one to four are tested and a 
series of conclusions are drawn. These hypotheses test the impact of corporate 
governance attributes (hypotheses One, Three, and Four) and the effect of abnormal 
accruals (hypothesis Two). When testing the hypotheses relating to corporate governance 
attributes, the analysis proceeds in three stages. First, the relationship between the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals and corporate governance variables is tested. To 
undertake stage one, the magnitude of abnormal accruals is determined using the 
modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) model.  
The second stage assesses the relationship between corporate governance variables 
and the earnings response coefficients. This tests Hypothesis Three. In this stage, share 
returns are based on annual returns accumulated over the 12 months extending from nine 
months prior to through three months after each firm’s respective fiscal year-end (e.g. 
Easton and Harris, 1991; Ali, 1994; Cheng et al., 1996). 
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The third stage of the analysis examines the impact of corporate governance 
variables on the earnings response coefficients after conditioning on the magnitude of 
abnormal accruals. This is a test of Hypothesis Four. 
When testing Hypothesis Two, the relationship between the magnitude of abnormal 
accruals and the earnings response coefficients is examined. This link is based on using 
the magnitude of abnormal accruals as a signal of the degree of non-permanent 
components included in earnings. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 presents descriptive statistics and 
correlation coefficients. Section 4.3 describes the development of the variables for 
abnormal accruals. Section 4.4 discusses testing of the hypotheses and robustness checks. 
Section 4.5 concludes the chapter by summarising the analysis and findings. 
4.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENTS  
4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the key variables are presented in Table 4-1. The table 
separates the variables based on whether the magnitude of abnormal accruals, according 
to the modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) model, is high or low. High and low 
abnormal accruals are determined based on whether the firm’s magnitude of abnormal 
accruals is higher or lower than the yearly cross-sectional median. This helps the analysis 
of descriptive statistics through the following: 
1. Dividing the sample based on the magnitude of abnormal accruals empowers the 
investigation of whether corporate governance is more effective when managers 
have an incentive to manage earnings. 
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2. Separating firms into two groups enables the investigation of whether the 
market’s response differs depending on the magnitude of abnormal accruals. 
3. Sorting out firms into two groups based on indicators opportunistic managerial 
behaviour is expected to provide more information on the characteristics of the 
firm (i.e. risk and growth). 
Table 4-1: Pooled Descriptive Statistics 
High magnitudes 
of abnormal 
accruals 
Low magnitudes 
of abnormal 
accruals 
Full sample Variable 
Name 
Variable 
Symbol  
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Share 
Returns 
ARjt 0.173 1.019 0.092 0.520 0.131 0.800 
Earnings per 
share 
Ejt 0.054 0.140 0.047 0.137 0.050 0.139 
Change in 
earnings per 
share 
∆Ejt 0.002 0.135 0.007 0.140 0.005 0.154 
Ownership 
concentration 
OWNCONjt 0.672 0.173 0.670 0.166 0.671 0.169 
Managerial 
ownership 
OWNMANjt 0.137 0.610 0.214 2.278 0.177 1.694 
Independent 
directors’ 
ownership 
OWNOUTjt 0.085 0.165 0.072 0.186 0.078 0.176 
Debt reliance DEBTRLjt 0.173 0.166 0.184 0.189 0.179 0.178 
CEO 
dominance 
CEOjt 0.171 0.377 0.144 0.351 0.157 0.364 
Board size BRDSZEjt 6.659 2.095 6.802 2.126 6.699 2.113 
Board 
independence 
BRDINDjt 0.676 0.197 0.707 0.179 0.692 0.188 
Audit 
committee 
independence 
AUDINDjt 0.807 0.290 0.831 0.274 0.820 0.282 
Audit 
committee 
competence 
AUDCMPjt 0.561 0.319 0.572 0.324 0.567 0.321 
Beta risk BETAjt 0.833 1.703 0.715 1.142 0.772 1.440 
Firm Growth GROWTHjt 2.137 6.228 2.226 6.621 2.183 6.431 
 
Table 4-1 shows that firms with low abnormal accruals display lower share returns 
and lower risk than firms with high abnormal accruals. The results relating to firm risk 
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are consistent with Sweeny (1994) who argued that risky firms are more likely to engage 
in earnings management to justify the greater risk. 
In comparing the means for corporate governance variables, the results indicate that 
some variables differ depending on the magnitude of abnormal accruals and are in 
alignment with the study’s propositions. For example, the means of board size show that 
larger boards are associated with low magnitudes of abnormal accruals. This is consistent 
with prior studies. Xie et al. (2003) and Chtourou et al. (2001) empirically find that larger 
boards are strongly associated with lower levels of earnings management.  
The results of the descriptive statistics show the need to take into account the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals when analysing share returns and the impact of corporate 
governance attributes. These results are investigated further in the following sections.  
 
4.2.2 Correlation Coefficients 
Table 4-2 presents the Pearson correlations among share returns, the magnitude of 
abnormal accruals, and all corporate governance variables. The correlation coefficients were 
checked for the presence of high collinearity among regressors.73  
Table 4-2: Pearson correlations coefficients. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
AR (1) 1 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.08* -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.13† 
AAA# (2)  1 0.04 0.01 -0.09* -0.13† -0.10† -0.04 0.003 -0.01 0.04 
OWNCON (3)   1 0.02 0.01 -0.13† -0.16† -0.08* -0.23† -0.02 0.01 
CEO (4)    1 -0.19† -0.39 -0.32† -0.22† -0.002 0.01 -0.02 
BRDSZE (5)     1 0.22† 0.23† 0.11† -0.10† 0.03 0.06 
BRDIND (6)      1 0.54† 0.33† 0.02 -0.11† 0.17† 
AUDIND (7)       1 0.61† -0.12† -0.08* 0.14† 
AUDCMP (8)        1 -0.08* -0.03 0.13† 
OWNOUT (9)         1 0.03 -0.06 
OWNMAN (10)          1 -0.03 
DEBTRL (11)           1 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
†Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
# The magnitude of abnormal accruals 
                                                 
73 This test is motivated by Klein’s (2002a) findings of multicollinearity between board characteristics and 
audit committee characteristics. 
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It is evident from the correlation coefficients in Table 4-2 that there is no high 
correlation among the variables. As a result, collinearity does not appear to pose a threat to 
the interpretation of regression coefficients of the independent variables, which are reported 
in the following subsections. The highest coefficient in Table 4-2 is (0.61), which is an 
indication of the likelihood of partial collinearity, which is found to be harmless after further 
testing using the condition index. Formal testing using the Belsley et al. (1980) condition 
indices on the full sample confirmed that harmful collinearity does not exist.74 Next, the 
results of testing the hypotheses are discussed.  
4.3 ABNORMAL ACCRUALS 
Chapter Three presented the modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) model as a model 
used to estimate abnormal accruals. In order to estimate abnormal accruals, it is first 
necessary to calculate total accruals. Total accruals are calculated as the difference between 
earnings before extraordinary items and cash flows from operations (see Equation 13 in 
section 3.4.3.3).  
The modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) model, represented by Equation 10, uses 
change in cash revenue and the level of property plant and equipment as the explanatory 
variables for predicting expected total accruals. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is 
used to estimate the equation by industry for each year. The resulting model (Equation 11) is 
then used to calculate abnormal accruals through the difference between actual and expected 
total accruals for each firm. 
The calculation of total accruals covers 14 industries over four financial years. As the 
results of these calculations are too numerous to report efficiently, an example for one 
                                                 
74 Warga (1989) shows that the condition index is a valid diagnostic for financial returns data. In this case, 
the condition index is 23.3, which is below the benchmark of 30. 
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industry is presented in Appendix (F). Additionally, Equation 10 is estimated for the full 
sample to demonstrate the explanatory power of the modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) 
model. Table 4-3 presents the estimated coefficients of the total accruals model. 
Table 4-3: Estimation of the parameters of total accruals model for the full sample. 
Equation 10: TAj,g/Aj,g = γ0 (1/Aj,g) + γ1 ((∆REVj,g - ∆RECj,g)/Aj,g) + γ 2 (PPEj,g/Aj,g) 
Adjusted R2 
(F-Stat.) 
γ0 γ1 γ 2 N 
0.40 
(170.29)*** 
-2806.99 
(-1.78)* 
-0.09 
(-8.89)*** 
-0.91 
(-2.56)*** 
778 
TA = Total accruals, A = Beginning of year total assets, ∆REV = Change in net revenue, PPE = Property, plant, and 
equipment, j = denote firm from g industry group, and g = denote industry group. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
The model is significant at the 1% level. The modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) 
model has an explanatory power of 40%. It allows for the estimation of abnormal accruals 
through deducting expected total accruals from actual total accruals (see Equation 11 in 
section 3.4.3.2).  
Two approaches are used to incorporate abnormal accruals into the tested models. They 
are as follows: 
1. When incorporating abnormal accruals as a dependent or an independent variable (i.e. 
first and second hypotheses), the magnitude of abnormal accruals is included as the 
estimated residuals of the modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) model.  
2. When incorporating abnormal accruals as an interceding variable (i.e. fourth 
hypothesis), a dummy variable is used. The dummy variable is calculated using the 
yearly cross-sectional median of the magnitude of abnormal accruals. If the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals of a firm is higher than the sample’s yearly cross-
sectional median, then it is deemed as a high earnings management firm (dummy 
variable = 1). If the magnitude of abnormal accruals of a firm is lower than the 
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sample’s yearly cross-sectional median, then it is deemed as a low earnings 
management firm (dummy variable = 0).  
The magnitude of abnormal accruals is used as it is the size of the deviation of reported 
earnings rather than the direction that signifies earnings management. Table 4-4 provides a 
comparison of the mean magnitude of abnormal accruals for high and low earnings 
management firms. 
Table 4-4: Mean of the magnitude of abnormal accruals for high and low earnings management 
firms. 
Mean  
High Earnings 
Management 
Low Earnings 
Management 
Difference in 
Means 
Magnitude of 
abnormal 
accruals 
0.36 0.07 0.28 
(36.68)*** 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
As abnormal accruals are scaled by total assets, the values can be interpreted as a 
percentage of total assets. For firms with high earnings management, the mean magnitude of 
abnormal accruals is 36% of total assets compared to only 7% for low earnings management 
firms.  
The importance of abnormal accruals rests with the assumption that abnormal 
accruals represent managers’ discretion over accruals. This assumption is validated 
through the results in Tables 4-3 and 4-4. Next, the hypotheses presented in Chapter 
Three are tested.  
4.4 TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESES AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
When testing each hypothesis, pooled regressions are reported. Previous studies found 
that pooled regression results are likely to provide biased standard errors due to cross-
sectional dependence in the regression residuals (e.g. Ali, 1994). Two steps were taken to 
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overcome the potential bias of standard errors (Barth et al., 2001a; Bernard, 1987). First, the 
standard errors from all pooled regressions were corrected using White (1980). Second, 
beside pooled coefficients, inference is also drawn from the mean coefficients of the yearly 
cross-section regressions (see Appendix G). 
The study uses the returns-earnings (Easton and Harris, 1991) model as the basis for 
testing three out of the four hypotheses, within the Australian context. Given that earnings 
components are likely to include a mixture of permanent and non-permanent earnings, 
unexpected earnings are better captured by a weighted average of earnings level and earnings 
change (Cheng and Yang, 2003). 
The testing of hypotheses Two, Three, and Four are conducted over four stages. First, 
the returns-earnings (Easton and Harris, 1991) model is tested irrespective of the proposed 
indicators of reliability (i.e. earnings management and corporate governance). Second, the 
returns-earnings model is tested after incorporating earnings management (Hypothesis Two), 
corporate governance (Hypothesis Three), or both (Hypothesis Four).  
Third, the Wald test is used to make a formal comparison of the coefficient estimates. 
The Wald test is applied to each of these interactions. If the Wlad test is significant for an 
interaction variable, it indicates that earnings response coefficients are significantly different 
after incorporating the interaction variable. Thus, the variable has a substantial effect on the 
returns-earnings (Easton and Harris, 1991) model. 
Fourth, interaction variables that are deemed to have a substantial effect are analysed 
further. For instance, the adjusted R-squared after incorporating each interaction variable is 
compared. The variable producing the highest adjusted R-squared indicates higher 
information content relative to earnings.  
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The returns-earnings (Easton and Harris, 1991) model is based on testing the 
information content of earnings level and change in earnings. Table 4-5 presents the 
coefficients of the model irrespective of any proposed variables.  
Table 4-5: The pooled earnings response coefficients of earnings level and change in earnings 
ARj = β 0 + β 1 Ejt + β2 ∆Ejt + ζj 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
Pooled 
Constant -0.026 
(-0.34) 
Ejt 0.91 
(1.84)* 
∆Ejt 0.06 
(0.13) 
R2 0.10 
F-value 28.48*** 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Pooled represents the pooled GLS (random effect) regression. 
All t-statistics are calculated using white (1980) heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. 
The results shown are controlled for beta risk (an earnings response coefficient determinant). 
 
The pooled response coefficients as well as mean estimates across results for each 
of the four individual years are presented in Table 4-5 and Appendix G. The results from 
Table 4-5 and Appendix G show that the pooled and mean response coefficients of 
earnings level and change in earnings (β 1 and β 2) are positive; and therefore provide 
incremental information content of earnings.  
Only the pooled response coefficient for earnings level is significantly greater than zero 
at the 0.10 level. This is explained by Easton and Harris (1991), which suggests that 
earnings level becomes a better proxy for unexpected earnings only when earnings are 
transitory. Given that the Asian currency crisis occurred during the study period, it is 
likely that it has altered shareholders’ perception of the permanence of earnings during 
the study period (or part of it).  
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The returns-earnings (Easton and Harris, 1991) model is used as the basis for testing 
hypotheses Two, Three, and Four. Given that the Wald test is used to make a formal 
comparison of the coefficient estimates, it is essential to test whether the pooled coefficients 
from Table 4-5 are misspecified. The F-value for the Ramsey RESET test (F = 2.92, M =1, 
d.f. = 773) does not reject the null hypothesis (βM = 0) (Ramsey, 1969). This indicates that the 
coefficients from Table 4-5 have no specification error at both levels (1% and 5%). Hence, 
findings from the Wald test are statistically adequate. Next, each hypothesis is tested and 
discussed.  
 
4.4.1 Test Results for Hypothesis One 
Hypothesis One relates corporate governance variables to the magnitude of 
abnormal accruals. Table 4-6 and Appendix G display the pooled and mean coefficients 
for the univariate and multivariate results of the association between corporate 
governance variables and the magnitude of abnormal accruals. 
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Table 4-6: The pooled regression of absolute value of abnormal accruals on empirical indicators of 
corporate governance 
Does corporate governance influence earnings management? 
AAAj = γ 0 + γ1 OWNCONjt + γ 2 CEOjt + γ 3 BRDSZEjt + γ 4 BRDINDjt + γ 5 AUDINDjt + γ 6 AUDCMPjtj 
+ γ 7 OWNOUTjt + γ 8 OWNMANjt + γ 9 DEBTRLjt + υj 
Hypotheses Corporate 
Governance 
Pooled 
(univariate) 
Pooled 
(multivariate) 
Findings 
H1A0 
γ 1 ≥ 0 
Ownership 
Concentration 
0.14 
(0.74) 
0.05 
(0.39) 
Do not reject 
H1B0 
γ 2 ≥ 0 
CEO dominance 0.02 
(0.73) 
-0.11 
(-1.36) 
Do not reject 
H1C0 
γ 3 ≥ 0 
Board Size -0.03 
(-1.95)** 
-0.02 
(-1.93)* 
Reject 
H1D0 
γ 4 ≥ 0 
Board 
Independence 
-0.43 
(-1.39) 
-0.42 
(-1.26) 
Do not reject 
H1E0 
γ 5 ≥ 0 
Audit Committee 
Independence  
-0.22 
(-1.66)* 
-0.12 
(-2.39)** 
Reject 
H1F0 
γ 6 ≥ 0 
Audit Committee 
Competence 
-0.08 
(-1.38) 
0.03 
(1.12) 
Do not reject 
H1G0 
γ 7 ≥ 0 
Independent 
Directors’ 
Ownership 
0.01 
(0.21) 
-0.02 
(-0.25) 
Do not reject 
H1H0 
γ 8 ≥ 0 
Managerial 
Ownership 
-0.004 
(-1.39) 
-0.01 
(-1.32) 
Do not reject 
H1I0 
γ 9 ≥ 0 
Debt Reliance 0.16 
(0.70) 
0.26 
(0.89) 
Do not reject 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Pooled represents the pooled GLS (random effect) regression. 
All t-statistics are calculated using white (1980) heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. 
The results shown are controlled for beta risk (an earnings response coefficient determinant). 
 
The results show that board size and audit committee independence have an inverse 
significant impact on the magnitude of abnormal accruals on a consistent basis. The 
pooled coefficients of board size and audit committee independence are significant 
greater than zero univariately and multivariately. The mean response coefficients also 
support the significance of board size and on a multivariate level audit committee 
independence (see Appendix G). The results are supported by the corporate governance 
literature as follows: 
1. The negative association between board size and the empirical indicator of 
earnings management is similar to the findings of Xie et al. (2003) and Chtourou 
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et al. (2001). They found that larger boards are strongly associated with lower 
levels of earnings management. The findings of the current study support John 
and Senbet’s (1998) argument that an increase in board size increases the board’s 
monitoring capacity. 
2. The negative association between audit committee independence and the 
empirical indicator of earnings management is similar to the findings of Klein 
(2002b). She finds that earnings management is associated with a dichotomous 
variable of whether or not the audit committee has a majority of outside directors. 
Given that primarily board size and audit committee independence display 
significant results, this highlights the argument raised by Klein (2002a) that board 
committee (i.e. audit committee) assignments are influenced by board size since large 
boards have more directors to spread around. As such, she suggests that board monitoring 
is increasing in board size due to the ability to distribute the work load over a greater 
number of observers. 
Seven of the nine attributes did not show significant results, which is likely due to 
one (or more) of the following reasons:  
1. The impact of some attributes goes beyond the association into directly 
influencing either the actual integrity of the financial reporting process or 
shareholders’ perception of the integrity of the financial reporting process. 
2. The lack of a special event may have played a role in that the abnormal accruals 
were not variate enough for such an association to show statistically significant 
results. 
3. Unlike board size, it could be argued that other attributes were represented by a 
percentage. Thus, there is low variability in the cross-sectional observations. This 
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is supported by the high standard deviation of board size compared to other 
attributes (see Table 4-3). 
Although not significant, some researchers might be encouraged by the point that 
board independence and managerial ownership provide the predicted sign through out all 
the different tests. This emphasis the role expected from corporate governance in 
reducing managerial behaviour.  
The current study supports the view that the significance of corporate governance is 
not appreciated unless shareholders react to it. If shareholders respond to corporate 
governance’s improvement to the reliability of earnings, then corporate governance 
should improve the earnings response coefficients. The following hypotheses extend the 
link by examining the regression of earnings response coefficients as measured by Easton 
and Harris (1991). Next, the returns-earnings (Easton and Harris, 1991) model is tested 
after incorporating the proposed variables according to each hypothesis.  
4.4.2 Test Results for Hypothesis Two 
The second hypothesis focuses on the impact of the empirical indicator of earnings 
management on the earnings response coefficients. The results are illustrated in  
Table 4-7. 
Table 4-7: The pooled results of regressing earnings response coefficients on the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals 
Does earnings management influence the informativeness of earnings? 
ARj = β 0 + α 0 Ejt + + α 1 EAAAjt + ψ0 ∆Ejt + ψ1 ∆EAAAjt + ζj 
Hypothesis  Ejt EAAAjt ∆Ejt ∆EAAAjt Findings 
Pooled 1.15 
(1.91)*
-1.04 
(-2.41)**
0.01 
(0.22)
-0.08 
(-0.77) 
H20 
(α0 + α 1) ≥ β1 , (ψ 0 + ψ 1) ≥ β2 
Wald  0.819 0.004 
Do not reject
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Pooled represents the pooled GLS (random effect) regression. 
All t-statistics are calculated using white (1980) heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. 
The results shown are controlled for beta risk (an earnings response coefficient determinant). 
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The empirical indicator of earnings management is expected to reduce the earnings 
response coefficient, because it reflects the degree of non-permanent earnings 
components contained in reported earnings. The results in Table 4-7 show the 
incremental sensitivity of the earnings response coefficient to the empirical indicator of 
earnings management.  
The Wald test is not significant. Although a few studies found a link between 
abnormal accruals and the earnings response coefficients, most studies tested the link 
during a special event (i.e. initial public offerings). It could be argued that testing a long 
term interval (i.e. annually) and not focusing on a specific event might have contributed 
to the insignificance of the Wald test. 
Although the Wald test is not significant, some researchers could take comfort in 
the aspect that the signs of the pooled and mean coefficients support the alternate 
hypothesis. The negative coefficients (α 1 pooled = -1.04 and mean = -2.34) indicate that 
when earnings level is accompanied with large abnormal accruals, the market’s response 
to earnings significantly declines. This evidence is supported by Ali and Hwang (1995). 
They find that as accruals management increases, the slope of earnings response 
coefficients decreases.  
Inclusion of interaction variables that represent the magnitude of abnormal accruals 
slightly improves the explanatory power of the returns-earnings model as reflected in the 
pooled and mean adjusted R-squared (10.4% and 15%, respectively). The adjusted R-
squared after incorporating the magnitude of abnormal accruals is higher than the 
adjusted R-squared in Table 4-5 before incorporating any interacting variable (pooled 
9.9% and mean 11%). Hence, the empirical indicator of earnings management, as a 
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source of information relating to earnings reliability, increases the overall explanatory 
power of earnings.75  
The study takes these findings further by testing the impact of the magnitude of 
abnormal accruals, as moderator, on the relationship between corporate governance and 
the information content of accounting earnings (Hypothesis Four). Next, the other 
indicator of earnings reliability (corporate governance) is tested irrespective of earnings 
management (Hypothesis Three).  
4.4.3 Test Results for Hypothesis Three 
The third hypothesis focuses on the impact of corporate governance on the earnings 
response coefficients, as illustrated in Equation 14. The results are illustrated in  
Table 4-8. 
Equation 14: Regressions of earnings response coefficients on corporate governance variables. 
ARj = β0 + ϕ0 Ejt + ϕ1 Ejt D1OWNCONjt + ϕ2 Ejt CEOjt + ϕ3 Ejt D2 BRDSZEjt + ϕ4 Ejt D3 
BRDINDjt + ϕ5 Ejt AUDINDjt + ϕ6 Ejt D4 AUDCMPjtj + ϕ7 Ejt D5 OWNOUTjt + ϕ8 Ejt D6 
OWNMANjt + ϕ9 Ejt D7DEBTRLjt + λ0 ∆Ejt + λ1 ∆Ejt D1OWNCONjt + λ2 ∆Ejt CEOjt + λ3 ∆Ejt D2 
BRDSZEjt + λ4 ∆Ejt D3 BRDINDjt + λ5 ∆Ejt AUDINDjt + λ6 ∆Ejt D4 AUDCMPjt + λ7 ∆Ejt D5 
OWNOUTjt + λ8 ∆Ejt D6 OWNMANjt + λ9 ∆Ejt D7DEBTRLjt + εj 
                                                 
75 Prior studies use change in earnings (or the magnitude of change in earnings) as an indictor of the level 
of non-permanent earnings (Cheng et al., 1994). As a result, it can be assumed that the empirical indicator 
of earnings management is a source of information relating to unexpected earnings and a substitute to 
change in earnings, as an indicator of the degree of non-permanent earnings (see Cheng et al., 1996 for 
details). Hence, the empirical indictor of earnings management is likely to replace the value relevance of 
change in earnings. 
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Table 4-8: The pooled results of regressing earnings response coefficients on the empirical indicators 
of corporate governance. 
Does corporate governance influence earnings informativeness? 
Hypotheses Corporate 
Governance 
Earnings 
Type 
Pooled 
(univariate) 
Pooled 
(multivariate) 
Wald 
Stat.  
Findings 
E 1.59 
(2.42)** 
1.25 
(3.45)*** 
0.9 H3A0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 1) ≤ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 1) 
≤ β2 
Ownership 
Concentration 
∆E -0.29 
(-0.44) 
0.30 
(0.53) 
0.02 
Do not 
reject 
E -3.93 
(-3.21)*** 
-3.82 
(-2.83)*** 
5.62** H3B0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 2) ≥ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 2) 
≥ β2 
CEO 
dominance 
∆E 1.28 
(3.58)*** 
1.66 
(1.94)** 
1.75 
Reject a 
E 0.05 
(1.03) 
-0.06 
(-3.55)*** 
0.003 H3C0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 3) ≤ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 3) 
≤ β2 
Board Size 
∆E -0.02 
(-0.40) 
0.11 
(3.02)*** 
0.0002 
Do not 
reject 
E 0.11 
(0.12) 
-0.99 
(-0.94) 
0.01 H3D0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 4) ≤ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 4) 
≤ β2 
Board 
Independence 
∆E -0.63 
(-1.10) 
0.78 
(2.11)** 
0.21 
Do not 
reject 
E 1.13 
(1.41) 
-0.58 
(-0.78) 
0.02 H3E0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 5) ≤ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 5) 
≤ β2 
Audit 
Committee 
Independence  ∆E 0.95 
(0.87) 
1.72 
(0.62) 
0.01 
Do not 
reject 
E 1.84 
(3.77)*** 
1.62 
(4.43)*** 
2.45 H3F0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 6) ≤ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 6) 
≤ β2 
Audit 
Committee 
Competence ∆E -1.08 
(-1.00) 
-1.62 
(-3.22)*** 
0.47 
Do not 
reject 
E 1.44 
(2.26)** 
-0.25 
(-0.11) 
1.8 H3G0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 7) ≤ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 7) 
≤ β2 
Independent 
Directors’ 
Ownership ∆E -2.20 
(-5.44)*** 
-1.28 
(-0.34) 
6.51** 
Do not 
reject b 
E -0.10 
(-0.54) 
-0.07 
(-0.44) 
0.02 H3H0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 8) ≤ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 8) 
≤ β2 
Managerial 
Ownership 
∆E 0.32 
(7.17)*** 
0.30 
(4.54)*** 
0.21 
Do not 
reject 
E -0.25 
(-0.20) 
-0.02 
(-0.04) 
0.004 H3I0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 9) ≤ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 9) 
≤ β2 
Debt Reliance 
∆E -1.77 
(-2.28)** 
-3.45 
(-2.23)** 
2.25 
Do not 
reject 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Pooled represents the pooled GLS (random effect) regression. 
All t-statistics are calculated using white (1980) heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. 
The results shown are controlled for beta risk (an earnings response coefficient determinant). 
a The null hypothesis is only rejected for earnings level. 
b Although the Wald test is significant, the coefficients are significant in the opposite direction of the alternate hypothesis. 
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Although the results from Table 4-8 are not consistent in explaining the 
relationship, the Wald test emphasises that the incorporation of two corporate governance 
variables alters the earnings response coefficients significantly. CEO dominance and 
independent directors’ ownership have significant influence over the returns-earnings 
regressions. While the empirical indicator of CEO dominance displays significant 
coefficients through out all the tests, the empirical indicator of independence displays 
significant results only at the univariate level. Accordingly, these two attributes are 
analysed further (see Table 4-9).  
Table 4-9: Pooled GLS univariate regressions of earnings response coefficients on CEO dominance. 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Constant Ejt ECGjt ∆Ejt ∆ECGjt R2 F-value 
CEOjt -0.04 
(-0.49) 
1.67 
(8.05)*** 
-3.93 
(-3.21)*** 
-0.36 
(-1.25) 
1.28 
(3.58)*** 0.16 30.64*** 
OWNOUTjt -0.03 
(-0.33) 
0.73 
(1.52) 
1.44 
(2.26)** 
0.34 
(0.78) 
-2.20 
(-5.44)*** 0.10 18.53*** 
 
4.4.3.1 CEO Dominance 
Equation 15: Univariate regression of earnings response coefficients on CEO dominance. 
 
ARj = β0 + ϕ0 Ejt + ϕ2 Ejt CEOjt + λ0 ∆Ejt + λ2 ∆Ejt CEOjt + εj 
 
 
The results in Table 4-9 show the incremental sensitivity of the earnings response 
coefficients to the empirical indicator of CEO dominance. The findings, as derived from 
Equation 15, are as follows:  
1. While the summed coefficients (ϕ2+ λ2) capture the additional information content 
when CEO dominance is present, the summed coefficients (ϕ0+ λ0) are expected to 
capture the additional information content when CEO dominance is absent. The 
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summed pooled earnings coefficients interacting with the presence of CEO 
dominance (ϕ2+ λ2) equals -2.65, which is negative and significant. The summed 
pooled earnings coefficients interacting with the absence of CEO dominance (ϕ0+ 
λ0) equals 1.31, which is positive, but insignificant. Nonetheless, it might be 
reassuring to some researchers that the signs of both summed earnings 
coefficients support the role of CEO dominance in decreasing the incremental 
sensitivity of the earnings response coefficients. 
2. Similarly, the mean response coefficients capturing CEO dominance are also 
negative and significant, which supports the findings of the pooled response 
coefficients that CEO dominance has incremental information content relating to 
earnings (see Appendix G). 
3. The adjusted R-squared of the returns-earnings model after incorporating CEO 
dominance is 16% up from the original 9.9%. This suggests that CEO dominance 
is a source of value relevant information.  
4. At earnings level (where the Wald statistic is significant), the coefficient  
(ϕ2 = -3.93, t = -3.21) shows a negative sign at significant level when the dummy 
variable representing CEO dominance equals one, which supports the alternative 
hypothesis (H3B1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 2) < β1 [not rejected]). This can be interpreted that the 
market responds negatively to earnings level when the CEO is dominant. The 
market also responds positively to earnings level when the CEO is not dominant, 
which is the coefficient (ϕ0 = 1.67, t = 8.05) when the dummy variable of CEO 
dominance equals zero. This signifies the role CEO dominance plays in shaping 
investors perception of reported earnings.  
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The findings imply that the effect of earnings on share returns is inversely related to 
CEO dominance. These findings support the findings of prior studies (i.e. Anderson et al., 
2003). Anderson et al. (2003) find that the separation between CEO and board chair 
positions appear to positively influence the information content of accounting earnings. 
The findings also support the argument that the financial reporting integrity decreases 
when the chairman of the board in not independent of management (Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni, 1994). Next, the independent directors’ ownership is investigated. 
4.4.3.2 Independent Directors’ Ownership 
Equation 16: Univariate regression of earnings response coefficients on independent directors’ 
ownership. 
 
ARj = β0 + ϕ0 Ejt + ϕ7 Ejt D5 OWNOUTjt + λ0 ∆Ejt + λ7 ∆Ejt D5 OWNOUTjt + εj 
 
 
The results in Table 4-9 show the incremental sensitivity of the earnings response 
coefficients to the empirical indicator of independent directors’ ownership. The findings, 
as derived from Equation 16, are as follows:  
1. While the summed coefficients (ϕ7+ λ7) capture the additional information content 
when independent directors’ ownership is high, the summed coefficients (ϕ0+ λ0) 
are expected to capture the additional information content when independent 
directors’ ownership is low. The summed pooled earnings coefficients interacting 
with the high independent directors’ ownership (ϕ2+ λ2) equals -0.76, which is 
negative and significant. The summed pooled earnings coefficients interacting 
with the low ownership of independent directors (ϕ0+ λ0) equals 1.07, which is 
positive, but insignificant. The signs of both summed earnings coefficients 
support the null hypothesis, which seems to follow the notion that high ownership 
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may cause independent directors to act opportunistically. Hence, high independent 
directors’ ownership reduces the earnings response coefficients. 
2. The mean response coefficients from Appendix G support the findings of the 
pooled response coefficients that independent directors’ ownership decreases the 
incremental information content of earnings. 
3. The adjusted R-squared of the returns-earnings model after incorporating 
independent directors’ ownership is 10.1% up from the original 9.9%. This shows 
that independent directors’ ownership increases the value relevance of earnings.  
4. At earnings change (where the Wald statistic is significant), the coefficient  
(ϕ7 = -2.20, t = -5.44) shows a negative sign at significant level when independent 
directors’ ownership is high, which does not support the alternative hypothesis 
(H3G1: (λ0 + λ7) > β2 [Rjected], because the findings support (λ0 + λ7) < β2). This 
can be interpreted that the market responds negatively to earnings change when 
the equity stakes of independent directors’ in the firm are high. Hence, it supports 
an alternative view that directors are likely to change their objectives to enhance 
personal wealth by supporting policies that temporarily increase share prices. 
These findings are contrary to the views of regulators (Hampel report, 1997) and the 
findings of prior studies (Bhagat and Black, 1999; Bhagat et al., 1999). The findings in 
the current study side with the view that high independent directors’ ownership motivates 
directors to act in their own interests rather than the interests of shareholders. 
Although seven of the attributes were not significant according to the Wald test, 
some researchers could take comfort in that the pooled coefficients of four attributes 
(ownership concentration, audit committee competence, managerial ownership, and debt 
reliance) are significantly different from zero (see Table 4-8). It can be argued that such 
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corporate governance attributes are even more effective when managers have a strong 
incentive to act opportunistically. Thus, not conditioning the link on the magnitude of 
abnormal accruals could have contributed to the insignificant Wald test. The fourth 
hypothesis extends the link by examining the combined impact of the empirical indicators 
of corporate governance and earnings management on the overall explanatory power of 
earnings.  
When comparing the adjusted R-square from Equation 5 (pooled = 19% and mean = 
26.9%) to the adjusted R-square from Equation 3 (pooled = 2% and mean = 4.4%), the 
comparison indicates that corporate governance has a greater role in influencing 
shareholders’ perception than merely reducing earnings management. Next, earnings 
management is used to condition the link between corporate governance variables and the 
earnings response coefficients. 
 
4.4.4 Test Results for Hypothesis Four 
The fourth hypothesis focuses on the impact of corporate governance on the 
earnings response coefficients after conditioning on earnings management as illustrated 
in Equation 17. The fourth hypothesis is based on the view that the relationship between 
the empirical indicators of corporate governance and earnings response coefficients is 
empowered when managers have a strong incentive to act opportunistically. Firms with 
high magnitudes of abnormal accruals are deemed to have an incentive to manage 
earnings, because managers manage earnings only when they have an incentive to do so. 
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Corporate governance is most needed when managers have an incentive to act 
opportunistically.76 The pooled results are illustrated in Table 4-10. 
Equation 17: Regression of earnings response coefficients on corporate governance variables 
conditioned on the magnitude abnormal accruals. 
ARj = β0 + ϕ0 Ejt + ϕ1 Ejt D0D1OWNCONjt + ϕ2 Ejt D0 CEOjt + ϕ3 Ejt D0D2 BRDSZEjt + ϕ4 Ejt 
D0D3 BRDINDjt + ϕ5 Ejt D0 AUDINDjt + ϕ6 Ejt D0D4 AUDCMPjtj + ϕ7 Ejt D0D5 OWNOUTjt + ϕ8 
Ejt D0D6 OWNMANjt + ϕ9 Ejt D0D7DEBTRLjt + λ0 ∆Ejt + λ1 ∆Ejt D0D1OWNCONjt + λ2 ∆Ejt D0 
CEOjt + λ3 ∆Ejt D0D2 BRDSZEjt + λ4 ∆Ejt D0D3 BRDINDjt + λ5 ∆Ejt D0 AUDINDjt + λ6 ∆Ejt D0D4 
AUDCMPjt + λ7 ∆Ejt D0D5 OWNOUTjt + λ8 ∆Ejt D0D6 OWNMANjt + λ9 ∆Ejt D0D7 DEBTRLjt + εj 
 
There are two major findings from the tests shown in Table 4-10 and Appendix G. 
First, the multivariate pooled and mean adjusted R-squared after conditioning on the 
empirical indicator of earnings management are (22% and 36.8%, respectively) higher 
than the adjusted R-squared before conditioning on earnings management. This means 
incorporating indicators of earnings reliability (i.e. corporate governance and earnings 
management) with earnings explains share returns more than twice as do earnings 
independently. Hence, the overall explanatory power of earnings improves due to 
combing the empirical indicators of corporate governance and earnings management.  
Second, after conditioning on earnings management, the Wald test shows an 
increase in the number of significant corporate governance variables from two significant 
variables (see Table 4-8) to five significant variables (see Table 4-10). The five variables 
are the empirical indicators of ownership concentration, CEO dominance, audit 
committee competence, independent directors’ ownership and debt reliance. The results 
of the Wald test indicate that the earnings response coefficients are significantly different 
after incorporating these variables.  
                                                 
76 This is reflected by the larger number of significant corporate governance attributes compared to the 
previous test (before conditioning on earnings management). 
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Table 4-10: The pooled results of regressing earnings response coefficient on the empirical indicators 
of corporate governance conditioned on the empirical indicator of earnings management 
Does corporate governance influence earnings informativeness in the presence of earnings 
management? 
Hypothesis Corporate 
Governance 
Earnings 
Type 
Pooled 
(univariate)
Pooled 
(multivariate) 
Wald 
Stat.  
Findings 
E 2.37 
(3.73)*** 
2.27 
(1.79)* 
3.85** H4A0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 1) ≤ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 
1) ≤ β2 
Ownership 
Concentration 
∆E -0.48 
(-1.64)* 
1.20 
(1.44) 
0.22 
Reject a 
E -4.31 
(-2.14)** 
-4.51 
(-2.58)*** 
3.4* H4B0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 2) ≥ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 
2) ≥ β2 
CEO 
dominance 
∆E 1.64 
(2.38)** 
2.97 
(6.30)*** 
2.38 
Reject a 
E 0.08 
(1.19) 
-0.12 
(-1.01) 
0.00 H4C0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 3) ≤ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 
3) ≤ β2 
Board Size 
∆E -0.05 
(-1.02) 
0.40 
(17.86)*** 
0.00 
Do not 
reject 
E 0.50 
(0.24) 
-1.09 
(-0.52) 
0.03 H4D0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 4) ≤ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 
4) ≤ β2 
Board 
Independence 
∆E -0.25 
(-0.35) 
2.33 
(3.12)*** 
0.05 
Do not 
reject 
E 1.19 
(1.33) 
0.41 
(0.44) 
0.54 H4E0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 5) ≤ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 
5) ≤ β2 
Audit 
Committee 
Independence  ∆E -0.12 
(-0.13) 
-0.30 
(-0.34) 
0.01 
Do not 
reject 
E 3.08 
(8.98)*** 
3.12 
(3.16)*** 
14.33*** H4F0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 6) ≤ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 
6) ≤ β2 
Audit 
Committee 
Competence ∆E -2.44 
(-2.32)** 
-3.27 
(-2.91)*** 
3.42* 
Reject a 
E 1.14 
(0.94) 
-0.72 
(-0.21) 
0.51 H4G0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 7) ≤ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 
7) ≤ β2 
Independent 
Directors’ 
Ownership ∆E -2.36 
(-9.59)*** 
-9.83 
(-9.09)*** 
10.37*** 
Do not 
reject b 
E -0.01 
(-0.05) 
0.41 
(0.66) 
0.00 H4H0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 8) ≤ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 
8) ≤ β2 
Managerial 
Ownership 
∆E -1.07 
(-1.71)* 
-4.80 
(-1.16) 
1.3 
Do not 
reject 
E 0.53 
(0.46) 
-1.15 
(-0.87) 
0.18 H4I0 
(ϕ0 + ϕ 9) ≤ 
β1 , (λ 0 + λ 
9) ≤ β2 
Debt Reliance 
∆E -3.10 
(-2.40)** 
-0.33 
(-0.23) 
4.33** 
Do not 
reject b 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Pooled represents the pooled GLS (random effect) regression. 
All t-statistics are calculated using white (1980) heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. 
The results shown are controlled for beta risk (an earnings response coefficient determinant). 
a The null hypothesis is only rejected for earnings level. 
b Although the Wald test is significant, the coefficients are significant in the opposite direction of the alternate hypothesis. 
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The five significant attributes are analysed further in following paragraphs.  
Table 4-11 displays all parameters of the Pooled GLS univariate regressions.77 
Table 4-11: Pooled GLS univariate regressions of earnings response coefficients on corporate 
governance variables conditioned on abnormal accruals 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Constant Ejt ECGjt ∆Ejt ∆ECGjt R2 F-value 
OWNCONjt -0.01 
(-0.17) 
0.33 
(0.77) 
2.37 
(3.73)***
0.23 
(0.60) 
-0.48 
(-1.64)* 0.12 21.54*** 
CEOjt -0.04 
(-0.50) 
1.35 
(4.06)*** 
-4.31 
(-2.14)** 
-0.19 
(-0.54) 
1.64 
(2.38)** 0.14 27.28*** 
AUDCMPjt -0.05 
(-0.60) 
0.65 
(1.48) 
3.08 
(8.98)***
0.20 
(0.41) 
-2.44 
(-2.32)** 0.12 21.62*** 
OWNOUTjt -0.02 
(-0.32) 
0.76 
(1.73)* 
1.14 
(0.94) 
0.30 
(0.75) 
-2.36 
(-9.59)*** 0.10 18.64*** 
DEBTRLjt -0.03 
(-0.43) 
0.97 
(1.60) 
0.53 
(0.46) 
0.18 
(0.42) 
-3.10 
(-2.40)** 0.10 17.99*** 
 
4.4.4.1 Ownership concentration 
Equation 18: Univariate regression of earnings response coefficients on ownership concentration 
conditioned on the magnitude of abnormal accruals. 
 
ARj = β0 + ϕ0 Ejt + ϕ1 Ejt D0D1OWNCONjt + λ0 ∆Ejt + λ1 ∆Ejt D0D1OWNCONjt + εj 
 
 
The results in Table 4-11 show the incremental sensitivity of the earnings response 
coefficients to the empirical indicator of ownership concentration. The findings, as 
derived from Equation 18, are as follows:  
                                                 
77 As can be noted from Table 4-11, all coefficients for earnings changes (except for CEO dominance) after 
incorporate corporate governance are negative, while the coefficients for earnings level are positive after 
incorporate corporate governance. The signs of the coefficients indicate that when an increase in earnings 
level is due to high earnings changes caused by high earnings management, the market response to total 
earnings declines. This is demonstrated by the decline in the summed coefficients. This is explained by 
Cheng et al. (1996) that the market perceives change in earnings as transitory. Hence, if earnings level is a 
result of high change in earnings, then the market discounts for the component that is influenced by change 
in earnings. 
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1. While the summed coefficients (ϕ1+ λ1) capture the additional information content 
when ownership concentration and earnings management are high, the summed 
coefficients (ϕ0+ λ0) are expected to capture the additional information content 
when ownership concentration or earnings management are low. The sum of the 
pooled earnings coefficients interacting with high ownership concentration and 
earnings management (ϕ1+ λ1) equals 1.89, which is positive and significant. The 
summed pooled earnings coefficients interacting with the low ownership 
concentration or earnings management (ϕ0+ λ0) equals 0.56, which is lower than 
the first summed earnings coefficients positive, but insignificant. Nonetheless, the 
both summed earnings coefficients support the role of ownership concentration 
and earnings management in increasing the incremental sensitivity of the earnings 
response coefficients. 
2. Similarly, the univariate mean response coefficients from Appendix G support the 
findings of the pooled response coefficients that ownership concentration and 
earnings management jointly have incremental information content relating to 
earnings. 
3. The adjusted R-squared of the returns-earnings model after incorporating 
ownership concentration jointly with earnings management is 11.7% up from the 
original 9.9%. This suggests that the ownership concentration and earnings 
management combined increase the value relevance of earnings.  
4. At earnings level (where the Wald statistic is significant), the coefficient  
(ϕ1 = 2.37, t = 3.73) shows a positive sign at significant level when the ownership 
concentration and earnings management are high, which supports the alternative 
hypothesis (H4A1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 1) > β1 [not rejected]). This can be interpreted that the 
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market responds positively to earnings level when large shareholders exist and 
managers have an incentive to manage earnings.  
4.4.4.2 CEO dominance 
Equation 19: Univariate regression of earnings response coefficients on CEO dominance conditioned 
on the magnitude of abnormal accruals. 
 
ARj = β0 + ϕ0 Ejt + ϕ2 Ejt D0 CEOjt + λ0 ∆Ejt + λ2 ∆Ejt D0 CEOjt + εj 
 
 
The results in Table 4-11 show the incremental sensitivity of the earnings response 
coefficients to the empirical indicator of CEO dominance. The findings, as derived from 
Equation 19, are as follows:  
1. While the summed coefficients (ϕ2+ λ2) capture the additional information content 
when the CEO is dominant and earnings management is high, the summed 
coefficients (ϕ0+ λ0) are expected to capture the additional information content 
when the CEO is not dominant or earnings management is low. The sum of the 
pooled earnings coefficients interacting with CEO dominance and high earnings 
management (ϕ2+ λ2) equals -2.67, which is negative and significant. The summed 
pooled earnings coefficients interacting with the chairman independence or low 
earnings management (ϕ0+ λ0) equals 1.16, which is positive, but only significant 
at earnings level. Nevertheless, both summed earnings coefficients support the 
combined role of CEO dominance and earnings management in decreasing the 
earnings response coefficients. 
2. Although not significant, some researchers might find comfort in the point that the 
signs of the mean response coefficients from Appendix G support the findings of 
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the pooled response coefficients that CEO dominance and earnings management 
jointly have decremental information content relating to earnings. 
3. The adjusted R-squared of the returns-earnings model after incorporating CEO 
dominance jointly with earnings management is 14.5% up from the original 9.9%. 
Although the explanatory power is lower than in Hypothesis Three, this still 
supports the evidence that CEO dominance combined with earnings management 
increases the value relevance of earnings.  
4. At earnings level (where the Wald statistic is significant), the coefficient  
(ϕ1 = -4.31, t = -2.14) shows a negative sign at significant levels when the dummy 
variables representing CEO dominance and high earnings management equal one, 
which supports the alternative hypothesis (H4B1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 2) < β1 [not rejected]). 
This can be interpreted that the market responds negatively to earnings level when 
the CEO is dominant and earnings management is high.  
4.4.4.3 Audit committee competence 
Equation 20: Univariate regression of earnings response coefficients on audit committee competence 
conditioned on the magnitude of abnormal accruals. 
 
ARj = β0 + ϕ0 Ejt + ϕ6 Ejt D0D4 AUDCMPjtj + λ0 ∆Ejt + λ6 ∆Ejt D0D4 AUDCMPjt + εj 
 
 
The results in Table 4-11 show the incremental sensitivity of the earnings response 
coefficients to the empirical indicator of audit committee competence. The findings, as 
derived from Equation 20, are as follows:  
1. Given that the Wald statistic is significant at earnings level and change, the 
summed earnings response coefficients are the focus of the analysis. While the 
summed coefficients (ϕ6+ λ6) capture the additional information content when 
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audit committee competence and earnings management are high, the summed 
coefficients (ϕ0+ λ0) are expected to capture the additional information content 
when audit committee competence or earnings management are low. The sum of 
the pooled earnings coefficients interacting with high audit committee 
competence and earnings management (ϕ6+ λ) equals 0.64, which is positive and 
significant. The summed pooled earnings coefficients interacting with the low 
audit committee competence or earnings management (ϕ0+ λ0) equals 0.85, which 
is higher than the first summed earnings coefficients, positive, and insignificant. 
Although the findings relating to audit committee competence are not decisive at 
this stage, only the significant coefficients indicate that audit committee 
competence and earnings management collectively increase the incremental 
sensitivity of the earnings response coefficients. The significant coefficients also 
demonstrate that audit committee competence and earnings management 
collectively are incremental on earnings level and decremental on earnings 
change. Thus, the alternate hypothesis is not rejected (H4F1: (ϕ0 + ϕ 6) > β1 [not 
rejected]). 
2. The mean response coefficients from Appendix G are not distant from the pooled 
response coefficients. 
3. The adjusted R-squared of the returns-earnings model after incorporating audit 
committee competence jointly with earnings management is 11.7% up from the 
original 9.9%. This suggests that audit committee competence and earnings 
management combined provide information that increases the value relevance of 
earnings.  
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4.4.4.4 Independent directors’ ownership 
Equation 21: Univariate regression of earnings response coefficients on independent directors’ 
ownership conditioned on the magnitude of abnormal accruals. 
 
ARj = β0 + ϕ0 Ejt + ϕ7 Ejt D0D5 OWNOUTjt + λ0 ∆Ejt + λ7 ∆Ejt D0D5 OWNOUTjt + εj 
 
 
The results in Table 4-11 show the incremental sensitivity of the earnings response 
coefficients to the empirical indicator of independent directors’ ownership. The findings, 
as derived from Equation 21, are as follows:  
1. While the summed coefficients (ϕ7+ λ7) capture the additional information content 
when independent directors’ ownership and earnings management are high, the 
summed coefficients (ϕ0+ λ0) are expected to capture the additional information 
content when independent directors’ ownership or earnings management are low. 
The sum of the pooled earnings coefficients interacting with high independent 
directors’ ownership and earnings management (ϕ7+ λ7) equals -1.22, which is 
negative and significant at earnings change. The summed pooled earnings 
coefficients interacting with the low independent directors’ ownership or earnings 
management (ϕ0+ λ0) equals 1.36, which is higher than the first summed earnings 
coefficients, positive, and significant at earnings level. Both summed earnings 
coefficients support the combined role of independent directors’ ownership and 
earnings management in decreasing the incremental sensitivity of the earnings 
response coefficients. 
2. Although not significant, some researchers are likely to take comfort in that the 
signs of the mean response coefficients from Appendix G match the signs of the 
pooled response coefficients. 
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3. The adjusted R-squared of the returns-earnings model after incorporating 
independent directors’ ownership jointly with earnings management is 10.2% up 
from the original 9.9%, which is slightly higher than the R-squared in Hypothesis 
Three. This suggests that Independent directors’ ownership and earnings 
management combined to some extent increases the value relevance of earnings.  
4. At earnings change (where the Wald statistic is significant), the coefficient  
(λ7 = -2.36, t = -9.59) shows a negative sign at significant level when independent 
directors’ ownership and earnings management are high, which does not support 
the stated hypothesis (H4A1: (λ 0 + λ 7) > β1 [rejected], because it supports (λ 0 + λ 7) 
< β1). This can be interpreted that the market responds negatively to earnings 
change when independent directors’ ownership and earnings management are 
high. 
4.4.4.5 Debt reliance 
Equation 22: Univariate regression of earnings response coefficients on debt reliance conditioned on 
the magnitude of abnormal accruals. 
 
ARj = β0 + ϕ0 Ejt + ϕ9 Ejt D0D7DEBTRLjt + λ0 ∆Ejt + λ9 ∆Ejt D0D7 DEBTRLjt + εj 
 
 
The results in Table 4-11 show the incremental sensitivity of the earnings response 
coefficients to the empirical indicator of debt reliance. The findings, as derived from 
Equation 22 are, as follows:  
1. While the summed coefficients (ϕ9+ λ9) capture the additional information content 
when debt reliance and earnings management are high, the summed coefficients 
(ϕ0+ λ0) are expected to capture the additional information content when debt 
reliance or earnings management are low. The sum of the pooled earnings 
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coefficients interacting with high debt reliance and earnings management (ϕ9+ λ9) 
equals -2.57, which is negative and significant at earnings change. The summed 
pooled earnings coefficients interacting with the low debt reliance or earnings 
management (ϕ0+ λ0) equals 1.15, which is positive, but insignificant. 
Nonetheless, both summed earnings coefficients support the role of debt reliance 
and earnings management in decreasing the incremental sensitivity of the earnings 
response coefficients. 
2. The mean response coefficients from Appendix G are insignificant and include 
signs that are different from the pooled response coefficients. Due to its 
insignificant coefficients, inference is only drawn from the pooled coefficients. 
3. The adjusted R-squared of the returns-earnings model after incorporating debt 
reliance jointly with earnings management is 9.8% down from the original 9.9%. 
This indicate that corporate governance as measured by debt reliance combined 
with earnings management does not increase the relevance of earnings.  
4. At earnings change (where the Wald statistic is significant), the coefficient  
(ϕ9 = -3.10, t = -2.40) shows a negative sign at significant level when the debt 
reliance and earnings management are high, which does not support the 
alternative hypothesis (H4I1: (λ 0 + λ 9) > β2 [rejected], because the findings 
support (λ 0 + λ 9) < β2). This can be interpreted that the market responds negatively 
to earnings changes when debt is high and managers have an incentive to manage 
earnings.  
The results relating to Hypothesis Four find that when earnings management is 
high, value-relevance of earnings is higher for better corporate governance as reflected by 
high ownership concentration, absence of CEO dominance, and high audit committee 
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competence. Four attributes were not significant according to the Wald test. Although 
board size and audit committee independence show a strong impact on abnormal 
accruals, it likely that shareholders perceive these two attributes different either due to 
their nature or due to the importance of other significant attributes such as audit 
committee competence. 
It could be argued some attributes are not significant, because there are defined 
differently by shareholders. For instance, shareholders might define board independence 
differently or that shareholders put a significant weight on chairman independence rather 
than director independence. It could also be argued hat using the degree of executive 
directors’ ownership is not as important to shareholders’ perception as the degree of 
management ownership. This could be a factor in not finding significant results. 
Even though not all corporate governance attributes support the stated hypotheses, 
the objective is achieved by identifying the attributes and the circumstances that answer 
the research question. As conditioning on earnings management increases the explanatory 
power of returns-earnings model after incorporating corporate governance, the fourth 
hypothesis is supported. Hence, conditioning on earnings management helps clarify the 
impact of corporate governance attributes. Next, the study illustrated the steps taken to 
ensure the robustness of the results. 
  
 
4.4.5 Robustness of the Results 
The study has used the following checks to improve the reliability and robustness of 
results: 
1. Outliers are removed using the same criteria used in Easton and Harris (1991).  
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2. All t-statistics are calculated using white (1980) heteroscedasticity corrected 
standard errors after detecting heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan (1979) 
approach. 
3. The Durbin-Watson test is employed to determine whether the error terms in all 
regressions are autocorrelated. The error terms are shown to be virtually 
uncorrelated.  
4. Normal probability plots for all models follow a continuous line.  
5. Linearity was tested when applicable, because the linearity assumption of OLS is 
not met when using pooled data.  
6. Two measures are used to ensure that the results were not affected by harmful 
collinearity among the explaining variables in all models. First, the direct 
correlations between corporate governance variables do not show serious 
collinearity. Second, condition indices (Belsley et al., 1980) were used to ensure 
that the sample did not contain sever harmful collinearity. Potentially severe 
multicollinearity is likely to exist if the maximum condition index is over 30.78  
7. The mean coefficients of annual regressions were reported in Appendix G to 
avoid potential overstated test statistics caused by residuals’ cross-correlations 
(Barth et al, 2001a; Bernard, 1987).  
8. A dummy variable approach plays a role in reducing the effect of measurement 
errors significantly. Using a dummy variable approach, as is in this study, has 
been effective in evaluating the effect of certain characteristics on earnings 
response coefficients (see Cheng et al., 1996).  
                                                 
78 The highest condition index for all four years (full sample) was 23. 
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9. Using the modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) model to calculate abnormal 
accruals assists in accounting for industry differences. 
10. The significant impact of earnings response coefficient determinants might over 
shadow the impact of corporate governance attributes. To correctly measure the 
impact of corporate governance on the returns-earnings relationship, systematic 
risk (beta risk) was used as a control variable.79  
These checks demonstrate that the findings are robust. Next, a summary of the chapter is 
presented. 
 
4.5 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
This chapter presented the results of the analysis of the data and the tests of the 
hypotheses. Table 4-12 summarises the results of the hypotheses tests.  
                                                 
79 Growth is not added as a control variable, because the development of the earnings growth valuation 
model shows that growth is already incorporated in the constant variable. Thus, including growth as a 
control variable may bias the results rather than amend them. 
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Table 4-12: Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
Hypothesis One: The coefficients of regressing the magnitude of abnormal accruals on 
the empirical indicators of corporate governance are statistically different from zero. 
H1A0 Do not reject H1A1 Reject 
H1B0 Do not reject H1B1 Reject 
H1C0 Reject H1C1 Do not reject 
H1D0 Do not reject H1D1 Reject 
H1E0 Reject H1E1 Do not reject 
H1F0 Do not reject H1F1 Reject 
H1G0 Do not reject H1G1 Reject 
H1H0 Do not reject H1H1 Reject 
H1I0 Do not reject H1I1 Reject 
Hypothesis Two: The interaction between the magnitude of abnormal accruals and 
earnings is less than the coefficient for earnings in the absence of abnormal accruals. 
H20 Do not reject H21 Reject 
Hypothesis Three: The interactions between earnings and the empirical indicators of 
corporate governance are different from zero and from the coefficient for earnings in the 
absence of corporate governance. 
H3A0 Do not reject H3A1 Reject 
H3B0 Reject H3B1 Do not reject 
H3C0 Do not reject H3C1 Reject 
H3D0 Do not reject H3D1 Reject 
H3E0 Do not reject H3E1 Reject 
H3F0 Do not reject H3F1 Reject 
H3G0 Do not reject H3G1 Reject 
H3H0 Do not reject H3H1 Reject 
H3I0 Do not reject H3I1 Reject 
Hypothesis Four: The coefficients for the interaction between earnings and the empirical 
indicators of corporate governance conditioned on the magnitude of abnormal accruals 
are different from zero and from the earnings response coefficient in the absence of 
abnormal accruals and/or corporate governance. 
H4A0 Reject H4A1 Do not reject 
H4B0 Reject H4B1 Do not reject 
H4C0 Do not reject H4C1 Reject 
H4D0 Do not reject H4D1 Reject 
H4E0 Do not reject H4E1 Reject 
H4F0 Reject H4F1 Do not reject 
H4G0 Do not reject H4G1 Reject 
H4H0 Do not reject H4H1 Reject 
H4I0 Do not reject H4I1 Reject 
 
Finally, some evidence support the core hypotheses presented in the study. The 
combination of earnings management and corporate governance influence the value 
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relevance of earnings using Australia data. The relation between corporate governance 
and the information content of earnings is empowered by conditioning on earnings 
management. Additionally, earnings management is found to be inversely associated with 
corporate governance. Although not all corporate governance attributes support the stated 
hypotheses, the study has achieved its objective by identifying the attributes that answer 
the research question and under which circumstances. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Five summarises the research and the major findings. Chapter Five 
presents the examination of research limitations, and discusses the implication of the 
study on practitioners, regulators, educators, and researchers. The chapter proceeds as 
follows: Section 5.2 summarises the research objectives, methods, analysis, and 
conclusions. Section 5.3 presents the examination of research limitations and suggests 
potential future research. Section 5.4 addresses the implication of the research results. 
Section 5.6 provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
5.2 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH 
The aim of this research was to theoretically and empirically investigate the links 
among corporate governance, earnings management and the information content of 
accounting earnings. The motivation for this study is derived from two research areas. 
The first is the suggestion that the weak returns-earnings relationship is contributed by 
lack of earnings reliability due management’s earnings manipulation (i.e. earnings 
management). The second is the importance of corporate governance in enhancing 
financial reporting credibility and reducing opportunistic behaviour.  
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While most studies from the corporate governance literature focus on directly 
associating corporate governance with share performance, the literature lacked studies 
investigating associations among corporate governance, earnings management and the 
returns-earnings relationship. This research raises the issue that efficient corporate 
governance increases the credibility of financial performance, rather than directly 
increasing financial performance. This is supported by the mixed results found when 
testing the association between corporate governance and corporate performance (see 
Appendix A for replicated results), as well as by a recent approach to associate corporate 
governance to earnings management and the information content of accounting earnings. 
The second approach grew as results became significant and explainable. These 
associations are tested in this study (see sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.3). The study tests these 
associations using Australian data with the intention of enhancing the external validate of 
their findings. The current research extends prior studies by testing the impact of 
corporate governance on the information content of accounting earnings in the presence 
of earnings management (see section 4.3.4).  
Using agency theory, corporate governance was used as a system that helps increase 
financial reporting credibility and reduces opportunistic behaviour. A review of the 
relevant literature identified three key categories of corporate governance: 1) 
organisational monitoring; 2) incentive alignment; and 3) governance structure.  
Nine attributes of corporate governance were examined. Attributes of corporate 
governance are expected to provide a signal to the market about the firm’s financial 
reporting credibility. However, some firms may exercise minimum level of corporate 
governance to ensure market governance rules are met. Consequently, the mere existence 
of an attribute does not necessarily mean strong financial reporting credibility. The study 
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uses the median of the sample as a benchmark to determine whether corporate 
governance is deemed influential or not.  
Consistent with prior research (e.g. Kothari et al., 2001; Becker et al., 1998; Jones, 
1991; Healy, 1985), the study computes abnormal accruals using aggregate accruals 
models as an approach to measure earnings management. Abnormal accruals were 
estimated using the modified Jones (Dechow et al, 1995) model.  
As with prior research, the information content of accounting earnings is assessed 
by examining the earnings response coefficients in a returns-earnings (Easton and Harris, 
1991) model. The literature examining the information content of accounting earnings 
identifies circumstances in which the returns-earnings relationship improves. Such as 
using multiple proxies for unexpected earnings and controlling for risk and growth. The 
basic model is share returns as the dependent variable and earning per share and change 
in earnings per share as the independent variables. 
The study investigated the relationship with respect to earnings reliability as a value 
relevant source of information. The study proposes that corporate governance and 
earnings management are likely to influence shareholders’ perception of earnings 
reliability. Corporate governance and earnings management were introduced to the model 
as interacting terms to the returns-earnings regressions. Specifically, corporate 
governance should play a role in explaining performance in the presence of opportunistic 
managerial behaviour. The study uses earnings management as a moderating construct 
for the corporate governance-earnings informativeness relationship.  
 
From the model, a set of propositions was stated. The model was tested using a 
sample of firms consisted of the top 500 companies listed on the Australian Stock 
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Exchange. Sample inclusion depended on the nature of the industry and the availability of 
corporate governance, accounting, and market data. Firms in financial, mining and 
regulated industries were excluded due to different accrual choices and valuation process. 
The study covers the period of four financial years (1996/97, 1997/98, 1998/99, and 
1999/2000).  
Four hypotheses were derived from the proposition. Prior to testing hypotheses Two, 
Three, and Four, the returns-earnings (Easton and Harris, 1991) model is tested irrespective 
of the proposed indicators of reliability (i.e. earnings management and corporate 
governance).80 The returns-earnings model is then tested after incorporating earnings 
management (Hypothesis Two), corporate governance (Hypothesis Three), or both 
(Hypothesis Four). These coefficients are then examined using the Wald test to find out 
whether the earnings response coefficients after incorporating indictors of earnings 
reliability are significantly different from the earnings response coefficients irrespective 
of any propositions. Table 5-1 provides a summary of the study’s propositions, 
hypotheses, and key findings. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-1: Summary of propositions, hypotheses, and findings 
Proposition Hypothesis/ Reference References/Findings 
Proposition One: Corporate 
governance is associated with earnings 
management. 
Hypothesis One: The 
coefficients of regressing the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals 
Table 4-6 
Hypothesis supported for 
board size and audit 
                                                 
80 The response coefficients from the initial returns-earnings (Easton and Harris, 1991) model show that 
earnings level and change in earnings are positive (β1 = 0.91 and β2 = 0.06); and therefore provide 
incremental information content of earnings. A Ramsey RESET test (F = 2.92, M =1, d.f. = 773) indicates 
that the response coefficients have no specification error at both levels (1% and 5%). 
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on the empirical indicators of 
corporate governance are 
statistically different from zero. 
 
committee independence. 
 
Proposition Two: Earnings 
management is negatively associated 
with the information content of 
earnings. 
Hypothesis Two: The interaction 
between the magnitude of 
abnormal accruals and earnings is 
less than the coefficient for 
earnings in the absence of 
abnormal accruals. 
Table 4-7 
Hypothesis not supported. 
 
Proposition Three: Corporate 
governance is associated with the 
information content of earnings. 
 
Hypothesis Three: The 
interactions between earnings and 
the empirical indicators of 
corporate governance are 
different from zero and from the 
coefficient for earnings in the 
absence of corporate governance. 
 
Tables 4-8 and 4-9 
Hypothesis supported for 
CEO dominance. 
Proposition Four: Managers’ incentive 
to manage earnings moderates the 
association between corporate 
governance and the information content 
of earnings. 
Hypothesis Four: The 
coefficients for the interaction 
between earnings and the 
empirical indicators of corporate 
governance conditioned on the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals 
are different from zero and from 
the earnings response coefficient 
in the absence of abnormal 
accruals and/or corporate 
governance. 
Table 4-10 and 4-11 
Hypothesis supported for 
ownership concentration, 
CEO dominance, and audit 
committee competence. 
 
The results from testing Hypothesis One show that board size and audit committee 
independence are negatively associated with the magnitude of abnormal accruals.  This is 
consistent with the findings of Xie et al. (2003) and Chtourou et al. (2001) for board size 
and consistent with the findings of Klein (2002b) for audit committee independence.   
Hypothesis Two is tested by incorporating the magnitude of abnormal accruals in 
the returns-earnings (Easton and Harris, 1991) model as a variable directly influencing 
the earnings response coefficient rather than share returns. Hypothesis Two is not 
supported. 
The Wald test for Hypothesis Three shows that the earnings response coefficients 
are significantly different after incorporating CEO dominance and independent directors’ 
ownership. The coefficients associated with CEO dominance (ϕ2 = -3.93, t = -3.21, ϕ0 = 
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1.67, t = 8.05) show that the market responds negatively to earnings level when the CEO 
is dominant. The adjusted R-squared of the returns-earnings model after incorporating 
CEO dominance is 16% up from the original 9.9%, which indicates that CEO dominance 
is a source of value relevant information. This is consistent with the findings of Anderson 
et al. (2003) and Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994). 
However, the coefficient for independent directors’ ownership (ϕ7 = -2.20, t = -5.44) 
suggests that the market responds negatively to earnings change when the equity stakes of 
independent directors’ in the firm are high.  This is contrary to the views of regulators 
(Hampel, 1997) and the findings of prior studies (Bhagat and Black, 1999; Bhagat et al., 
1999). Hence, it supports an alternative view that high independent directors’ ownership 
motivates directors to act in their own interests rather than the interests of shareholders. 
Through the inclusion of a dummy variable representing abnormal accruals to the 
previous test, Hypothesis Four is tested. The impact of corporate governance on the 
information content of accounting earnings is tested after conditioning on earnings 
management. The multivariate pooled and mean adjusted R-squared increases (pooled = 
22% and mean = 36.8%), which suggests that the overall explanatory power of earnings 
improves due to combing the empirical indicators of corporate governance and earnings 
management. The Wald test for Hypothesis Four shows an increase in the number of 
significant corporate governance variables when earnings management is present. This 
suggests that the empirical indicator of earnings management plays a decisive role in 
explaining the relationship between corporate governance and the information content of 
accounting earnings. Thus, Hypothesis Four is supported. 
Although not all corporate governance attributes reject the null hypothesis, the 
objective of the study is achieved by finding which of the attributes answers the research 
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question and under which circumstances. The results of Hutchinson and Gul (2004) 
suggest that not all corporate governance attributes are appropriate for all firms. 
Corporate governance attributes are used selectively as control devices depending on a 
firm’s characteristics. 
The robustness of the results was checked. Earnings response coefficients 
determinants were taken into account. Steps were taken to check for harmful collinearity 
and any violation of the regression assumptions. Violations of the regression assumptions 
were remedied using recommended approaches from the literature. 
5.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
There are a number of potential limitations of this research, which the reader must 
be mindful when interpreting the findings. These limitations relate primarily to threats to 
the validity of the research. The threats to validity are categorised into two groups: 
internal and external validity (Campbell and Stanley, 1963). Due to the nature of the 
constructs and the research method, there is a greater emphasis on internal validity than 
external validity.81  
5.3.1 Internal Validity 
Internal validity relates to the certainty with which conclusions can be made about 
the relationship between the variables as measured in the research. As the study is not an 
experiment, many of the traditional threats to internal validity are not present. Internal 
validity of this research is enhanced by the following controls:  
• External independent auditors examine figures in financial reports, which controls 
the legitimacy of information obtained.  
                                                 
81 Although Cook and Campbell (1979) classify threats to validity to include threats to statistical conclusion 
and construct validity, these threats are included as internal validity issues. 
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• ASX disclosure requirements ensure that financial reports are complete, which 
controls for missing data.  
• ASX listing rules apply to all firms listed without exceptions, which controls for 
unstandardised reporting. 
The threats to internal validity are categorised into four issues. They are: sample, 
data, industries, and constructs & variables.  
5.3.1.1 Sample 
A challenge to internal validity is created by the selection of the sample on 
predetermined criteria. Examining a non-random sample of firms introduces an inherent 
bias into the study. Given the non-random nature of the sample, the detection of false 
associations arising from the sample design cannot be prevented.  
It is nearly impossible in Australian studies of earnings management or corporate 
governance to select firms randomly. This is due to the limited number of firms that 
publicly disclose standardised business information.  
Sample size is another concern in terms of statistical conclusion validity, which 
relates to the probability that the statistical results are representative of the actual 
relationship within the data set. The sample is also limited to the top 500 companies, thus 
introducing a size bias. However, the size bias is likely to reduce survivorship bias over 
the study period, because larger firms are less likely to be delisted than smaller firms.  
5.3.1.2 Data 
Data availability dictates that sample firms are only drawn from the top 500 
companies listed on ASX. It is possible that firms with poor corporate governance are 
managing earnings to conceal recent poor performance, which leads to these firms’ 
market capitalisation to fall outside the top 500 listed companies. In contrast, other firms 
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may have an incentive to manage earnings in an attempt to maintain rank. The exclusion 
of these firms may remove the very firms that are likely to answer the research question. 
Given the size of the final sample compared to the initial target, selection bias caused by 
the availability of annual reports or clarity of disclosed data should not threaten the 
results of the study.  
The model will be tested using archival data that contains the effects of all 
influences, not just the release of the accounting information. Therefore, isolating the 
impact of accounting information on investor behaviour may prove difficult. 
5.3.1.3 Industries 
This research relies on the ASX industry sub-group classification in calculating 
normal and abnormal accruals. The model may be misspecified if the ASX industry 
classification is inappropriately set, which results in reducing control over industry 
specific factors.  
When a study is conducted across industries, industry specific variables may be 
driving the results. While a single industry approach would have enhanced the internal 
validity of the study, it would have been to the disadvantage of external validity. If a 
selected sample contains various industries, external validity is promoted but the power 
of the tests are reduced, as it increases the risk of including firms and industries in the 
sample that consider corporate governance practices irrelevant. 
5.3.1.4 Constructs and Variables 
Construct validity relates to the degree to which an operational variable measures 
the theoretical construct. Studying natural behaviours in natural settings can contribute to 
construct validity because uninterrupted observed behaviours (such as discretionary 
judgement over accruals) are likely to reflect the desired construct (opportunistic earnings 
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management) to a greater extent than other research methods, which might be more 
subject to response biases (Judd et al., 1991).  
The proposed indicators of earnings reliability (i.e. corporate governance and 
earnings management) may have some limitations. Whilst their use can be theoretically 
justified, neither construct can be accurately measured empirically. These limitations are 
minimised through the clear operational definitions of the used measures, which is 
provided in Chapter Three.  
Construct validity is important when variables are newly developed, as is the case 
with audit committee competence. Returns, earnings, and abnormal accruals, and 
governance attributes (except for audit committee competence) have been used 
extensively in previous research. The existing literature was reviewed to provide 
guidance for the development of a measure for audit committee competence. 
There are no major conceptualisation differences between setters of financial 
reports and the data collector of this research. This study made certain that the operational 
measures used for the independent variables were consistent with measures used in the 
literature. In certain cases, the corporate governance literature identifies more than one 
operational measure. However, a single operationalisation was sometimes necessary to 
avoid nesting problems and to reduce the number of sample firms required.  
The examination of a limited set of corporate governance attributes is a limitation 
that needs to be taken into account when interpreting the findings. If other corporate 
governance characteristics contribute to the integrity of the accounting measures then the 
parameter estimates may be biased. An opportunity arises for further research by 
investigating other attributes of corporate governance. 
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A limitation of the study is that there are other factors that may influence earnings 
reliability apart from earnings management and corporate governance. Also there are 
other factors are likely to influence abnormal returns over the 12 months window, such as 
company disclosure policies, impact of non-financial announcements, and frequent 
company announcements. 
The literature indicates a high level of measurement error in the accrual models 
commonly used to detect earnings management. One of the limitations is that earnings 
management are assumed to be opportunistic rather than informative. Discretionary 
accruals may reflect either opportunistic behaviour or managerial discretion in providing 
information that is more relevant. Currently, no clear method exists by which to make 
this distinction.  
The methods used to analyse relationships between variables capture associations 
only in a statistical sense. Causation cannot be inferred, because it is not feasible due to 
the historical focus of the study. 
It is unclear whether investors use abnormal accruals, as measured by aggregate 
accruals approach, as a representation of earnings management. The complexity of such 
models suggests that the average investor is unlikely to use this measure. An opportunity 
arises for further research in the development of an experiment that would identify how 
average investors measure earnings management. 
One of the steps taken to minimise the general threats to internal validity is through 
controlling for earnings response coefficient determinants. These determinants were 
included to reduce biasness from testing a cross-sectional regression model.  
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5.3.2 External Validity 
External validity relates to the certainty to which the results of the research can be 
generalised to the population and to other settings and conditions. The sample selection 
procedure reduces the study’s external validity, because the representativeness of the 
sample dictates the degree of generalisability. Although the initial sample selection of 
firms is based on data availability, random sampling was not used as it would have 
further reduced an already small sample size. It is also difficult to generalise the results of 
the investigated sample in this study to the population of smaller firms. 
Results can be generalised subject to no significant changes occurring to corporate 
governance practices in Australia. Testing in accordance with real-world settings without 
intervening with any observations ensures the generalisation of the findings.  
Due to using Australian data, care should be taken in generalising the results to 
share markets in other countries due different regulations, practices, and economic 
factors. The Australian capital market differs from international markets in terms of size, 
number of listed firms or market valuation. However, the similarity in the results of the 
study with past international research indicates a degree of generalisability. 
Furthermore the exclusion of firms, whether it is due to the nature of the industry, 
the size of the industry or the rank of the firm, reduces the generalisability of the results 
to all publicly traded firms. An opportunity arises for further research into the impact of 
corporate governance in regulated or financial industries or smaller companies. Different 
attributes of corporate governance could also be investigated. 
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5.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Despite its potential limitation, this study clearly contributes to the current literature 
on the role of corporate governance and earnings management in improving the returns-
earnings relationship. One of the tests in the study addresses the impact of corporate 
governance attributes on the information content of accounting earnings in the presence 
earnings management. It documents evidence that corporate governance help improve the 
explanatory power of earnings and that earnings management should be controlled for 
when measuring the impact of corporate governance on the information content of 
accounting earnings.  
Although the current study is not the first to examine the impact of corporate 
governance on earnings management and on the information content of accounting 
earnings, the approach differs from previous efforts in the following ways:  
1. The study theoretically and empirically investigated the collective interaction 
among corporate governance, earnings management, and the information content 
of accounting earnings. 
2. When testing the association between corporate governance and the information 
content of earnings, the relationship is conditioned on earnings management. 
3. While most, if not all, previous research in the corporate governance literature 
used a signal proxy to represent unexpected earnings, a multiple proxy for 
unexpected earnings is used in this study.  
4. While most relevant studies focus on whether coefficients are significantly 
different from zero, the study, among other tests, investigates whether earnings 
response coefficients after introducing earnings reliability indicators are 
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significantly different from the original returns-earnings coefficients before 
incorporating any interaction variables.  
5. The study focuses on a study period when managers in Australia had an incentive 
to managing earnings due to the effect of the Asian currency crisis. 
6. The study adopts recent classifications and definitions adopted by recent 
regulatory developments (e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002). 
7. Unlike most corporate governance studies, this study focuses on the control aspect 
of corporate governance rather than the performance enhancing aspect. 
Further, this is one of the few studies investigating the role of corporate governance 
in improving the returns-earnings relationship within the Australian context, if not the 
only, that identifies, explores, and tests several major attributes of corporate governance. 
The findings show that investors do not ignore corporate governance when examining the 
information content of accounting earnings. 
Given that corporate governance and earnings management affect the information 
content of earnings through their impact on shareholders’ perception of the integrity of 
the financial reporting process, the findings of this study should have implications on 
investors, accounting standard setters, auditors, financial analysts, and capital market 
regulators. Further, this study has implications on corporate governance practices due to 
the impact of corporate governance on managerial opportunistic behaviour as well as 
financial reporting credibility. 
5.4.1 Practical Implications  
Corporate decision makers need to satisfy shareholders and attract potential 
investors. Measuring the impact of corporate governance allows decision makers to 
evaluate the role of corporate governance in enhancing shareholders’ perception of the 
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reliability of financial reports. Once shareholders are able to obtain reliable information 
about corporate performance, their response to financial performance measures becomes 
greater.  
The results from this study will unlock a new door for investors to improve their 
decision-making process. Measuring the different aspects of corporate governance allows 
investors to be mindful of management’s capacity to alter accounting earnings for 
opportunistic purposes, which helps investors in evaluating the reliability and value-
relevance of accounting earnings.  
The results of the study provide market participants with guidance in knowing 
which factors to take into account when evaluating firms’ financial reports. The results 
demonstrate that corporate governance affects earnings management and the information 
content of accounting earnings. The results also show that corporate governance affects 
the information content of earnings in the presence of earnings management. Thus, a 
firm’s corporate governance structure and its earning management practices are value 
relevant information that should be considered by equity market participants in the 
valuation process.  
5.4.2 Regulatory Implications  
Authorities involved in regulating corporate governance can use this study as 
empirical support to the development of regulations and recommendations. Stock 
exchanges (eg. ASX) can employ this study to evaluate the current disclosure 
requirement of corporate governance practices.  
For example, Australian corporate regulators do not currently oblige listed firms to 
have independent boards and board committees, but the results suggest that mandatory 
formation could improve financial reporting credibility. While regulatory bodies (eg. 
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ASX and ASIC) have a vested interest in monitoring the financial reporting process, 
legislation has also acknowledged the need to monitor financial reporting to protector 
market participants (Sarbanes-Qxley Act 2002).  
The results of the research provide evidence to support ongoing regulatory activities 
aimed at effectively monitoring financial reporting and improving corporate governance 
practices. Additionally the findings of the study will assist in the identification of which 
attributes of corporate governance are likely to impact on market’s response to the 
content of the financial reports. 
New corporate governance regulations and revisions of existing corporate 
governance rules would be based on evidence from empirical studies rather than 
politically motivated debates. Empirically supporting the importance of corporate 
governance’s role would prove that the benefits of imposing governance regulations on 
firms outweigh the costs; and provide regulators with sufficient justification to impose 
additional corporate governance requirements. 
Furthermore, any move to harmonise corporate governance practices around the 
globe requires evidence that corporate governance systems are effective. This study 
provides evidence of the role corporate governance plays in enhancing the reliability of 
value relevant information (i.e. accounting earnings).  
 
5.4.3 Educational Implications  
Recent corporate collapses have led to the rise of corporate governance as a 
necessary factor in courses that aim to evaluate financial statements. The potential lack of 
credibility of accounting information acknowledges the need to understand managerial 
opportunistic behaviour and the means to monitor and control such behaviour.  
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Financial statement analysis textbooks address the issue of earnings management 
practices and the incentives of such practices. However, few texts address the issue of 
how to detect earnings management practices. Furthermore, no credit is given to the role 
corporate governance plays in monitoring and reducing such practices, which 
sequentially enhances the credibility of accounting information.  
Financial statement analysis courses largely focus on unscrambling the ambiguity of 
firm valuations. The study provides further evidence of the role of corporate governance 
and earnings management in explaining the link between accounting information and 
markets’ response. Furthermore, the results demonstrate the link between corporate 
governance and earnings management that tends to assist in explaining their impact of the 
returns-earnings relationship. 
Educators of corporate governance will have a clearer understanding of the role 
corporate governance plays in capital markets. The model will also assist classroom 
discussions on the different aspects of corporate governance and the analysis of case 
studies. For instance, educators could encourage the classroom to evaluate corporate 
governance practiced for different firms and match their results with the level of 
abnormal accruals and the earnings response coefficients, as part of their empirical 
research project. 
5.4.4 Research Implications  
A key issue that deserves attention from researchers is the development of a link 
among share returns, reported earnings, earnings management, and corporate governance. 
Corporate governance and earnings management were used as indictors of the reliability 
of financial information, specifically reported earnings.  
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A small number of studies examined the impact of corporate governance on the 
value relevance of accounting earnings. Unlike these studies, the study investigates the 
impact of corporate governance on the value relevance of earnings under distinctive 
conditions of earnings management. The results clearly demonstrate the potential of 
earnings management in clarifying the role of corporate governance attributes in 
improving the returns-earnings relationship. 
Significant results should help sway the focus of corporate governance literature 
from corporate performance to corporate credibility. The results highlight the importance 
of corporate governance in influencing shareholders’ perception of reported earnings. 
Results from the study also contribute to the literature in the following ways:  
1. This study extends the earnings management literature by examining the 
relationship between corporate governance and the information content of 
accounting earnings only when managers have an incentive to manage earnings. 
Using managers’ incentives to manage earnings is important to the theory in that 
the impact of corporate governance becomes essential only when management’s 
interest deviates from the interest of shareholders.  
2. The results would support the view from the literature that abnormal accruals are 
better measures of earnings management.  
3. The major contribution to the earnings response coefficient research is to show 
that corporate governance and earnings management are important determinants 
of earnings response coefficient.  
4. Classifications adopted by recent regulatory developments (e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley 
act of 2002) are empirical tested in the proposed model (i.e. director 
independence, financial expertise). 
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The similarity of the results with previous research using US data demonstrates the 
generalisability of the findings to international markets. Replication of the research using 
data from other international stock exchanges is likely to provide insight into market 
response to corporate governance and earnings management. It would also be of great 
interest for future research to address the issue of executives’ motive behind adopting 
corporate governance, whether to increase perceived credibility or to satisfy shareholders 
and regulators. 
 
5.5 SUMMARY 
The chapter presented a summary of the research. It discussed the motivations and 
objectives of the research, how those objectives were reached, and the findings of the 
research. The limitations of the research were then presented. The chapter concluded by 
discussing the major contribution of the research and the implications of the research for 
practitioners, regulators, educators and researchers. 
The links described in the study primarily examine the impact of corporate 
governance attributes on the information content of accounting earnings conditioned on 
earnings management. The study proposes and finds that earnings management and 
corporate governance collectively improve the relations between share returns and 
unexpected earnings by providing information to investors that helps define their 
perception of the reliability of earnings. The model is immediately useable by market 
participants in their evaluation of corporate governance and the effectiveness in 
enhancing earnings reliability. The model will also assist regulators in requiring more 
disclosure of corporate governance practices, and will help educators to develop students’ 
understanding of corporate governance attributes.  
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The primary contributions to knowledge of the research are in its extensions of the 
literature on the value relevance of corporate governance. It helps earnings 
informativeness researchers to be mindful of the corporate environment when analysing 
their results, as suggested by Hutchinson and Gul (2004). 
In evaluating the results of this study, several limitations should be noted. Although 
certain empirical indicators of corporate governance were not found to be significant, the 
study managed to determine which attributes and circumstances would enhance the role 
of corporate governance. The difference in the results, from prior studies, is likely to be 
due to the different time periods or due to the use of Australian rather than US data. 
Finally it is worth noting that an implication of the results of this study is that ASX 
should perhaps, after gathering more empirical evidence, consider formally incorporating 
certain corporate governance practices in the listing rules to improve the credibility of 
financial reporting. 
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APPENDIX (A) CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE 
PERFORMANCE 
The results from Table A display the univariate and multivariate impact of 
corporate governance, respectively.  
Table A: Corporate governance and corporate performance. 
Does corporate governance influence corporate performance? 
 Pooled 
(univariate) 
Pooled 
(multivariate) 
Mean 
(univariate) 
Mean 
(multivariate) 
Ownership 
Concentration 
-0.08 
(-0.84) 
-0.04 
(-0.49) 
-0.14 
(-0.90) 
-0.49 
(-2.00)* 
CEO 
dominance 
0.09 
(0.75) 
0.05 
(0.42) 
-0.30 
(-0.89) 
0.19 
(1.34) 
Board Size -0.03 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.03 
(-2.58)*** 
-0.30 
(-2.75)** 
-0.52 
(-3.54)** 
Board 
Independence 
-0.23 
(-1.39) 
-0.18 
(-0.68) 
-0.42 
(-1.94)* 
-0.08 
(-0.30) 
Audit 
Committee 
Independence  
-0.01 
(-0.05) 
0.17 
(1.39) 
0.09 
(0.43) 
-0.08 
(-0.27) 
Audit 
Committee 
Competence 
-0.04 
(-0.22) 
-0.03 
(-0.22) 
-0.03 
(-0.16) 
0.27 
(0.98) 
Independent 
Directors’ 
Ownership 
-0.11 
(-1.31) 
-0.13 
(-1.50) 
-0.22 
(-1.34) 
-0.58 
(-3.30)** 
Managerial 
Ownership 
-0.02 
(-5.50)*** 
-0.03 
(-10.57)*** 
1.56 
(1.22) 
0.18 
(0.60) 
Debt Reliance -0.58 
(-1.72)* 
-0.57 
(-1.80)** 
-1.00 
(-5.13)*** 
-0.80 
(-2.94)** 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Pooled represents the pooled GLS (random effect) regression. 
Mean represents the mean of the four yearly coefficients, and the t-statistic of the mean is obtained by dividing the mean by its 
standard error. Significance level at three degrees of freedom are 4.451 (0.01 level), 2.353 (0.05 level), and 1.638 (0.10 level). 
All t-statistics are calculated using white (1980) heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. 
The results shown are controlled for beta risk. 
 
By analysing the adjusted R-squared (Pooled 2% and Mean 4%), it seems that 
corporate governance has a higher role than simply and directly enhancing share 
performance. Compared to the findings in section 4.3, corporate governance is more 
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related to earnings as an indictor of reliability than being a device to directly increase 
share performance.  
Only three corporate governance variables are negatively associated with share 
returns at significant levels. The pooled coefficients of board size, managerial ownership 
and debt reliance are significant greater than zero, univariately and multivariately. The 
some of the results are supported by prior studies.  
1. Board size  
Zahra and Pearce (1989) and Jensen (1993) argue that large boards are less likely to 
function effectively. Empirical results in Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) 
support the notion that firm performance is enhanced by smaller boards. Yermack 
(1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) report a negative relationship between board size 
and firm value. 
2. Managerial ownership 
Given that the empirical literature finds a positive association between firm value and 
managerial ownership (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Mehran, 
1995), the findings relating to share performance are supportive of the entrenchment 
effect literature rather than the alignment effect literature.  
3. Debt reliance 
The significant negative impact of debt reliance is explained by Hitt and Smart’s 
(1992) findings that high leverage is often a major source of reductions in 
performance. Hence, the results relating to share performance display debt reliance 
not as a monitoring device, but rather as an indicator of financial risk. 
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APPENDIX (B) EXTREME EARNINGS MANAGEMENT vs. NO 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
Focusing on extreme earnings management is conducted by creating a sub-sample. 
Earnings management is incorporated into the models by classifying firms into quartiles 
based on its magnitude of abnormal accruals. Firms in the top quartile are considered to 
have engaged in extreme earnings management. Firms in the bottom quartile are 
considered to have not employed earnings management.  
The approach is expected to empower the strength of hypotheses testings, because it 
removes the confounding effect of the middle two quartiles. However, the results should 
be noted with caution because chances of harmful collinearity are high in this sub-sample 
(condition index is above 30).  
Table B-1: The regression of extreme abnormal accruals on empirical indicators of corporate 
governance 
Does corporate governance influence extreme earnings management? 
 Pooled 
(univariate) 
Pooled 
(multivariate) 
Mean (univariate) Mean 
(multivariate) 
Ownership 
Concentration 
0.18 
(0.62) 
-0.01 
(-0.07) 
0.15 
(1.33) 
-0.39 
(-2.81)** 
CEO dominance 0.04 
(0.82) 
-0.22 
(-1.55) 
0.13 
(0.93) 
-0.07 
(-0.57) 
Board Size -0.05 
(-1.80)* 
-0.04 
(-1.73)* 
-0.14 
(-3.17)** 
-0.08 
(-3.13)** 
Board Independence -0.83 
(-1.24) 
-1.04 
(-1.13) 
-0.74 
(-1.17) 
-0.52 
(-0.67) 
Audit Committee 
Independence  
-0.42 
(-1.55) 
-0.26 
(-3.84)*** 
-0.49 
(-1.44) 
-0.26 
(-2.57)** 
Audit Committee 
Competence 
-0.16 
(-1.34) 
0.07 
(2.81)*** 
0.31 
(-1.24) 
0.26 
(1.04) 
Independent 
Directors’ Ownership 
-0.000 
(-0.80) 
0.08 
(1.02) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
-0.16 
(-0.74) 
Managerial Ownership -0.001 
(-0.71) 
-0.40 
(-1.02) 
0.11 
(2.91)** 
-0.08 
(-0.18) 
Debt Reliance 0.37 
(0.91) 
0.61 
(1.09) 
0.32 
(1.04) 
0.49 
(1.22) 
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Table B-2: The results of regressing earnings response coefficient on extreme abnormal accruals. 
Does extreme earnings management influence the informativeness of earnings? 
 Ejt EAAAjt ∆Ejt ∆EAAAjt 
Pooled 0.93 
(1.11) 
-1.14 
(-3.1)*** 
-0.08 
(-0.12) 
0.21 
(4.64)*** 
Wald 1.16 0.01 
Table B-3: The results of regressing earnings response coefficient on the empirical indicators of 
corporate governance conditioned on the magnitude of extreme abnormal accruals 
Does corporate governance influence earnings informativeness in the presence of extreme earnings 
management? 
 Pooled 
(univariate) 
Pooled 
(multivariate) 
Mean 
(multivariate) 
Wald Stat.  
E 2.50 
(1.51) 
1.19 
(2.25)** 
1.89 
(0.95) 
0.21 Ownership 
Concentration 
∆E -0.60 
(-0.40) 
0.39 
(0.35) 
-1.28 
(-1.86)* 
0.02 
E -5.30 
(-2.59)*** 
-6.58 
(-2.64)*** 
-2.79 
(-2.15)* 
4.91** CEO dominance 
∆E 1.43 
(1.67)* 
1.74 
(1.22) 
3.58 
(1.52) 
0.59 
E 0.23 
(2.78)*** 
0.16 
(2.23)** 
0.07 
(0.91) 
1.45 Board Size 
∆E -0.10 
(-1.38) 
0.02 
(0.30) 
-0.09 
(-0.25) 
0 
E -1.78 
(-1.27) 
-1.45 
(-1.36) 
1.96 
(1.03) 
0.88 Board 
Independence 
∆E -0.33 
(-0.39) 
-0.06 
(-0.11) 
-3.54 
(-3.19)** 
0.06 
E 0.74 
(0.94) 
-3.63 
(-1.82)* 
-2.18 
(-1.76)* 
0.1 Audit 
Committee 
Independence  ∆E 0.62 
(0.65) 
1.67 
(0.68) 
0.97 
(0.25) 
0 
E 1.49 
(2.82)*** 
2.86 
(2.15)** 
1.08 
(0.89) 
0.56 Audit 
Committee 
Competence ∆E -0.80 
(-3.07)*** 
-1.78 
(-3.26)*** 
3.00 
(0.87) 
1.23 
E -0.32 
(-1.92)* 
-1.99 
(-1.57) 
-1.20 
(-0.50) 
0.58 Independent 
Directors’ 
Ownership ∆E -1.34 
(-1.94)** 
-1.07 
(-0.25) 
17.03 
(0.51) 
1.5 
E 0.43 
(1.05) 
7.71 
(4.62)*** 
6.58 
(1.34) 
0.01 Managerial 
Ownership 
∆E 1.77 
(0.92) 
-2.99 
(-4.33)*** 
-4.19 
(0.81) 
0.43 
E 0.23 
(0.16) 
0.24 
(0.31) 
-0.29 
(-0.06) 
0.002 Debt Reliance 
∆E -0.52 
(-0.37) 
-1.79 
(-0.86) 
-5.26 
(-0.88) 
0.14 
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APPENDIX (C) EXCLUDED ATTRIBUTES 
The model excludes some corporate governance attributes that may reflect earnings 
reliability. These attributes are excluded due to poor definition or lack of consistent 
empirical evidence on their effects. They are: 
1. Board Dynamics (or Activities) 
The model includes no attributes relating to board dynamics or activities of board 
committees. After reviewing the literature, Johnson et al. (1996) and Zahra and 
Pearce (1989) argue that evidence, from the literature, relating to the impact of board 
activities is sporadic and inconclusive. For example, Forbes and Milliken (1999) 
demonstrate the complexity of board dynamics by showing how a single aspect of 
board demography can have multiple and contrasting effects on different mediating 
constructs. Thus, even if these attributes may reflect earnings reliability, poor 
definition, attribute complexity, and lack of empirical evidence prevent their 
inclusion.  
2. Disclosure Quality of Corporate Governance 
Disclosure quality of corporate governance practices is not included. The exclusion is 
related to the fact the disclosure for corporate governance does not necessarily vary 
across firms, because the ASX listing rules require a standard level of corporate 
governance disclosure (Asian Business Review, 1996). Thus, it is not possible to 
measure a non-varying attribute. 
3. Shareholders’ Activism 
The model excludes shareholder activism due to three reasons. First, shareholder 
activism is measured, in the literature, by focusing largely on shareholder proposals 
or resolutions (e.g. Smith, 1996). Such measures cannot be effective, because most 
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proposals can be ignored by management. Second, there is lack of empirical evidence 
signifying the impact of shareholder activism. For instance, Karpoff (1998) and 
Romano (2001) surveyed the existing evidence on shareholder activism and found no 
evidence relating shareholder activism to firm value. Third, the potential impact of 
shareholder activism is captured by ownership concentration (included in the model), 
because Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that the presence of large outside 
shareholders increases the likelihood that firms are a target for shareholder activism. 
Hence, including shareholders’ activism may create nesting problems.  
4. Tenure of Outside Directors 
Tenure of outside directors is not included due to he lack of empirical evidence 
supporting its inclusion. In addition, outside directors’ independence and financial 
expertise are more relevant to addressing the research question than directors’ tenure.  
5. Compensation Plans 
Compensation plans are not included in the model to avoid nesting problems. This is 
because setting compensation plans for executive management is part of the board’s 
duties. Thus, compensation plans are directly influenced by attributes relating to the 
board. 
6. External Auditor 
Independence of external auditors is not included in the model or controlled for. First, 
the traditional audit quality measure, which is based on big-five versus non-big five, 
is no longer a helpful measure in the wake of the Enron bankruptcy and the troubled 
Arthur Andersen. Second, the limited number of top 500 companies using the 
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services of non-big five auditing firms prevents from establishing a valid statistical 
relationship.82 
 
                                                 
82 In 1999, less than 20% of the top 500 companies were audited by non-big five auditing firms. 
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APPENDIX (D) THE DEVELOPMENT OF EQUATIONS FIVE AND 
SIX 
The original returns-earnings regression by Easton and Harris (1991) is:  
 
ARj = β0 + β1 Ej + β2 ∆Ej + υj 
 
If β1 and β2 are functions of corporate governance attributes, then 
 
β1 = ϕ0 + ϕ1 D1OWNCONjt + ϕ2 CEOjt + ϕ3 D2 BRDSZEjt + ϕ4 D3 BRDINDjt + ϕ5 
AUDINDjt + ϕ6 D4 AUDCMPjtj + ϕ7 D5 OWNOUTjt + ϕ8 D6 OWNMANjt + ϕ9 
D7DEBTRLjt  
 
β2 = λ0 + λ1 D1OWNCONjt + λ2 CEOjt + λ3 D2 BRDSZEjt + λ4 D3 BRDINDjt + λ5 
AUDINDjt + λ6 D4 AUDCMPjt + λ7 D5 OWNOUTjt + λ8 D6 OWNMANjt + λ9 
D7DEBTRLjt  
  
By replacing β1 and β2 in the first equation with the above values, the equation becomes: 
 
ARj = β0 + (ϕ0 + ϕ1 D1OWNCONjt + ϕ2 CEOjt + ϕ3 D2 BRDSZEjt + ϕ4 D3 BRDINDjt + 
ϕ5 AUDINDjt + ϕ6 D4 AUDCMPjtj + ϕ7 D5 OWNOUTjt + ϕ8 D6 OWNMANjt + ϕ9 
D7DEBTRLjt) Ej + (λ0 + λ1 D1OWNCONjt + λ2 CEOjt + λ3 D2 BRDSZEjt + λ4 D3 
BRDINDjt + λ5 AUDINDjt + λ6 D4 AUDCMPjt + λ7 D5 OWNOUTjt + λ8 D6 OWNMANjt 
+ λ9 D7DEBTRLjt) ∆Ej + υj 
 
By multiplying earnings and change in earnings with every coefficient, the result 
becomes:  
 
(Equation Five) 
ARj = β0 + ϕ0 Ejt + ϕ1 Ejt D1OWNCONjt + ϕ2 Ejt CEOjt + ϕ3 Ejt D2 BRDSZEjt + ϕ4 Ejt D3 
BRDINDjt + ϕ5 Ejt AUDINDjt + ϕ6 Ejt D4 AUDCMPjtj + ϕ7 Ejt D5 OWNOUTjt + ϕ8 Ejt D6 
OWNMANjt + ϕ9 Ejt D7DEBTRLjt + λ0 ∆Ejt + λ1 ∆Ejt D1OWNCONjt + λ2 ∆Ejt CEOjt + λ3 
∆Ejt D2 BRDSZEjt + λ4 ∆Ejt D3 BRDINDjt + λ5 ∆Ejt AUDINDjt + λ6 ∆Ejt D4 AUDCMPjt + 
λ7 ∆Ejt D5 OWNOUTjt + λ8 ∆Ejt D6 OWNMANjt + λ9 ∆Ejt D7DEBTRLjt + εj 
 
However, if β1 and β2 are functions of corporate governance attributes conditioned on 
earnings management, then 
 
β1 = ϕ0 + ϕ1 D0D1OWNCONjt + ϕ2 D0CEOjt + ϕ3 D0D2 BRDSZEjt + ϕ4 D0D3 BRDINDjt 
+ ϕ5 D0AUDINDjt + ϕ6 D0D4 AUDCMPjtj + ϕ7 D0D5 OWNOUTjt + ϕ8 D0D6 OWNMANjt 
+ ϕ9 D0D7DEBTRLjt  
 
β2 = λ0 + λ1 D0D1OWNCONjt + λ2 D0CEOjt + λ3 D0D2 BRDSZEjt + λ4 D0D3 BRDINDjt + 
λ5 D0AUDINDjt + λ6 D0D4 AUDCMPjt + λ7 D0D5 OWNOUTjt + λ8 D0D6 OWNMANjt + 
λ9 D0D7DEBTRLjt  
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By replacing β1 and β2 in the first equation with the above values, the equation becomes: 
 
ARj = β0 + (ϕ0 + ϕ1 D0D1OWNCONjt + ϕ2 D0CEOjt + ϕ3 D0D2 BRDSZEjt + ϕ4 D0D3 
BRDINDjt + ϕ5 D0AUDINDjt + ϕ6 D0D4 AUDCMPjtj + ϕ7 D0D5 OWNOUTjt + ϕ8 D0D6 
OWNMANjt + ϕ9 D0D7DEBTRLjt) Ej + (λ0 + λ1 D0D1OWNCONjt + λ2 D0CEOjt + λ3 
D0D2 BRDSZEjt + λ4 D0D3 BRDINDjt + λ5 D0AUDINDjt + λ6 D0D4 AUDCMPjt + λ7 
D0D5 OWNOUTjt + λ8 D0D6 OWNMANjt + λ9 D0D7DEBTRLjt) ∆Ej + υj 
 
By multiplying earnings and change in earnings with every coefficient, the result 
becomes:  
 
(Equation Six) 
ARj = β0 + ϕ0 Ejt + ϕ1 Ejt D0D1OWNCONjt + ϕ2 Ejt D0 CEOjt + ϕ3 Ejt D0D2 BRDSZEjt + 
ϕ4 Ejt D0D3 BRDINDjt + ϕ5 Ejt D0 AUDINDjt + ϕ6 Ejt D0D4 AUDCMPjtj + ϕ7 Ejt D0D5 
OWNOUTjt + ϕ8 Ejt D0D6 OWNMANjt + ϕ9 Ejt D0D7DEBTRLjt + λ0 ∆Ejt + λ1 ∆Ejt 
D0D1OWNCONjt + λ2 ∆Ejt D0 CEOjt + λ3 ∆Ejt D0D2 BRDSZEjt + λ4 ∆Ejt D0D3 BRDINDjt 
+ λ5 ∆Ejt D0 AUDINDjt + λ6 ∆Ejt D0D4 AUDCMPjt + λ7 ∆Ejt D0D5 OWNOUTjt + λ8 ∆Ejt 
D0D6 OWNMANjt + λ9 ∆Ejt D0D7 DEBTRLjt + εj 
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APPENDIX (E) EXCLUDING GROWTH 
Growth is excluded from the model due to three major reasons. First, most studies 
measure growth as market value to book value of equity. This measure is biased when 
including newly listed firms to test a model that employs share returns. While the first 
year growth measure for a newly listed firm is (1+r), share returns equals r. Thus, the 
inclusion of growth as control variable is likely to create bias in the results.  
Second, if firm growth is captured by earnings growth, then growth is already 
captured by the variable representing change in earnings per share. Third, Cheng et al. 
(1999) present an assumption derived from the development of the standard share price 
growth model. They imply that firm growth is incorporated in the constant variable of the 
returns-earnings regression when the tests are cross-sectional. The rationalisation of their 
assumption can be expressed and developed as follows: 
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In a regression form this becomes: 
R = β0 + β1 Ejt + β2 ∆Ejt + υjt 
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In other research, the presence of an intercept is not implied by the theoretical relations 
(e.g. Ali and Zarowin, 1992; Easton and Harris, 1991). However, the developed standard 
share price growth (Cheng et al., 1999) model expects a positive intercept term 
approximating the overall growth for financial period in a cross-sectional returns-
earnings model.  
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APPENDIX (F) TOTAL ACCRUALS REGRESSIONS 
The following table presents the results of the regression used to estimate total accruals 
for Miscellaneous Industry as categorised by the ASX. 
Table E: Estimation of the parameters of total accruals model for the Miscellaneous industry. 
 Adjusted R2 
(F-Stat.) 
γ0 γ1 γ 2 N 
Pooled 0.58 
(90.96)*** 
-3911.84 
(-1.86)* 
-0.17 
(-6.15)*** 
-1.27 
(-6.07)*** 
197 
1997 0.09 
(2.43)* 
-2126.15 
(-2.375)** 
0.05 
(0.68) 
-0.03 
(0.60) 
43 
1998 0.60 
(23.97)*** 
4420.70 
(0.53) 
-0.17 
(-1.61) 
-1.34 
(-6.80)*** 
46 
1999 0.20 
(5.28)*** 
2519.86 
(3.70)*** 
0.01 
(0.46) 
-0.09 
(-2.04)** 
53 
2000 -0.02 
(0.61) 
606.48 
(1.24) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(-0.82) 
55 
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APPENDIX (G) MEAN RESPONSE COEFFICIENTS 
The following table presents the results of the mean coefficients used to test the 
hypotheses. 
Returns-Earnings Model 
Table F-1: The mean earnings response coefficients of earnings level and change in earnings 
ARj = α 0 + α 1 Ejt + α 2 ∆Ejt + ζj 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
Mean 
Constant -0.06 
(-1.76)* 
Ejt 0.75 
(1.51) 
∆Ejt 0.20 
(0.40) 
R2 0.11 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Mean represents the mean of the four yearly coefficients, and the t-statistic of the mean is obtained by dividing the mean by its 
standard error. Significance level at three degrees of freedom are 4.451 (0.01 level), 2.353 (0.05 level), and 1.638 (0.10 level). 
All t-statistics are calculated using white (1980) heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. 
The results shown are controlled for beta risk (an earnings response coefficient determinant). 
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Hypothesis One 
Table F-2: The mean coefficient of regressing the absolute value of abnormal accruals on empirical 
indicators of corporate governance 
Does corporate governance influence earnings management? 
AAAj = γ 0 + γ1 OWNCONjt + γ 2 CEOjt + γ 3 BRDSZEjt + γ 4 BRDINDjt + γ 5 AUDINDjt + γ 6 AUDCMPjtj 
+ γ 7 OWNOUTjt + γ 8 OWNMANjt + γ 9 DEBTRLjt + υj 
Hypotheses Corporate 
Governance 
Mean (univariate) Mean 
(multivariate) 
Findings 
H1A0 Ownership 
Concentration 
0.12 
(0.61) 
0.03 
(0.24) 
Do not reject 
H1B0 CEO dominance -0.07 
(-0.87) 
-0.13 
(-1.39) 
Do not reject 
H1C0 Board Size -0.02 
(-1.8)* 
-0.27 
(-1.79)* 
Reject 
H1D0 Board 
Independence 
-0.37 
(-1.17) 
-0.46 
(-1.05) 
Do not reject 
H1E0 Audit Committee 
Independence  
-0.21 
(-1.44) 
-0.08 
(-2.46)** 
Reject 
H1F0 Audit Committee 
Competence 
-0.08 
(-1.24) 
0.01 
(0.72) 
Do not reject 
H1G0 Independent 
Directors’ 
Ownership 
-0.003 
(-0.03) 
0.04 
(1.46) 
Do not reject 
H1H0 Managerial 
Ownership 
-0.02 
(-0.80) 
-0.12 
(0.61) 
Do not reject 
H1I0 Debt Reliance 0.43 
(1.10) 
0.55 
(1.13) 
Do not reject 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Mean represents the mean of the four yearly coefficients, and the t-statistic of the mean is obtained by dividing the mean by its 
standard error. Significance level at three degrees of freedom are 4.451 (0.01 level), 2.353 (0.05 level), and 1.638 (0.10 level). 
All t-statistics are calculated using white (1980) heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. 
The results shown are controlled for beta risk (an earnings response coefficient determinant). 
 
Hypothesis Two 
Table F-3: The mean coefficients of regressing earnings response coefficients on the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals 
Does earnings management influence the informativeness of earnings? 
ARj = β 0 + α 0 Ejt + + α 1 EAAAjt + ψ0 ∆Ejt + ψ1 ∆EAAAjt + ζj 
Hypothesis Test Ejt EAAAjt ∆Ejt ∆EAAAjt Findings 
Mean 0.91 
(1.97)* 
-2.34 
(-0.61) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
6.35 
(0.90) 
H20 
Wald  0.819 0.004 
Do not reject 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Mean represents the mean of the four yearly coefficients, and the t-statistic of the mean is obtained by dividing the mean by its 
standard error. Significance level at three degrees of freedom are 4.451 (0.01 level), 2.353 (0.05 level), and 1.638 (0.10 level). 
All t-statistics are calculated using white (1980) heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. 
The results shown are controlled for beta risk (an earnings response coefficient determinant). 
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Hypothesis Three 
Table F-4: The mean coefficients of regressing earnings response coefficients on the empirical 
indicators of corporate governance. 
Does corporate governance influence earnings informativeness? 
Hypotheses Corporate 
Governance 
Earnings 
Type 
Mean 
(univariate) 
Mean 
(multivariate) 
Wald 
Stat. 
Findings 
E 1.95 
(1.35) 
0.23 
(0.21) 
0.9 H3A0 Ownership 
Concentration 
∆E -1.40 
(-0.79) 
0.48 
(0.31) 
0.02 
Do not 
reject 
E -2.90 
(-2.19)* 
-3.21 
(-2.40)** 
5.62** H3B0 CEO dominance 
∆E 1.35 
(10.78)*** 
3.68 
(2.55)** 
1.75 
Reject# 
E -0.22 
(-1.14) 
0.21 
(1.13) 
0.003 H3C0 Board Size 
∆E -0.03 
(-0.14) 
0.07 
(0.39) 
0.0002 
Do not 
reject 
E 1.70 
(2.75)** 
1.97 
(1.90)* 
0.01 H3D0 Board Independence 
∆E -0.85 
(-2.05)* 
-1.37 
(-1.98)* 
0.21 
Do not 
reject 
E 1.44 
(2.23)* 
-2.92 
(-2.25)* 
0.02 H3E0 Audit Committee 
Independence  
∆E -1.01 
(-0.80) 
2.85 
(0.70) 
0.01 
Do not 
reject 
E 1.55 
(5.35)*** 
2.13 
(4.37)** 
2.45 H3F0 Audit Committee 
Competence 
∆E -0.74 
(-0.59) 
-2.12 
(-1.71) 
0.47 
Do not 
reject 
E 1.21 
(1.86)* 
-2.10 
(-1.21) 
1.8 H3G0 Independent 
Directors’ 
Ownership ∆E -2.96 
(-3.61)** 
-1.44 
(-0.36) 
6.51** 
Do not 
reject 
E 1.92 
(1.04) 
4.25 
(1.47) 
0.02 H3H0 Managerial 
Ownership 
∆E -0.96 
(-0.34) 
-3.60 
(-0.88) 
0.21 
Do not 
reject 
E -0.91 
(-0.27) 
-0.67 
(-0.22) 
0.004 H3I0 Debt Reliance 
∆E -2.57 
(-1.16) 
-2.25 
(-0.68) 
2.25 
Do not 
reject 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Mean represents the mean of the four yearly coefficients, and the t-statistic of the mean is obtained by dividing the mean by its 
standard error. Significance level at three degrees of freedom are 4.451 (0.01 level), 2.353 (0.05 level), and 1.638 (0.10 level). 
All t-statistics are calculated using white (1980) heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. 
The results shown are controlled for beta risk (an earnings response coefficient determinant). 
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Hypothesis Four 
Table F-5: The mean coefficients of regressing earnings response coefficient on the empirical 
indicators of corporate governance conditioned on the empirical indicator of earnings management 
Does corporate governance influence earnings informativeness in the presence of earnings 
management? 
Hypothesis Corporate 
Governance 
Earnings 
Type 
Pooled 
(univariate)
Pooled 
(multivariate) 
Wald 
Stat.  
Findings 
E 1.70 
(2.28)* 
-0.33 
(-0.34) 
3.85** H4A0 Ownership 
Concentration 
∆E -0.69 
(-0.69) 
-0.06 
(-0.03) 
0.22 
Reject# 
E -1.81 
(-0.86) 
-1.95 
(-0.59) 
3.4* H4B0 CEO 
dominance 
∆E 0.09 
(0.06) 
0.43 
(0.13) 
2.38 
Reject# 
E 0.16 
(0.98) 
-0.02 
(-0.12) 
0.00 H4C0 Board Size 
∆E 0.18 
(1.41) 
0.45 
(1.16) 
0.00 
Do not 
reject 
E 1.07 
(0.42) 
2.09 
(1.24) 
0.03 H4D0 Board 
Independence 
∆E 0.35 
(0.42) 
-0.96 
(-0.42) 
0.05 
Do not 
reject 
E 0.74 
(0.50) 
-1.8 
(-0.72) 
0.54 H4E0 Audit 
Committee 
Independence  ∆E 1.65 
(0.93) 
3.96 
(-0.42) 
0.01 
Do not 
reject 
E 2.76 
(4.91)*** 
3.63 
(2.48)** 
14.33*** H4F0 Audit 
Committee 
Competence ∆E -4.05 
(-1.49) 
-8.2 
(-2.38)** 
3.42* 
Reject# 
E 1.01 
(0.52) 
-3.75 
(-1.03) 
0.51 H4G0 Independent 
Directors’ 
Ownership ∆E -1.89 
(-0.46) 
-7.92 
(-1.13) 
10.37*** 
Do not 
reject 
E 0.66 
(0.51) 
6.38 
(1.33) 
0.00 H4H0 Managerial 
Ownership 
∆E 0.23 
(0.07) 
-0.74 
(-0.12) 
1.3 
Do not 
reject 
E -4.32 
(-1.32) 
-3.50 
(-0.85) 
0.18 H4I0 Debt Reliance 
∆E 4.23 
(0.96) 
5.40 
(0.96) 
4.33** 
Do not 
reject 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Mean represents the mean of the four yearly coefficients, and the t-statistic of the mean is obtained by dividing the mean by its 
standard error. Significance level at three degrees of freedom are 4.451 (0.01 level), 2.353 (0.05 level), and 1.638 (0.10 level). 
All t-statistics are calculated using white (1980) heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. 
The results shown are controlled for beta risk (an earnings response coefficient determinant). 
